I agree that the constitution is a limited grant of power, and that none of its general phrases are to be construed into an extension of that grant. I am free to declare, that if the intent of this bill is to get rid of the judges, it is a perversion of your power to a base purpose; it is an unconstitutional act. If, on the contrary, it aims not at the displacing of one set of men, from whom you differ in political opinion, with a view to introduce others, but at the general good by abolishing useless offices, it is a constitutional act. The quo animo determines the nature of this act, as it determines the innocence or guilt of other acts. But we are told that this is to declare the Judiciary, which the constitution has attempted to fortify against the other branches of Government, dependent on the will of the Legislature, whose discretion alone is to limit their encroachments. Whilst I contend that the Legislature possess this discretion, I am sensible of the delicacy with which it is to be used. It is like the power of impeachment, or of declaring war, to be exercised under high responsibility. But the power is denied since its exercise will enable flagitious men to overturn the Judiciary, in order to put their creatures into office, and to wreak their vengeance on those who have become obnoxious by their merit. Yet the gentleman expressly says, that arguments drawn from a supposition of extreme political depravity, prove nothing; that every Government pre-supposes a certain degree of honesty in its rulers, and that to argue from extreme cases is totally inadmissible. Yet the whole of this argument is founded on the supposition of a total want of principle in the Legislature and Executive. In other words, arguments drawn from the hypothesis are irresistible when urged in favor of that gentleman's opinion; when they militate against him, they are totally inapplicable. It is said that the bill on your table cannot constitutionally be passed, because unprincipled men will pervert the power to the basest of purposes; that, hereafter, we may expect a revolution on the bench of justice, on every change of party, and the politics of the litigants, not the merits of the case, are to govern its decisions. The Judiciary is declared to be the guardian of the constitution against infraction, and the protection of the citizen, as well against Legislative as Executive oppression. Hence the necessity of an equal independence of both. For it is declared to be an absurdity, that we should possess the power of controlling a department of Government which has the right of checking us; since thereby that check may be either impaired or annihilated. This is a new doctrine of check and balance, according to which the constitution has unwisely given to an infant Legislature the power of impeaching their guardians, the judges. Apply this theory to the reciprocal control of the two branches of the Legislature over each other and the Executive, and of the Executive over them. But, sir, this law cannot be passed, because the character of the bench is to be given to it by the Legislature, to the entire prostration of its independence and impartiality. It will be conceded, that measures, such as have been portrayed, will never be taken, unless the sentiment of the ruling party is ready to support them. Although gentlemen contend, that the office of judge cannot be abolished, they are not hardy enough to deny that it may be created. Where then, sir, is the check, supposing such a state of things as the gentleman has imagined, (and which he has also declared cannot be conceived,) which shall prevent unprincipled men from effecting the same object by increasing the number of judges, so as to overrule, by their creatures, the decisions of the courts? Would not public opinion be as ready to sanction the one as the other of these detestable acts? Would not the same evil which has excited such apprehension in the minds of gentlemen, be thus effected by means even more injurious than those which they have specified? Without any breach of the constitution an unprincipled faction may effect the end which is so much apprehended from the measure now contemplated to be adopted. I might add, that, when the public sentiment becomes thus corrupt, the ties of any constitution will be found too feeble to control the vengeful ambition of a triumphant faction. The rejection of this bill does not secure the point which has furnished matter for so much declamation. Its friends are represented as grasping at power not devolved upon them by the constitution, which hereafter is to be made the instrument of destroying every judicial office, for the purpose of reviving them and filling the places with their partisans.
I have long been in the habit of attending to the arguments of the gentleman from Delaware, and I have generally found, in their converse, a ready touchstone, the test of which they are rarely calculated to withstand. If you are precluded from passing this law, lest depraved men make it a precedent to destroy the independence of your Judiciary, do you not concede that a desperate faction, finding themselves about to be dismissed from the confidence of their country, may pervert the power of erecting courts, to provide to an extent for their adherents and themselves? and that however flagrant that abuse of power, it is remediless, and must be submitted to? Will not the history of all Governments warrant the assertion, that the creation of new and unnecessary offices, as a provision for political partisans, is an evil more to be dreaded than the abolition of useless ones? Is not an abuse of power more to be dreaded from those who have lost the public confidence than from those whose interest it will be to cultivate and retain it? And does not the doctrine of our opponents prove that, at every change of administration, the number of your judges are probably to be doubled? Does it not involve the absurdity that, in spite of all constitutional prohibitions, Congress may exercise the power of creating an indefinite number of placemen, who are to be maintained through life at the expense of the community? But, when these cases are cited, you are gravely told that they suppose a degree of political depravity which puts an end to all argument. Here, sir, permit me to state an important difference of opinion between the two sides of this House. We are accused of an ambitious usurpation of power; of a design to destroy a great department of Government, because it thwarts our views, and of a lawless thirst of self-aggrandizement which no consideration can restrain. Let us not be amused by words. Let us attend to facts. They will show who are contending for unlimited, and who for limited power. The opponents of this bill contend that they did possess the power of creating offices to an indefinite amount; which, when created, were beyond the control of the succeeding Legislature. They, of course, contend for the existence of such a power in the present Legislature, for whose exercise there is no security but their self-respect. In other words, that if the present majority should incur the suspicion of the people, they may, as soon as there is any indication of their having forfeited the public confidence, on the signal of their dismissal from their present station, make ample and irrepealable provision for themselves and their adherents, by the creation of an adequate number of judicial offices. Now, sir, this is a power which we reject, though it is insisted that we possess it. We deny that such an authority does exist in us. We assert that we are not clothed with the tremendous power of erecting, in defiance of the whole spirit and express letter of the constitution, a vast judicial aristocracy over the heads of our fellow-citizens, on whose labor it is to prey. Who, then, are, in reality, the advocates of a limited authority, and who are the champions of a dangerous and uncontrollable power? In my estimation, the wisest prayer that ever was composed is that which deprecates the being led into temptation. I have no wish to be exposed myself, nor to see my friends exposed, to the dangerous allurements which the adverse doctrine holds out. Do gentlemen themselves think that the persons, whom I see around me, ought to be trusted with such powers? Figure to yourselves a set of men, whose incapacity or want of principle has brought on them the odium of their country, receiving, in the month of December, the solemn warning, that on the 4th of March following, they are to be dismissed from the helm of Government; establish the doctrine now contended for, and what may we not expect? Yes, sir, the doctrine advanced by our opponents is that of usurpation and ambition. It denies the existence of one power by establishing another infinitely more dangerous; and this you are told is to protect, through the organ of an independent judiciary, the vanquished party from the persecution of their antagonists, although it has been shown that, by increasing the number of judges, any tone whatever may be given to the bench.
The theory for which gentlemen contend seems to me far-fetched and overstrained. A mighty enginery is set in motion, which to all good purposes is ineffectual, although formidable in the perpetration of mischief. If, however, the people should be of a different opinion, I trust that at the next election they will apply the constitutional corrective. That is the true check; every other check is at variance with the principle, that a free people are capable of self-government.
But, sir, if you pass the law, the judges are to put their veto upon it by declaring it unconstitutional. Here is a new power, of a dangerous and uncontrollable nature, contended for. The decision of a constitutional question must rest somewhere. Shall it be confided to men immediately responsible to the people, or to those who are irresponsible? for the responsibility by impeachment is little less than a name. From whom is a corrupt decision most to be feared? To me it appears that the power which has the right of passing, without appeal, on the validity of your laws, is your sovereign. But an extreme case is put; a bill of attainder is passed; are the judges to support the constitution or the law? Shall they obey God or Mammon? Yet you cannot argue from such cases. But, sir, are we not as deeply interested in the true exposition of the constitution, as the judges can be? With all the deference to their talents, is not Congress as capable of forming a correct opinion as they are? Are not its members acting under a responsibility to public opinion, which can and will check their aberrations from duty? Let a case, not an imaginary one, be stated: Congress violates the constitution by fettering the press; the judicial corrective is applied to; far from protecting the liberty of the citizen, or the letter of the constitution, you find them outdoing the Legislature in zeal; pressing the common law of England to their service where the sedition law did not apply. Suppose your reliance had been altogether on this broken staff, and not on the elective principle? Your press might have been enchained till doomsday, your citizens incarcerated for life, and where is your remedy? But if the construction of the constitution is left with us, there are no longer limits to our power, and this would be true if an appeal did not lie through the elections, from us to the nation, to whom alone, and not a few privileged individuals, it belongs to decide, in the last resort, on the constitution. Gentlemen tell us that our doctrine will carry the people to the gallows if they suffer themselves to be misled into the belief that the judges are not the expositors of the constitution. Their practice has carried the people to infamous punishment, to fine and imprisonment; and had they affixed the penalty of death to their unconstitutional laws, judges would not have been wanting to conduct them to the gibbet.
Mr. Macon.—As no other member at present seems disposed to take the floor, I will ask the attention of the committee for a few minutes. I have attended with the greatest patience and diligence, to the arguments of gentlemen who oppose the bill as unconstitutional; and had they produced a single doubt in my mind on the point of constitutionality, I should most certainly have voted with them against the bill on your table; but I can with truth say, I have not heard any argument which has in the least changed my first conviction, that we have a constitutional right to pass it.
I should not, I believe, have spoken on this question, had not my colleagues, who differ with me in opinion, thought proper to bring into view a vote of the Legislature of the State, instructing her Senators and recommending it to the Representatives to use their best endeavors to obtain a repeal of the last Judiciary act. On this resolution of the State Legislature, they made some extraordinary remarks, which I mean to notice; but first permit me to inform the committee, that it has been the constant practice of the Legislature of that State, from the commencement of the General Government to the present day, to instruct her Senators, and to recommend to her Representatives, to pursue such measures on all the great national questions that have occurred, as the Legislature judged the interest of the State required, and this proceeding has never been considered improper. I shall endeavor to answer the gentlemen in the order they spoke, beginning with my colleague (Mr. Henderson,) who was first on the floor. If I understand him rightly, (and if I do not he will correct me, because it is not my desire to misstate a single word,) he said that the Legislature of the State might have adopted the resolutions in consequence of the Message of the President; but, upon examination of the dates, this will be found to be impossible. The message could not have reached the Legislature before the question on the resolutions was taken and decided; and on no important question was that body ever more unanimous; and though my colleague has said the question was there viewed but on one side, and decided in a manner ex parte, yet I will be bold to say, if there were any members in that Legislature who thought on this subject as he does, he enjoyed the same right there that my colleague does here, to deliver his sentiments.
Knowing as I do the great talents and integrity of my colleague, and I believe no one on this floor knows them better, I was surprised when he charged others with being under the influence of passion, when his conduct must convince them that he was guided by the very passion which he attributed to others. He quoted the Constitution of North Carolina, let us examine it, and see whether his argument can be aided by the practice under that instrument. The thirteenth article is in the following words: that "the General Assembly shall, by joint ballot of both Houses, appoint judges of the supreme court of law and of equity, judges of admiralty, and attorney general, who shall be commissioned by the Governor, and hold their offices during good behavior." On this clause he noted the independence of the State Judiciary; and they are independent so long as the law creating their office is in force, and no longer; and it is worthy of notice, that in this section, no mention is made of salary, and yet the judges have been considered as independent as the Judges of the United States. Soon after the adoption of the constitution, the Legislature of the States established courts in conformity thereto; first county courts, and then superior, and afterwards, by a Legislative act, without electing a single new judge, gave the superior courts the additional jurisdiction of a court of equity, and never a solitary complaint, that this law was unconstitutional; and it must be acknowledged, that if you can make a court of law also a court of equity, by a Legislative act, you can by the same power take it away; and what becomes, in this case, of the commission which is to be held during good behavior? It is, according to my construction, to last no longer than the law which created the office remains in force, and this is long enough to make the judges independent. As to the salary of the Judges of North Carolina, the twenty-first section of the constitution says, "they shall have adequate salaries during their continuance in office," and yet with this clear right in the Legislature, to lessen as well as to add to their salaries, the judges, it is agreed, are independent. My colleague well knows, that many attempts have been made to deprive the superior courts of exercising any jurisdiction in cases of equity; and he also knows, that attempts have been made to establish a court of appeals, which should revise the decisions of the superior courts now in being; and by the constitution of the State, any supreme court may, on presentment of a grand jury, try the governor for maladministration, &c., and I believe the present courts are authorized to do this. I have not at this place been able to see the act which gives this authority; but no doubt is entertained of the fact.
It is clear, then, that in North Carolina, all parties have thought, that "during good behavior," only meant so long as the office existed; because, by establishing a court of appeals, the judges now in being would not be supreme judges, and in all these various attempts, no one ever charged either of them to be unconstitutional. On examination of the Constitution of North Carolina, it will be found that it makes provision for the appointment of other officers by the Legislature, but says nothing about adequate compensation, except in the section last read, and if you take the office away, what is an adequate compensation for doing nothing? Another proof might be drawn from the Constitution of North Carolina, in favor of the opinion I hold, which is taken from the twenty-ninth section, that "no Judge of a Supreme Court shall have a seat in the General Assembly," and my colleague knows, that the present judges could not hold a seat there, because they are supreme judges. And he also knows, that no one ever doubted the constitutional right of the Legislature to establish the courts before mentioned; and it seems to me this, on his construction, would be a violation of the constitution, because, having once made a Supreme Court, it must always remain so, to secure, what he calls, the independence of the judges.
Sir, I was astonished when my colleague said, that the judges should hold their offices, whether useful or not, and that their independence was necessary, as he emphatically said, to protect the people against their worst enemies, themselves; their usefulness is the only true test of their necessity, and if there is no use for them, they ought not to be continued. I will here ask my colleague whether, since the year 1783, he has heard of any disorder in the State we represent, or whether any act has been done there which can warrant or justify such an opinion, that "it is necessary to have judges to protect the people from their worst enemies, themselves." I had thought we, the people, formed this Government, and might be trusted with it. My colleague never could have uttered this sentence, had he not been governed by that passion which he supposes governs others. It is true that we are not a rich and wealthy State, but it is equally true, that there is no State in the Union more attached to order and law; and my colleague himself would not say that it was necessary to have judges for this purpose in the country we represent; the people there behave decently without having Federal judges, or standing armies, to protect them against themselves. Is it not strange, that the people should have sense enough to pay their taxes without being driven to it by superior force, and not have sense enough to take care of themselves without this new Judiciary? They certainly contrived to do this before the act establishing this Judiciary passed.
Another expression of his equally astonished me; he said, that on the 7th day of December, a spirit which had spread discord and destruction in other countries, made its entry into this House. What! are we to be told, because at the last election the people thought proper to change some of their representatives, and to put out some of those who had heretofore been in power, and to put others in power of different opinions, that a destroying spirit entered into all the public functionaries? For what, sir, are elections held, if it be not that the people should change their representatives when they do not like them? And are we to be told from the house-tops, that the only use of elections is to promote, not public good, but public mischief? We are also told, that this constitution was to be destroyed by the all-devouring energies of its enemies. Who are its enemies? We are not, nor do I think there are any in this House; but there are parties as well in this House as out of doors, and no man wishes more sincerely than I do, that they were amalgamated, that we might get rid of all party gall, and free ourselves from improper reflections hereafter. But by what energy is the constitution to be destroyed? The only energy heretofore used, and which made the change so much complained of, was the energy of election. Sir, I scarcely know what to say when I hear such uncommon sentiments uttered from a head so correct and a heart so pure; it is the effect of a passion of which he is unconscious. Again he says, if you repeal this law, the rich will oppress the poor. Nothing but too much law can any where put it in the power of the rich to oppress the poor. Suppose you had no law at all, could the rich oppress the poor? Could they get six, eight or ten per cent. for money from the poor without law? If you destroy all law and government, can the few oppress the many, or will the many oppress the few? But the passing the bill will neither put it in the power of the rich to oppress the poor, nor the poor to oppress the rich. There will then be law enough in the country to prevent the one from oppressing the other. But while the elective principle remains free, no great danger of lasting oppression can be really apprehended; as long as this continues, the people will know who to trust.