He also told us, that we attempt to do indirectly what we cannot do directly. I do not know of any such attempt. The bill is certainly a direct attempt to repeal the act of the last session; but I have seen things done indirectly which I believe could not have been done directly; such was the army of volunteers; it surely was an indirect attempt to officer and get possession of the militia. The same gentleman challenges us to say there are any in the United States who prefer monarchy. In answer to this, I say, there were such during the American revolutionary war, and I have not heard that they had changed their opinion; but as he has told us there were jacobins in the country, it is not unfair to suppose there are monarchists; they being the two extremes. We are also charged with a design to destroy the whole Judiciary. If there is such a design, this is the first time I ever heard it; no attempt of the kind is yet made. But what is the fact? We only propose to repeal the act of the last session, and restore the Judiciary exactly to what it was for twelve years, and this is called destroying the Judiciary.
To complete the scene, we were told of the sword, of civil discord, and of the sword of brother drawn against brother. Why such declamation? Why do we hear of such things on this floor? It is for them to tell who use the expressions; to me they are too horrid to think of. Do gentlemen appeal to our fears, rather than to our understanding? Are we never to be clear of these alarms? They have often been tried without producing any effect. Every instrument of death is dragged into this question; sword, bayonet, hatchet, and tomahawk; and then we are told that the passing this bill may be attended with fatal consequences to the women and children. Can it be possible, sir, that the gentleman was really serious when he talked about an injury to women and children? He also told us, if you pass the bill and it should produce a civil war, not only himself but many enlightened citizens would support the judges. And have we already come to this, that enlightened citizens have determined on their side in case of a civil war, and that it is talked of in this assembly with deliberation and coolness? We certainly were not sent here to talk on such topics, but to take care of the affairs of the nation, and prevent such evils. In fact, it is our duty to take care of the nation, and not destroy it. Compare this with the conduct of the former minority. I challenge them to show any thing like it in all their proceedings. Whenever we supposed the constitution violated, did we talk of civil war? No, sir; we depended on elections as the main corner-stone of our safety; and supposed, whatever injury the State machine might receive from a violation of the constitution, that at the next election the people would elect those that would repair the injury, and set it right again; and this, in my opinion, ought to be the doctrine of us all; and when we differ about constitutional points, and the question shall be decided against us, we ought to consider it a temporary evil, remembering that the people possess the means of rectifying any error that may be committed by us.
Is the idea of a separation of these States so light and trifling an affair, as to be uttered with calmness in this deliberate assembly? At the very idea I shudder, and it seems to me that every man ought to look on such a scene with horror, and shrink from it with dismay. Yet some gentlemen appear to be prepared for such an event, and have determined on their sides in case it should happen. For my part, sir, I deplore such an event too much to make up my mind on it until it shall really happen, and then it must be done with great hesitation indeed. To my imagination, the idea of disunion conveys the most painful sensations; how much more painful then would be the reality! Who shall fix the boundaries of these new empires, when the fatal separation shall take place? Is it to be done with those cruel engines of death that we have heard, of, the sword, the bayonet, and the more savage instruments of tomahawk and hatchet? And is the arm of the brother to plunge them into the breast of brother, and citizen to be put in battle array against citizen, to make this separation which would ruin the whole country? And why is all this to be done? Because we cannot all think alike on political topics. As well might it be said, because we cannot all agree in the tenets embraced by each particular sect of our holy religion, because one is a Calvinist and another a Lutheran, that each should be employed in plunging the dagger into the heart of the other. But suppose, sir, you agree to divide these States, where is the boundary to be? Is it to be a river, or a line of marked trees? Be it which it may, both sides must be fortified, to keep the one from intruding on the other; both the new governments will have regular soldiers to guard their fortified places, and the people on both sides must be oppressed with taxes to support these fortifications and soldiers. What would become, in such a state of things, of the national debt, and all the banks in the United States? If we do wrong by adopting measures which the public good does not require, the injury cannot be very lasting; because at the next election the people will let us stay at home, and send others who will manage their common concerns more to their satisfaction. And if we feel power and forget right, it is proper that they should withdraw their confidence from us; but let us have no civil war; instead of the arguments of bayonets, &c., let us rely on such as are drawn from truth and reason.
Another topic has been introduced, which I very much regret; it is the naming of persons who have received appointments from the late or the present President. I hope I shall be pardoned for not following this example. And one gentleman is named as having been an important member during the election of President by the late House of Representatives. It ought to be remembered there were others as important as the gentleman named. In talking about the late or the present President, it ought not to be forgotten that they both signed the Declaration of Independence, that they have both been Ministers in Europe, and both Presidents of the United States. Although they may differ in political opinion, as many of us do, is that any reason we should attempt to destroy their reputation? Is American character worth nothing, that we should thus, in my judgment, improperly, attempt to destroy it on this floor? The people of this country will remember that British gold could not corrupt nor British power dismay these men. I have differed in opinion with the former President, but no man ever heard me say, that he was either corrupt or dishonest; and sooner than attempt to destroy the fame of those worthies, to whose talents and exertions we owe our independence, I would cease to be an American; nor will I undertake to say that all who differ from me in opinion are disorganizers and jacobins.
Thursday, February 25.
Judiciary System.
The House then went into a committee on the bill, sent from the Senate, entitled, "An act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the courts of the United States, and for other purposes."
Mr. Rutledge.—I beg leave, Mr. Chairman, to proffer my thanks to the committee for the indulgence with which they favored me yesterday, and at the same time to acknowledge the respect excited by the politeness of the honorable gentleman from Maryland, who moved for its rising. In the course of the observations I yesterday offered, I endeavored to show that it was the intention of the Convention to make our judges independent of both Executive and Legislative power; that this was the acknowledged understanding of all the political writers of that time; the belief of the State Conventions, and of the first Congress, when they organized our Judicial system. If I have been successful in my attempt to establish this position, and if (what I suppose cannot be denied) it be true in jurisprudence, that whenever power is given specially to any branch of Government, and the tenure by which it is to be exercised be specially defined, that no other, by virtue of general powers, can rightfully intrude into the trust; then I presume it must follow of consequence, that the present intermeddling of Congress with the Judicial Department is a downright usurpation, and that its effect will be the concentration of all power in one body, which is the true definition of despotism. As, sir, every thing depends upon the fair construction which this article in the constitution respecting the Judiciary is susceptible of, I must again read it. [Here Mr. R. read several clauses of the constitution.] Some of the clauses we see are directory and others prohibitory. Now, sir, I beg to be informed of what avail are your prohibitory clauses, if there be no power to check Congress and the President from doing what the constitution has prohibited them from doing? Those prohibitory regulations were designed for the safety of the State Governments, and the liberties of the people. But establish what is this day the ministerial doctrine, and your prohibitory clauses are no longer barriers against the ambition or the will of the National Government; it becomes supreme and is without control. In looking over those prohibitory clauses, as the Representative of South Carolina, my eye turns with no inconsiderable degree of jealousy and anxiety to the ninth section of the first article, which declares—[Here Mr. R. read the article respecting migration before the year 1808.]
I know this clause was meant to refer to the importation of Africans only, but there are gentlemen who insist that it has a general reference, and was designed to prohibit our inhibiting migration as well from Europe as any where else. It is in the recollection of many gentlemen who now hear me, that, in discussing the alien bill, this clause in the constitution was shown to us, and we were told it was a bar to the measure. And an honorable gentleman from Georgia, then a member of this House, and now a senator of the United States, (and who had been a member of the Convention,) told us very gravely he never considered this prohibition as relating to the importation of slaves. I call upon gentlemen from the Southern States to look well to this business. If they persevere in frittering away the honest meaning of the constitution by their forced implications, this clause is not worth a rush—is a mere dead letter; and yet, without having it in the constitution, I know the members from South Carolina would never have signed this instrument, nor would the convention of that State have adopted it. My friend from Delaware, standing on this vantage ground, says to our opponents, Here I throw the gauntlet, and demand of you how you will extricate yourselves from the dilemma in which you will be placed, should Congress pass any such acts as are prohibited by the constitution? The judges are sworn to obey the constitution, which limits the powers of Congress, and says they shall not pass a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, they shall not tax articles exported from any State, and has other prohibitory regulations. Well, sir, suppose Congress should pass an ex post facto law, or legislate upon any other subject which is prohibited to them, where are the people of this country to seek redress? Who are to decide between the constitution and the acts of Congress? Who are to pronounce on the laws? Who will declare whether they be unconstitutional? Gentlemen have not answered this pertinent inquiry. Sir, they cannot answer it satisfactorily to the people of this country. It is a source of much gratification to me to know that my sentiments on this subject, as they relate to the constitutionality of it, are in unison with the wisest and best men in my native State. The Judicial system had proved so inconvenient there, as to render a new organization of it necessary some years past. There were gentlemen in the Legislature as anxious to send from the bench some of the judges as gentlemen here are to dismiss our federal judges. Personal animosities existed there as well as here, though not to so great an extent; but it was the opinion of a large majority of the South Carolina Legislature, that as the constitution declares, "the judges shall hold their offices during good behavior," the office could not be taken from them, the measure was abandoned, and the wise and cautious course pursued, which we wish gentlemen here to follow: the system was not abolished, but modified and extended; the judges had new duties assigned to them, and their number was increased, but no judge was deprived of his office. In South Carolina they have a court of chancery, consisting of three chancellors, and the law establishing it requires the presence of two judges to hold a court. During a recess of the Legislature, one of the chancellors resigned and another died. The functions of the court of consequence became suspended. All the business pending in it was put to sleep. The public prints were immediately filled with projects for destroying the court, which had been denounced as unnecessary. As the citizens of the western part of the State had not participated much in the benefits derived from the court of chancery, many of the most influential of them deemed it of little utility. The opposition assumed so formidable an aspect as to determine the Governor (who exercises the power of appointing judges during the recess of the Legislature) not to make any appointment, believing the court would be abolished. When the Legislature met, an effort was made to abolish the court, but a large majority giving to the constitution the honest meaning of its framers, considered the judges as having a life estate in their offices, provided they behaved well; and the vacancies on the chancery bench were immediately supplied.