But the gentleman is afraid that if we do not immediately seize the country, we shall lose the golden opportunity of doing it. Would your national honor be free from imputation by a conduct of such inconsistency and duplicity? A minister is sent to the offending nation with an olive-branch, for the purpose of an amicable discussion and settlement of differences, and before he has scarcely turned his back, we invade the territories of that nation with an army of fifty thousand men! Would such conduct comport with the genius and principles of our Republic, whose true interest is peace, and who has hitherto professed to cultivate it with all nations? Would not such a procedure subject us to the just censure of the world, and to the strongest jealousy of those who have possessions near to us? Would such a procedure meet the approbation of even our own citizens, whose lives and fortunes would be risked in the conflict? And would it not be policy inexcusably rash, to plunge this country into war, to effect that which the President not only thinks can be effected, but is now actually in a train of negotiation? If, on the other hand, negotiation should fail, how different will be the ground on which we stand! We stand acquitted by the world, and what is of more consequence, by our own citizens, and our own consciences. But one sentiment will then animate and pervade the whole, and from thenceforth we will take counsel only from our courage.
But to induce us to depart from this proper, this safe, and honorable course of proceeding, which is pursuing by the President, the gentleman from Pennsylvania first, and the gentleman from Delaware again told you, that by such pacific measures you will irritate the Western people against you; that they will not be restrained by you, but will either invade the country themselves, or withdraw from the Union and unite with those who will give them what they want. Sir, said Mr. B., I did not expect to hear such language held on this floor. Sir, the gentleman from Pennsylvania best knows the temper and views of the Western people he represents, but if he meant to extend the imputation to the State I have the honor to represent, I utterly disclaim it. The citizens of Kentucky value too highly their rights and character to endanger the one or dishonor the other. They deal not, sir, in insurrections. They hold in too sacred regard their federal compact to sport with it. They were among the first to oppose violations of it, and will, I trust, be the last to attempt its dissolution. The time indeed was, when not only irritation but disgust prevailed in that country; when, instead of sending fifty thousand men to seize on Orleans, an attempt was meditated, and a solemn vote taken in Congress to barter away this right for twenty-five years. The time indeed was, when great dissatisfaction prevailed in that country, as to the measures of the General Government; but it never furnished there, whatever it might have done elsewhere, even the germs for treasons or insurrections. The people I have the honor to represent are not accustomed to procure redress in this way. Instead of trampling on the constitution of their country, they rally round it as the rock of their safety. But, unhappily, these times have passed away. Distrust and dissatisfaction have given place to confidence in, and attachment to those in whom the concerns of the nation are confided. I ask no reliance on my opinion for this fact, but appeal to the memorial of the Legislature of Kentucky to the present Congress, for the truth of this assertion. In this disposition of mind, therefore, and from the sound sense and correct views and discernment of their true interest, which the people of Kentucky possess, I have no hesitation in pledging myself, that no such precipitate and unwarranted measures will be taken by them, as predicted by the gentlemen in the opposition.
But he begged leave to ask gentlemen who hold such language, would the Western people, admitting they were to withdraw from the Union, be able to accomplish the object? Could they alone go to war with France and Spain? Could they hold Orleans, were they to take possession of it, without the aid of the United States? Admitting they could hold it, what security would they have for their commerce? A single ship of the line would be able completely to blockade that port. See, also, the Havana, one of the safest and strongest of the Spanish ports, and so situated as to possess every advantage in annoying our commerce. Are the gentlemen, therefore, really serious when they endeavor to persuade us that the Western people are in such a state of fury and mad impatience that they will not wait even a few months to see the fate of a negotiation, and, if unsuccessful, receive the aid of the whole nation, but that they will madly run to the attack without a ship, without a single cannon, without magazines, without money or preparation of any kind; and, what is worse, without union among themselves; and what is still worse, in face of the laws and constitution of their country? It is impossible. Such a desperate project could not come to a successful issue; for should they even obtain the right by their own exertions alone, they could not expect long to enjoy it in peace, without descending from that exalted, that enviable rank of one of the independent States of United America, to the degraded, dependent condition of a colonial department of a foreign nation.
Although he thought it incumbent on us, for the reasons he had stated, to try the effect of negotiation, yet, should that fail, he thought it incumbent on us also to be prepared for another resort. He considered this right, and upon a different footing from what we ever enjoyed it, so all-important, so indispensable to the very existence of the Western States, that it was a waste of words and time to attempt to portray the evils which a privation of it would produce; and he rejoiced to find that gentlemen with whom he had not been in the habit of voting on most political subjects so perfectly accord with him, that our precarious tenure of it must be changed. He hoped they were sincere in their declarations. If they were, the only difference between us now is, what are the proper means to obtain this great end? The course pursued by the President was, in his opinion, the only true and dignified course. It is that, and that only, which will certainly attain the object; and is the only one which will tend to unite cordially all parts of the Union. But we ought to be prepared, in case of a failure, instantly to redress ourselves. This, instead of having an evil, would, in his opinion, have a good effect on the negotiation. It would show, that although we are willing amicably to adjust our differences, yet that we are not only resolved on, but prepared for that resort which cannot fail to restore our violated rights. With that view, he would offer the following resolutions, as substitutes for those proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
He moved that the whole of the resolutions be struck out, excepting the word "Resolved," and the following be substituted in their place—after the word "Resolved:"
"That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized, whenever he shall judge it expedient, to require of the Executives of the several States to take effectual measures to organize, arm, and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warning, eighty thousand effective militia, officers included.
Resolved, "That the President may, if he judges it expedient, authorize the Executives of the several States, to accept, as part of the detachment aforesaid, any corps of volunteers; who shall continue in service for such time, not exceeding —— months, and perform such services as shall be prescribed by law.
Resolved, "That —— dollars be appropriated for paying and subsisting such part of the troops aforesaid, whose actual service may be wanted, and for defraying such other expenses as, during the recess of Congress, the President may deem necessary for the security of the territory of the United States.
Resolved, "That —— dollars be appropriated for erecting at such place or places on the Western waters, as the President may judge most proper, one or more arsenals."
Mr. Clinton.—The importance of a free navigation of the Mississippi has been duly appreciated by the Government, and a constant eye has been kept upon it in our negotiations with foreign powers. An attempt was, indeed, made under the Old Confederation to barter it away for twenty-five years, which, however, was effectually controlled by the good sense and patriotism of the Government. By the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain in 1783, by the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with her in 1794, and by the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation with Spain, in 1795, the right of a free navigation of the Mississippi is recognized, and declared to exist from its source to the ocean, in the citizens of the United States. By the 22d article of the Treaty with Spain, it is declared that, "in consequence of the stipulations contained in the 4th article, his Catholic Majesty will permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores. And his Majesty promises either to continue this permission if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain; or, if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them, on another part of the lands of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment." The 22d article, granting the right of deposit, is, therefore, founded upon the 4th article recognizing the right of free navigation, and is intended to give full and complete efficacy to it. By a proclamation of the Intendant of the Province of Louisiana, dated the 16th of October last, the right of deposit is prohibited. The reason assigned for this daring interdiction is, that the three years for which it was granted having expired, it cannot be continued without an express order from the King of Spain; and at the same time no equivalent establishment is assigned, according to the stipulations of the Treaty.