Mr. Goddard.—The gentleman from Massachusetts yesterday told us the call for information ought to be public, though the information itself should be secret. This reasoning had been satisfactory to him then; he had hoped it would have also proved so to-day. But it appears that he is now for sending us to a secret committee. Mr. G. said in his opinion, the call ought to be public, whatever the nature of the information might be. This information gentlemen will either deny or grant. They say it is not to be denied. Why then go into a committee? And if granted, why not grant it without assigning reasons, as well as with assigning them? Are we to be told by the gentleman from Virginia, there is no occasion for this call; that we have information enough? How does that honorable gentleman get his information? If from the cabinet, are we, the representatives of the people, to obtain it from him? Surely this will be degrading to our characters. We may believe it is true as coming from him, but, as representatives, we should spurn at receiving it in such a channel. We want official information, but gentlemen say they want to go into secret committee on this resolution. What will be the good of this? Though he could not say what was done in secret yesterday, he might say what had not been done. They had done nothing; and if they went into secret session again, the consequence would be the same.
Mr. Randolph felt extremely reluctant to rise in this stage of the discussion, but he deemed it time to repel insinuations so frequently thrown out as perhaps to gain some credit, if they were permitted to pass entirely unnoticed. We are averse to take up the motion of the gentleman from Connecticut, and wherefore? Because, as our opponents would fain have it believed, we are insensible to the vast interest affected by the obstruction of the Mississippi? No, sir, because we are alive to this delicate and momentous subject; because we wish to act upon it; because we wish to go into committee on the confidential Message of the Executive; because the information required by the motion before you is not necessary to determine us in the course which we ought, and, I trust, will pursue; and because these preliminary questions, whatever be their object, are, in effect, only calculated to retard and to embarrass the decision of this House on this great question. Sir, I am content that gentlemen should repeat after each other the trite observations which have been so often reiterated of the magnitude of the object in question. I am content that they should make the best possible display of their ardor on this occasion. But wherefore this exhibition of a zeal so inordinate as to arrogate to itself all sensibility to the national welfare? Since gentlemen insist upon it, since they provoke the discussion, I must request to be indulged in some remarks on the history of this subject. And in reply to the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Goddard,) I must be permitted to observe that such of my information as may have been derived from the Executive is equally accessible to every member of this House, and I believe to every reputable citizen in the Union, who chooses to apply for it. That, however, which I am about to present, is derived from a source accessible to the whole world. It is to be found in a document of inestimable value, (the debates of the Virginia Convention in 1788,) and might truly be said to be official. It is an account given in his official character of member of Congress, and under the old confederation, by that able and eminent man, that faithful and illustrious public servant, the late Governor of Virginia, to the Convention of that State, at their requisition. At his own suggestion the Legislature of the State had declined to insist upon it. To the Convention it was given, (however reluctantly,) as to a paramount authority. [Here Mr. E. read Mr. Monroe's speech.][73]
"After some desultory conversation, Mr. Monroe spoke as follows: Mr. Chairman—My conduct respecting the transactions of Congress upon this interesting subject, since my return to the State, has been well known to many worthy gentlemen here. I have been often called upon before this, in a public line, and particularly in the last Assembly, whilst I was present, for information in regard to these transactions; but have heretofore declined it, and for reasons that were held satisfactory. Being amenable, upon the principles of the Federal compact, to the Legislature, for my conduct in Congress, it cannot be doubted, if required, it was my duty to obey their directions; but that honorable body thought it best to dispense with such demand. The right in this Assembly is unquestionably more complete, having power paramount to that; but even here I could wish it had not been exerted as I understand it to be, by going into committee for that purpose. Before, however, I enter into this subject, I cannot but observe, it has given me pain to hear it treated by honorable gentlemen in a manner that has appeared not altogether free from exception. For they have not gone into it fully, and given a proper view of the transaction in every part, but of those only which preceded, and were subsequent to that, which had been the particular object of inquiry; a conduct that has seemed too much calculated to make an impression favorable to their wishes in the present instance. But, in making this observation, I owe it to those gentlemen to declare, that it is my opinion such omission has proceeded, not from intention, but their having forgotten facts, or to some cause not obvious to me, and which I make no doubt they will readily explain.
"The policy of this State, respecting this river, has always been the same. It has contemplated but one object, the opening it for the use of the inhabitants, whose interest depended on it; and in this she has, in my opinion, shown her wisdom and magnanimity. I may, I believe, with propriety say, that all the measures that have at any time been taken by Congress for that purpose, were adopted at the instance of this State. There was a time, it is true, sir, when even this State, in some measure, abandoned the object, by authorizing its cession to the Court of Spain. But let us take all circumstances into view, as they were at that time, and I am persuaded it will by no means show a departure from this liberal and enlightened system of policy, although it may manifest an accommodation to the exigencies which pressed on us at the time. The Southern States were overrun, and in possession of the enemy. The governments of South Carolina and Georgia were prostrate, and opposition there at an end. North Carolina made but a feeble resistance; and Virginia herself was greatly harassed by the enemy in force at that time in the heart of the country, and by impressments for her own and the defence of the Southern States. In addition to this, the finances of the United States were in a deplorable condition, if not totally exhausted; and France, our ally, seemed anxious for peace; and as the means of bringing the war to a more happy and speedy conclusion, the object of this cession was the hopes of uniting Spain in it with all her forces. If I recollect aright, too, at this moment, the Minister of the United States, at the Court of Madrid, informed Congress of the difficulty he found in prevailing upon that Court to acknowledge our independence, or take any measure in our favor, suggested the jealousy with which it viewed our settlements in the Western country, and the probability of better success, provided we would cede the navigation of this river, as the consideration. The latter circumstances were made known to the Legislature, and they had their weight. All inferior objects must yield to the safety of the society itself. A resolution passed to that effect. An act of Congress likewise passed; and the Minister of the United States had full authority to relinquish this valuable right to that Court, upon the condition above stated. But what was the issue of this proposition? Was any treaty made with Spain that obtained any acknowledgment of our independence, although at war with Great Britain; and such acknowledgment would have cost her nothing? Was a loan of money accomplished? In short, does it appear that even Spain herself thought it an object of any importance? So soon as the war ended, this resolution was rescinded. The power to make such a treaty was revoked. So that this system of policy was departed from, only for a short time, for the most important object that can be conceived, and resumed again as soon as it possibly could be.
"After the peace, it became the business of Congress to investigate the relation of these States to the different powers of the earth, in a more extensive view than they had hitherto done, and particularly in the commercial line; and to make arrangements for entering into treaties with them on such terms as might be mutually beneficial for each party. As the result of the deliberations of that day, it was resolved, 'That commercial treaties be formed, if possible, with said powers, those of Europe in particular, Spain included, upon similar principles; and three Commissioners, Mr. Adams, Mr. Franklin, and Mr. Jefferson, be appointed for that purpose.' So that an arrangement for a treaty of commerce with Spain had already been taken. Whilst these powers were in force, a representative from Spain arrived, authorized to treat with the United States on the interfering claims of the two nations, respecting the Mississippi, and the boundaries, and other concerns, wherein they were respectively interested. A similar commission was given to the honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on the part of the United States, with these ultimata, 'That he enter into no treaty, compact, or convention whatever, with the said representative of Spain, which did not stipulate our right to the navigation of the Mississippi, and the boundaries as established in our treaty with Great Britain.' And thus the late negotiation commenced, under auspices, as I supposed, very favorable to the wishes of the United States; for Spain had become sensible of the propriety of cultivating the friendship of these States. Knowing our claim to the navigation of the river, she had sent a Minister hither principally to treat on that point; and the time would not be remote when, under the increasing population of the country, the inhabitants would be able to open it without our assistance or her consent. These circumstances being considered, was it not presumable she intended to make a merit of her concession to our wishes, and to agree to an accommodation upon that subject, that would not only be satisfactory, but highly pleasing to the United States? But what was the issue of this negotiation? How was it terminated? Has it forwarded the particular object in view, or otherwise promoted the interests and the harmony of the States, or any of them! Eight or ten months elapsed without any communications of its progress to Congress. At length a letter was received from the Secretary, stating that difficulties had arisen in his negotiation with the representative of Spain, which, in his opinion, should be so managed as that even their existence should remain a secret for the present; and proposing that a committee be appointed with full power to direct and instruct him in every case relative to the proposed treaty. As the only ultimata appointed in his instructions respected the Mississippi and the boundaries, it readily occurred that these occasioned the difficulties alluded to, and were those he wished to remove. And, for many reasons, this appeared, at least to me, an extraordinary proposition. By the Articles of Confederation nine States are necessary to enter into treaties. The instruction is the foundation of the treaty; for if it is formed agreeable thereto, good faith requires that it be ratified. The practice of Congress has also been always, I believe, in conformity to this idea. The instructions under which our commercial treaties have been made, were carried by nine States. Those under which the Secretary now acted were passed by nine States. The proposition, then, would be, that the powers which, under the constitution, nine States only were competent to, should be transferred to a committee, and the object thereby to disengage himself from the ultimata already mentioned in his existing instructions. In this light the subject was taken up, and on these principles discussed. The Secretary, Mr. Jay, being called before Congress to explain the difficulties mentioned in his letter, presented to their view the project of a treaty of commerce, containing, as he supposed, advantageous stipulations in our favor, in that line; in consideration for which we were to contract to forbear the use of the navigation of the river Mississippi for the term of 25 or 30 years, and earnestly advised our adopting it. The subject now took a decided form; there was no further ambiguity in it, and we were surprised, for reasons that have been already given, that he had taken up the subject of commerce at all. We were greatly surprised it should form the principal object of the project, and that a partial or temporary sacrifice of that interest, for the advancement of which the negotiation was set on foot, should be the consideration proposed to be given for it. But the honorable Secretary urged, that it was necessary to stand well with Spain; that the commercial project was a beneficial one, and should not be neglected; that a stipulation to forbear the use contained an acknowledgment, on her part, of the right in the United States; that we were in no condition to take the river, and therefore gave nothing for it; with other reasons which, perhaps, I have forgotten; for the subject in detail has nearly escaped my memory. We differed with the honorable Secretary, almost in every respect. We admitted, indeed, the propriety of standing well with Spain, but supposed we might accomplish that end, at least, on equal terms. We considered the stipulation to forbear the use, as a species of barter, that should never be countenanced in the councils of the American States, since it might tend to the destruction of the society itself; for a forbearance of the use of one river, might lead to more extensive consequences; to that of the Chesapeake, the Potomac, or any other of the rivers that emptied into it. In short, that the councils of the confederacy should be conducted with more magnanimity and candor, should contemplate the benefit of all parts upon common principles, and not the sacrifice of one part for that of another. There appeared to us a material difference between stipulating by treaty to forbear the use, and not being able to open the river. The former would be considered by the inhabitants of the Western country as an act of hostility; the latter might be justified by our inability. And, with respect to the commercial part of the project, we really thought it an ill-advised one on its own merits solely.
"Thus was this project brought before Congress, and so far as I recollect, in this form, and upon these principles. It was the subject of tedious and lengthy discussion in that honorable body. Every distinct measure that was taken I do not now remember, nor do I suppose it of consequence. I have shown the outlines of the transaction, which is, if I apprehend rightly, all that the committee wish to possess. The communications of the Secretary were referred to a Committee of the whole House. The Delegates of the seven easternmost States voted that the ultimata in the Secretary's instructions be repealed; which was reported to the House, and entered on the journal by the Secretary of Congress, that the question was carried. Upon this entry, a constitutional question arose to this effect: 'Nine States being necessary, by the Federal Constitution, to give an instruction; and seven having repealed a part of an instruction so given, for the formation of a treaty with a foreign power, so as to alter its import, and authorize, under the remaining part thereof, the formation of a treaty, on principles altogether different from what the said instruction originally contemplated, can such remaining part be considered as in force, and constitutionally obligatory?' We pressed on Congress for a decision on this point often, but without effect. Notwithstanding this, I understood it was the intention of the Secretary to proceed and conclude a treaty, in conformity to his project, with the Minister of Spain. In this situation I left Congress. What I have since heard, belongs not to me to discover. Other gentlemen have more ample information of this business, in the course it has taken, than I can possibly have been able to obtain; for, having done my duty whilst there, I left it for others who succeeded me to perform theirs, and I have made but little further inquiry respecting it. The animated pursuit that was made of this object, required, and, I believe, received, as firm an opposition. The Southern States were on their guard, and warmly opposed it. For my part, I thought it my duty to use every effort in Congress for the interest of the Southern States. But so far as it depended on me, with my official character, it ceased. With many of those gentlemen, to whom I always considered it as my particular misfortune to be opposed, I am now in habits of correspondence and friendship; and I am concerned for the necessity which has given birth to this relation.
"Whether the Delegates of those States spoke the language of their constituents; whether it may be considered as the permanent interest of such States to depress the growth and increasing population of the Western country, are points which I cannot pretend to determine. I must observe, however, that I always supposed it would, for a variety of reasons, prove injurious to every part of the Confederacy. These are well understood, and need not be dilated on here. If, however, such should be the interest of seven States, let gentlemen contemplate the consequences in the operation of the Government, as it applies to this subject. I have always been of opinion, sir, that the American States, to all national objects, had, in every respect, a common interest. Few persons would be willing to bind them together by a stronger or more indissoluble bond, or give the National Government more power than myself. I only wish to prevent it from doing harm, either to States or individuals; and the rights and interests of both, in a variety of instances, in which they are now left unprotected, might, in my opinion, be better guarded. If I have mistaken any facts, honorable gentlemen will correct me. If I omitted any, and it has not been intentional, so I shall be happy with their assistance to supply the defect.
"Mr. Monroe added several other observations, the purport of which was, that the interest of the Western country would not be as secure under the proposed constitution as under the Confederation; because, under the latter system, the Mississippi could not be relinquished without the consent of nine States, whereas by the former, he said, a majority of seven States could yield it. His own opinion was, that it would be given up by a majority of the Senators present in the Senate, with the President, which would put it in the power of less than seven States to surrender it. That the Northern States were inclined to yield it. That it was their interest to prevent an augmentation of the Southern influence and power; and that as mankind in general, and States in particular, were governed by interest, the Northern States would not fail of availing themselves of the opportunity given them by the constitution of relinquishing that river, in order to depress the Western country, and prevent the Southern interest from preponderating.
"Mr. Henry[74] then rose and requested that the honorable gentleman (Mr. Monroe) would discover the rest of the project, and what Spain was to do on her part, as an equivalent for the cession of the Mississippi.
"Mr. Monroe.—Mr. Chairman, I do not thoroughly recollect every circumstance relative to this project. But there was to be a commercial intercourse between the United States and Spain. We were to be allowed to carry our produce to the ports of Spain, and the Spaniards to have an equal right of trading hither. It was stipulated that there should be a reciprocity of commercial intercourse and benefits between the subjects of Spain and the citizens of the United States. The manufactures of Spain were to be freely imported and vended in this country, and our manufactures to be carried to Spain, &c., without obstruction, and both parties were to have mutual privileges in point of commercial intercourse and connection. This, sir, is the amount of the project of Spain, which was looked upon as advantageous to us. I thought myself that it was not. I considered Spain as being without manufactures, as the most slow in the progress of arts, and the most unwise, with respect to commerce, of all nations under the sun, (in which respect I thought Great Britain the wisest.) Their gentlemen and nobles look on commerce with contempt. No man of character among them will undertake it. They make little discrimination with any nation. Their character is to shut out all nations, and exclude every intercourse with them, and this would be the case with respect to us. Nothing is given to us by this project, but what is given to all other nations. It is bad policy, and unjustifiable on such terms to yield that valuable right. Their merchants have great stocks in trade. It is not so with our merchants. Our people require encouragement. Mariners must be encouraged. On a review of these circumstances, I thought the project unwise and impolitic."