Mr. Griswold here read his resolutions as follows:
Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law to define the powers to be exercised by the judges of the circuit courts of the United States, who were appointed under an act, entitled "An act to provide for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States."
Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law for submitting to judicial decision the right of the judges of the circuit court to their compensations.
Mr. Randolph said, the provision desired by the gentleman from Connecticut already exists. The Legislature has defined the powers of the late circuit judges, and has decided that they shall not execute any powers. Those powers are transferred to other courts. Unless the House had changed their opinion, it was not necessary to go into any discussion on this point. The readiest and fairest course for gentlemen would be to propose to repeal the law of the last session, and restore the judges.
The question was then taken on the first resolution, and lost—ayes 34, noes 56.
The Chairman then read the second resolution, as follows:
Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law for submitting to judicial decision the right of the judges of the circuit court to their compensations.
Mr. Randolph said he was not ready for the question. He had one or two remarks to offer, which had suggested themselves during the reading of the resolution. It had been repeatedly decided that the United States would not permit themselves to be brought into their own courts. Wherefore grant to a particular class of persons, in a single case, that which had ever been refused to the war-worn soldier of the Revolution; especially when it should be recollected that this case, involving the interests of judges, as a caste, could not be decided by any judicial tribunal free from bias?
A doctrine is advanced new to this House, which I have been told originated with an eminent character on the bench of the United States; I did not hear the gentleman from Connecticut distinctly, but I understand him as subscribing to it; that Congress may, constitutionally, deprive a judge of all authority, and transfer to another his powers and duties, but that the office nevertheless remains, and the judge, of course, entitled to his compensation. The constitution says that "the judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, for their services, receive a compensation." Without entering into a question which has already been so fully discussed, he would barely remark, that if the position just advanced be correct, the words "compensation" and "office," which the constitution supposes, and every one believes, to have distinct and different meanings, must be convertible terms. For when the powers and duties are taken away, what, let me ask, is left but a salary? The word office must be rendered by the word salary.
Mr. Dana.—The question of compensation to the judges involved considerations very distinct from those ordinarily decided upon in that House. Most of the individual cases brought here were made in pursuance of some particular law, and did not call in question the authority of Congress. If the case of the judges were to be referred to any tribunal, the right to refer was founded on the principle of controlling the decisions of the Legislature in case those decisions should appear to the tribunal to be unconstitutional. It was, therefore, in this view not proper to refer the question to a tribunal dependent on the body to be controlled. This was the only course that would probably be deemed impartial by all the parties concerned.