Mr. Bacon said he would state, in a few words, the reasons that influenced him in submitting these resolutions. In the first place, he knew of no advantage which the United States derived from retaining the exclusive jurisdiction of the District. Therefore, if the States to which it originally belonged were disposed to take it back, there could be no objection derived from this consideration. In the second place, it appeared, from their short experience, that the exercise of exclusive legislation would take up a great deal of time, and produce a great expense to the nation; and it was probable that, in the course of events, the trouble and expense would increase with the increasing number of the inhabitants. Should justice be done to the exercise of this power, it was likely that as much time would be spent in legislating for this District as for the whole United States. It was certain that very considerable time would be consumed. They would likewise be subjected to other expenses than those attendant on legislation. In the next place, the Government would be very diverse from that in the other parts of the Union. He would rather see the Government in the United States uniform. Here the citizens would be governed by laws, in the making of which they have no voice—by laws not made with their own consent, but by the United States for them—by men who have not the interest in the laws made that legislators ought always to possess—by men also not acquainted with the minute and local interests of the place, coming, as they did, from distances of 500 to 1,000 miles. From these considerations, he inferred their incompetency to legislate for this District, whatever their disposition might be. These were the principal reasons that influenced his mind. They might however, perhaps, be easily obviated by the reasons of other gentlemen, which he would be glad to hear.
Mr. Huger was opposed to the resolutions, first, because he was not inclined hastily to make alterations in the great national compact that held us together. It appeared to him that, though they might not always understand the reasons on which a part of it was founded, yet it was prudent not to change it until experience had clearly proved its inconvenience. It must be obvious that it was easier to perceive its present inconvenience than to foresee the effects that may ensue from a change. The constitution contemplates the exercise by Congress of exclusive legislation over ten miles square. It must impress itself upon the mind of every gentleman that the wise men who framed the constitution deemed it proper. Congress also had thought it proper, as well as two of the most respectable States in the Union—the one by receiving and the other by granting the territory. All these considerations impressed his mind with a disinclination hastily to alter the course that had been pursued.
Mr. Dennis regretted that he had been called out of the House when this subject was taken up, as, in the remarks which he considered it his duty to make, he could not avail himself of the ideas suggested by other gentlemen, and as he might repeat what had been perhaps already said. He would undertake, however, to show that the proposed resolutions were objectionable in every point of view that could be taken of them. They presented two aspects. Admitting, in the first place, that they could be carried into effect, so far as to restore the people of the territory to the situation in which they were placed before the cession, yet it appeared to him a strong objection that all the advantages of exclusive jurisdiction would be thereby lost. He had always thought that part of the constitution which gave Congress exclusive jurisdiction over a district of ten miles square wise and proper, and that a government whose laws were to pervade the whole United States ought not to be subjected to the whim or caprice of any part of the United States.
By exclusive legislation, he understood the exclusion to the States of all participation in legislation. He admitted that it was competent to Congress to sanction the acts of Maryland and Virginia; but he believed that no one would contend that Congress could divest themselves of an ultimate control. They might admit the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia to legislate for the territory, but Congress possessed the power of controlling or modifying their acts. He would wish to know what advantage there could be in giving this legislative agency to those States? If given, no doubt could be entertained of many acts passed by them being disagreeable to the people of the territory, who would apply to Congress to repeal them. The next Congress, too, would have the power of resuming the jurisdiction, or, more properly speaking, the jurisdiction would still remain in Congress. Under such a qualified cession, he presumed the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland would refuse to act; for, why should they legislate for people not within their limits? The power of legislation might as well be vested in the Legislature of Massachusetts. The truth is, that our jurisdiction would be paramount, and the acts of Maryland and Virginia would go into operation merely by our permission, and Congress might repeal and amend them whenever and howsoever they pleased. We should, therefore, be then relieved from no trouble that we now experience. There would then be as many applications to pass laws as there are now.
In another point of view he was astonished at these propositions, and at the quarter from which they came. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Bacon) has told us that his resolutions are bottomed on the broad basis of the rights of man; but he would ask how this could be, when the resolutions went to transfer twenty thousand men, without their consent, to a Government different from that under which they now live? Gentlemen are going to imitate some of the extraordinary scenes that have lately occurred in Europe, and propose to transfer this District with the same facility that in that quarter of the globe they have transferred an Italian dukedom or a German principality.
Mr. Dennis thought the situation of Congress in relation to the people of this Territory was not sufficiently understood. He knew that it was always troublesome to legislate for any people: he foresaw these inconveniences when they removed to this place. He had thought then, as he thought now, that some legislative government must be provided for the District. In this opinion he had never varied, but had, from successive events, become more confirmed in its accuracy. But, if gentlemen object to vesting the people with the power of government, he thought he could suggest a plan better than that of retrocession, to wit: to vest the President with the power to revise the laws of Maryland and Virginia, and make a report to the next session of Congress. The laws of Maryland and Virginia were generally agreeable to the people, but they experienced many inconveniences from local and peculiar circumstances.
Wednesday, February 9.
District of Columbia.
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the resolutions of Mr. Bacon to recede to the States of Maryland and Virginia the District of Columbia.
Mr. Bayard hoped the committee would not agree to the resolutions. He did not believe that a constitutional power existed enabling the Government of the United States to recede the Territory. The Territory had been acquired by the direction and under the permission of the constitution. The constitution also allows the cession by particular States. When, therefore, gentlemen say Congress has the power to recede, he was at liberty to call upon them to exhibit that part of the constitution that conferred the power. He had looked over the constitution with a vigilant eye, and he could see nothing to this effect. Can it be done without power? Do gentlemen recollect that the Government of the United States is federative, and of course possessed of limited powers; and what is not delegated does not exist; and that there is an express provision that powers not expressly given shall not be assumed by implication? It was difficult to point out a non-entity. If gentlemen contend for an entity, they should distinguish it. If Congress have the power to recede this Territory, they have also the power to recede the others, the Indiana and Mississippi Territories. It is an extremely different thing to receive a cession and to recede it after it is received. Congress has the power to do the one, but not the other. How can the retrocession be made? Gentlemen say, by law. That law may be repealed. If receded, what would be the situation of the Territory? It could be no affair of contract. For a contract cannot exist without a consideration. Though, on the cession, there was a consideration, in receding there would be none. Would there be a power in Virginia and Maryland, if receded, to prevent a resumption? Such a measure showed but little respect for the people of the Territory. As far as he knew the sentiments of the people, it was not their wish to be receded. They were willing to live under the protection of Congress. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has called them slaves. They may not thank him for the appellation. If they were slaves, there must be some corollary; and if so, we must be their tyrants. But they are not slaves; they are children, over whom it is not our wish to tyrannize, but whom we would foster and nurture. Are we, in the character of Representatives of the United States, to be considered as their tyrants, because they are not immediately represented here? We ought not to decide this question until the people express their desire to return to the States.