Mr. J. Clay.—This debate appears to me to arise from causes the most extraordinary, and such as we are not accustomed to hear assigned on this floor. The gentleman from Virginia has made a motion justified by his own knowledge as well as that of my colleague; and this motion is opposed in a most extraordinary manner. I believe this is the first instance in which a motion to appoint a committee of inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer has been opposed. We are told by the gentleman from Vermont that this House has no right to pass a censure on a judge, and that judges should be highly independent. I am afraid that unless great care be taken the doctrine of judicial independence will be carried so far as to become dangerous to the liberties of the country. This motion does not, however, affect the character of the judge. Let it also be recollected, that if the reputation of the judge be at stake, the reputation of this House also is implicated. I consider this House as the constitutional guardians of the morality of the Judiciary. Whenever even suspicion exists as to that morality, a committee of inquiry should be appointed. For the pure administration of justice is surely more important than the reputation of any particular judge. I am sorry my colleague thought it necessary to make any statement of facts to the House. I believe that more important facts than he has mentioned will be stated by witnesses. I believe likewise the reputation of the judge will be better preserved by the appointment of a committee than by assertions made on this floor by particular members, not responsible elsewhere for what they allege.
With regard to my opinions in this case, whatever my political impressions may be, they are entirely unbiassed. I have heard facts stated, but I cannot say that they have been satisfactorily proved to my mind. There are other charges equally reprehensible. Under these circumstances, I ask if the character of the judge is not more implicated by a discussion of his official conduct on this floor than by appointing a committee to obtain facts. If he is guilty of the facts alleged against him, no gentleman will say that he is not impeachable. If he is only suspected of them, there ought to be a committee, that if guilty he may be impeached, and if innocent, be freed from the imputation thrown upon him.
Mr. R. Griswold.—Gentlemen will acknowledge that this is a subject of great importance and delicacy. No one will doubt but that we ought to execute our duty so as to preserve the fountains of justice pure, and that we ought at the same time to treat the important character of a judge, or of any other high officer, with respect. I do not know but that this mode of procedure is warranted by precedent. But if it is, it is unknown to me. As the resolution now stands, I do not think it perfectly correct. The honorable gentleman from Virginia says he is acquainted with facts that warrant the proposed inquiry. The question is whether the House ought to be governed by the opinions of any one member. We know not what those facts are; the gentleman declines stating them. I do think, as the subject now strikes me, that the conviction of any one member of the propriety of this measure cannot warrant the interposition of the House. Instead of taking the individual opinion of a member, it ought to be stated that certain facts exist, which, if proved, will justify an impeachment. I do not know whether these ideas are not incorrect, having never before contemplated, or had a suspicion that such a motion would be made.
As to the remarks of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I do not consider them as entitled to much weight. If the facts stated by him were of his personal knowledge, they would undoubtedly merit attention. But he merely states that which he has received from others, and which amounts to nothing more than that the judge refused liberty to the counsel to argue a point of law after it was decided, and confined their argument to facts. In so doing the judge may have erred, but it was an error of judgment, for which he cannot be impeached. No lawyer will perhaps say that it was not the province of the judge to decide the law, and that he has not the right to prevent counsel from arguing it after his mind is made up. But this information is not of the knowledge of the gentleman. Are we then to institute an inquiry into the conduct of a high officer of the Government merely on hearsay? This has never been done under our Government. In the late case of Judge Pickering proof was furnished by the affidavits of witnesses testifying certain facts. I do not therefore consider it correct to proceed to inquire on the opinion of any gentleman. The proper course is first to have proofs which will justify ourselves to our own consciences in making the inquiry—for we ought not to touch the character of a judge, unless we are satisfied from facts that there is good reason for an investigation into his conduct. Gentlemen will not say that making an inquiry into the official conduct of a judge does not touch his character.
Gentlemen say if this committee find the conduct of the judge to have been correct, they will make a report to that effect; but it does not follow that the report will contain all the evidence adduced, and suspicion may still rest on the character of the judge, and that some facts may not be stated, which, if stated, would show his misconduct. Whereas, if the business be brought generally before the House, on the exhibition of certain facts, the public will be enabled to decide whether they warrant impeachment or even suspicion. With this view of the subject, I am of opinion that it will be best to delay acting in this affair until facts shall be disclosed which will justify the step now proposed to be taken. I have as high a respect for the opinion of the gentleman from Virginia as for that of any other member on this floor; but I doubt whether we can justify our votes on the opinion of any single member; facts alone ought to govern our opinions. I, therefore, for the purpose of considering the course most proper to be pursued, move a postponement of the further consideration of the motion until to-morrow.
Mr. J. Randolph.—Were I the personal enemy of the gentleman who is the object of this resolution, I should take precisely that course which, on this occasion, the gentleman from Connecticut seems more than half inclined to take. That gentleman wishes the resolution to lay until to-morrow, in order that he may have time to consider whether he can bring himself to refuse the inquiry altogether. He says that he cannot, or rather (for he speaks doubtingly) he thinks he cannot see the propriety of instituting an inquiry without evidence. What evidence? Nothing short of legal proof—testimony on oath. And what is the object of the resolution? To acquire that very evidence. If we had the evidence, to what purpose make inquiry? As, however, the evidence cannot be had without inquiry, and the gentleman will not grant the inquiry but upon the evidence, it is plain that if we take the course which he recommends, we must go without both. Will gentlemen offer objections against inquiry which are applicable only to impeachment? If an impeachment were moved, they would have a right to call for evidence. But what is the object of the present motion? Merely to inquire whether there exists evidence which will justify an impeachment. But this inquiry we are told cannot be instituted on mere hearsay, although we have the declaration of a member in his place. What would be said of a grand jury, who being informed by one of their body that A or B could testify to the fact of a murder being committed within their jurisdiction, should refuse an application to the court to have them summoned, and because they could not find a bill of indictment unsupported by evidence, should reject that evidence which might be within their reach? I profess not that tenderness of conscience which has been displayed by the gentleman from Connecticut. My conscience teaches me to accuse no man wrongfully, but to deny inquiry into the official conduct of no one, however exalted his station; and I had supposed, from his practice, that the gentleman held the same opinion. For it will be recollected that on the eve of the close of the last session he had himself instituted an inquiry which went to impeach the conduct of some of the first officers of the Government. No one on that occasion stepped in between the demand for an inquiry and those officers implicated in it. No inquiry was made, and it precluded any further proceeding on the part of the House, since the charges which had been attempted to be brought forward would not bear examination. Mr. R. concluded by calling for the yeas and nays.
Mr. Gregg said he should vote against the postponement, and in favor of the resolution. The case was somewhat new, but he perceived no impropriety in giving it the same direction with all the other business originated in the House. What is this committee to be appointed for? To investigate facts and report them to the House. Was it not most proper that gentlemen whose characters were implicated should have, in the first instance, facts stated privately before a committee, than that parts of their character should be immediately brought into view before the House? He recollected one fact not yet alluded to in debate. In 1792, after the army under the command of General St. Clair was defeated, great dissatisfaction arose, and the character of the commander was implicated. The idea was that the expedition had not been conducted with propriety. The business was brought before Congress. It was understood at that time, whether justly or not, Mr. G. would not pretend to say, that the commander-in-chief could not be tried by a court martial. Congress therefore took up the business, and appointed a committee of inquiry, who went through a lengthy examination of the subject. Mr. G. mentioned this precedent that gentlemen might turn their attention to it.
Mr. R. Griswold said—I had hoped that the language used by me, when I was up before, would not have led gentlemen to suppose that I was acting as the friend or the enemy of Judge Chase. I am acting in neither capacity. I am acting only as a member of this House, who ought to be anxious on an occasion of such importance to take that course which is most consistent with propriety; that course which results from the duty this House owes the nation, and that duty which they owe the character of a judge. It did appear to me that it was not correct to call the character of a public officer into question unless some necessity should first appear. No facts are presented on this occasion. The gentleman from Virginia has said that he is in possession of facts, or of something which makes him believe that an inquiry is proper, but he does not choose to communicate those facts. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has given us his information. The question is, whether it is proper on these light suggestions to institute a solemn inquiry into the character of this judge. It appears to me that we ought not to throw any imputation on the character of any officer without evidence that such an inquiry is necessary. The case mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gregg) does not apply. Dissatisfaction existed in the country and in this House on the events of a campaign; an inquiry was instituted; but what was its object? The committee were appointed to inquire into the general causes of the failure of the expedition; they were not instructed to inquire into the character of a particular officer.
The gentleman from Virginia has referred to another case, when he says that we were ready enough to institute an inquiry, and has left it to be inferred that the inquiry was made without any previous proofs of its necessity. But certainly on that occasion inquiry was not made without proof. I suppose the inquiry alluded to was that which related to the conduct of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. It was instituted on a report made by them, and which we thought was not satisfactory. The resolution offered was adopted, and inquiry was made, the result of which is well known to every gentleman. It follows, therefore, that there are no precedents adduced which apply to the present case.
It is my wish that the proceedings of this House may on this occasion be perfectly correct, and that we may not be precipitated into the adoption of this resolution without due consideration. If it is correct to vote an inquiry in all cases where a member rises on this floor and desires it, it is correct to vote it in this case. In this case a gentleman rises and says that he is satisfied an inquiry ought to take place. The question is, whether it is proper to inquire on the suggestion of a member? If it is proper, without facts being adduced, then it will be always proper to inquire whenever any member requires it, and it will be also proper whenever any individual citizen requires it. This course I have never thought correct. On the contrary, I think some facts ought to be previously presented to establish the necessity of an inquiry before it is voted. In the case of Judge Pickering a very different course has been pursued. The appointment of a committee of inquiry originated from a Message of the President. We find in February, 1803, the House received the following Message: