Congress has but little power, or rather they have no power to prevent the growth of the evil. To impose a tax on imported slaves is the extent of their power; but every one must see that it is infinitely disproportionate to what the morality, the interest, the peace, and safety, of individuals, and of the public, at this moment, demand. And though in regard to their present case the power of the General Government may be insufficient to check the mischief, yet I hope they are disposed to discourage it, as far as they are authorized by the constitution. Therefore I beg leave to offer the House the following resolution:
“Resolved, That a tax of ten dollars be imposed upon every slave imported into the United States.”
Ordered to lie on the table.
Official conduct of Judge Chase.
The House resumed the consideration of the motion of the fifth instant, “for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,” and the said motion, as originally proposed, being again read, in the words following, to wit:
“Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to report their opinion whether the said Samuel Chase hath so acted in his judicial capacity, as to require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House:”
A motion was made and seconded to amend the same, by inserting, after the words “one of the Associate Justices of the United States,” the following words, “and of Richard Peters, District Judge of the district of Pennsylvania.”
Mr. Smilie.—When the motion now under consideration was made yesterday, I should have felt surprised at the course which the debate took, had I not often witnessed such things in former times. It seems to be considered as improper that a gentleman should bring forward a motion for an inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer, and expect the House to comply with his request, unless he should at the same time produce such evidence as shall prove the facts charged. If this course of proceeding be correct, I have ever been in error. What does the gentleman from Virginia ask? Suppose he has taken exception to the conduct of the judge from some facts which have come to his own knowledge. Under such circumstances it will be allowed that it is the duty of the House to make the inquiry. When the question shall be whether an impeachment shall be preferred, it will be proper that evidence should be produced. But now only a committee is asked to receive evidence, and to determine whether it be such as in their opinion will afford grounds for an impeachment. It is impossible for me to conceive any way that can be pursued which will be more favorable to the person whose character is implicated, than that which is proposed. It is merely to inquire whether such facts can be sustained as will afford grounds for an impeachment. Certainly in this stage of the business it is not necessary to produce evidence to the House, as the House are not competent to receive testimony, which a committee is. It is a rule of this House that so much respect is due to a member, that if he states that he possesses information proper to be communicated to the House, but which in his opinion ought not to be done but with closed doors, that, in such case, the doors shall be shut without any vote of the House.
Surely, then, on the request of a member for a committee of inquiry, that measure ought to be adopted. This, in my opinion, is the best course that can be pursued for the person implicated. There is, it is true, thereby expressed an opinion of some one member that this judge has done wrong. So far his character is implicated; this is the only possible way in which it is implicated. The committee are to inquire whether there are grounds for an impeachment or not. If they report that there are not grounds, the accusation will be dismissed; and if the report is that there are grounds, the House will at once perceive the necessity of taking this step to ascertain their existence.
Another ground of resistance is taken. It is said there are precedents for this proceeding. I believe that all precedents must have an origin; and that one person has as good a right to establish them as another. Our Government is young, and only two cases of impeachment have occurred under it. Most of our precedents respecting parliamentary proceedings are borrowed from England, and, if precedents are necessary in this affair, we must resort to that country for them. My opinion is that they are not necessary, and that common sense and the reason of the thing are all that are necessary to guide our decision in this case. There is, however, in the British annals, no deficiency of precedents. The first I shall mention is to be found in the case of the Earl of Strafford. I may be told that this precedent was established in turbulent times: I may also be told of the improper mode of proceeding. I do not pretend to vindicate the whole course of procedure. I think it was wrong. But with regard to the first stages of the business, I believe them to have been correct. It will be seen that, in that instance, a more direct mode was pursued than is proposed in the present case.