Mr. F. said this precedent applied well to the present case. If the judges mentioned in the resolution had done their duty, their characters would be vindicated by the inquiry, and the public confidence in their integrity restored; if they were guilty, and not entitled to confidence, they ought to be removed from office, and neither the one nor the other could be done unless the inquiry proposed was authorized.
He said that the inquiry was necessary to secure the purity, honor, and usefulness of the Judiciary Department. If that House refused or neglected to exert the powers vested therein for securing public confidence in the Judiciary, unprincipled men would find means of recommending themselves to appointments, and would vitiate the streams where justice is expected to flow, and the citizens would be oppressed without the means or hopes of redress, and would feel the effects of tyrannical power in the administration of a government which, in its other departments, was the greatest and best of any in the world. Let proper inquiries be made where they are necessary; let the character of judges unjustly charged be vindicated, and the vicious and unworthy be removed, and improper characters will cease to intrude themselves; their friends will not dare to recommend, and Congress will have confidence that the laws which they pass will be applied agreeably to their genuine principles, to the protection and ease of the citizens; if we do not provide for this, we had better cease to make laws.
If virtuous men are appointed and the vicious discouraged, Congress may, from particular circumstances, be called on to make inquiries, but very rarely indeed to be employed in impeachments, (no men of real virtue and talents would refuse a seat on the bench for fear of inquiry or impeachment.) He said that the judges of the Supreme Court in the State he had the honor of representing, though they differed in political opinions, administered justice with such purity and diligence, that though some of them had been long in office, they enjoyed the confidence of the citizens, were in no danger of impeachment or removal by vote, and he believed would not shrink from inquiry if necessary. The more extensive the confidence of the citizens that was reposed in the Judiciary, the easier it would be to supply vacancies with men of character and talents. He said that among several other observations which occurred to his mind, with offering which he would not now detain the House, he had once thought of stating other charges against the official conduct of these judges, of which he had been well informed, but on due reflection he declined mentioning them, and thought it most for the public good to insist on the appointment demanded by a member on the responsibility of his own official character, and as a matter of right, and would do nothing that would impair the weight of the precedent that he hoped would be set by agreeing to the resolution as it stood.
Mr. F. said that having so long engaged the attention of the House he would conclude by observing, that as the case now stood it is proper for all the members to vote for the resolution; those that believed as he did, that there was a want of necessary confidence in those judges, and that this want of confidence was occasioned by their unauthorized and oppressive conduct, were obliged in conscience to vote for the inquiry; and every member who believed the judges to have done their duty, and that the public confidence is withdrawn from them without cause, are bound in duty to vote for the resolution, in order that the judges may have an opportunity to vindicate their character, that confidence in them being restored they may become useful to the public; therefore, in every light he could view it, he was convinced it was his duty to vote for the resolution, and would act accordingly.
Mr. Jackson.—As, Mr. Speaker, this subject is novel in its nature, and may be important in its consequences, I presume there exists a disposition to hear the reasoning which any gentleman may be disposed to offer upon it. It is with this view that I rise to express my opinion in favor of creating a committee of inquiry. I consider this House as the grand inquest of the nation, whose duty it is to inquire, on a proper representation, into the conduct of every official character under the Government. Like a grand jury, we ought, in my opinion, at the instance of any member, to send for all persons possessed of information calculated to throw light upon the conduct of any individual inculpated. A contrary doctrine would lead to the most unfortunate consequences. It would lead to this, that a minority would never be able to inquire into the conduct of a State offender, unless such inquiry were favored by the majority. As it is now contended that the inquiry is not a matter of right which any member may demand, but a matter of favor, to be granted according to the pleasure of the majority, it may be said that, if a majority favor an individual, he will always escape without an impeachment. But I believe otherwise; and that the Senate, like a virtuous judge, will not suffer an atom of prejudice or partiality to fall into the scales of justice.
But, say gentlemen, though it may be the duty of the House to impeach an officer, it is necessary that facts, warranting such an impeachment, should be first presented. This is not the course pursued in cases where a grand jury is called upon to act. If a murder is committed, it is their duty to inquire, and diligently inquire, who is guilty of the act, and to send for all persons capable of giving information respecting it. Such is the practice. If it shall be required to furnish facts, as is urged by gentlemen, the consequence will be that offences of the highest nature will be committed with impunity. It has been observed that it is odious to undertake the task of a public informer. But what the constitution and laws make our duty, so far from being odious, is honorable; because we thereby discharge a duty imposed upon us by our oaths, and because we show ourselves unawed by the vicious conduct of bad men. If the character of a public informer be odious, are we to expect that private individuals will come forward with affidavits? In such a case, to say the least of it, the duty would be of an unpleasant nature.
We have, in the course of this debate, been frequently called upon for precedents, and been told, that, when found, they ought to be adhered to. In a country from which we are accustomed to draw precedents—England—common report has been considered as a sufficient authority for similar inquiries. We do not, however, ask for an inquiry in this case on common report, but on the declaration of a member of this House, made in his place. Suppose there was no such declaration, has not a common report, from Maine to Georgia, condemned the conduct of the judge in the case of Fries and others, at Philadelphia, in the case of a grand jury in Delaware, whom he directed to inquire for seditious practices, and in the case of Callender, in Virginia? Has not the general sentiment of the country charged him with having, in these cases, abused his powers as a judge by tyrannizing over those who were brought before him? If we possess the right to inquire, on common report, surely we ought to institute this inquiry on the prevalence of so general a sentiment. To such an inquiry I would unhesitatingly agree, if the character of the President were implicated, the opinion of the gentleman from Vermont to the contrary notwithstanding. I would likewise agree to make the same inquiry in any other case; because the inquiry would redound to the honor of the individual implicated, if innocent; and because, if guilty, he ought to be punished.
I am sorry my friend from Pennsylvania stated any facts, as I do not consider it necessary that the House should be acquainted with any facts to make this inquiry; and because I think the facts, stated as grounds of impeachment, are not such as will warrant an impeachment. I have always understood that it was the right of a judge to expound the law, and I have known frequent instances where the court have refused the counsel the liberty of discussing the law on points on which they have made up their minds. While I am free to declare that the conduct of the court in the trial of Fries is not, in my opinion, such as to require an impeachment, yet I am in favor of instituting the inquiry. But, say gentlemen, by the passage of this resolution, we shall censure the judge. I believe not. If I believed so, I would first require testimony; for I hold it a good principle, that no man ought to be condemned until he has been heard. In my opinion, this resolution will have no such tendency; as, if the judge has not been guilty of misconduct, the inquiry will redound to his honor, and as it is the duty of a virtuous man to demand an inquiry whenever charged with an offence.
Gentlemen, in opposition to this measure, say they wish to guard against suspicion. But suspicion has long since gone forth; has been heard and re-echoed from every part of the Union; and the only way of defeating it, if ill-founded, is to institute an inquiry, and if the character of the judge be innocent, to pronounce it so. I am surprised to find gentlemen, who profess a friendship for the character of one of the persons implicated, opposed to this inquiry, when they believe him innocent. I should suppose it their peculiar duty to call for the inquiry, that the accused might have an opportunity of proving to the world that his character has been assailed without cause.
Mr. R. Griswold.—After what has passed on this floor, there can be no doubt that the gentlemen whose characters are implicated by this resolution will ardently desire an investigation of their conduct; and if, on this floor, we were merely to consult our own wishes, we should unanimously agree on an investigation. But this is not our duty; our duty is to take on this, as well as on all other occasions, a correct course; to take those steps only which are warranted. It is because I doubt, after considerable deliberation, whether this course is warranted, that I am opposed to it. What, I ask, is the nature of the resolution on the table? It contains no charges against the judges implicated; it only proposes to raise a committee to inquire whether their official conduct has been such as to justify the interposition of the constitutional power of this House. If a committee of inquiry is raised, what will be their powers? One thing will certainly follow. They will be clothed with a power to send for persons, and probably for papers. Is it consistent with principle to appoint a committee, which, from its nature, must be secret, with power to ransack the country in the first instance for accusations against the judges, and then for proofs to support them? Is this correct? Are gentlemen prepared to say so? to seek for accusations, and then for proofs to support those accusations, against high officers of the Government? For one, I believe that this course is not correct. I believe it to be dangerous. I agree with the gentleman from Vermont, that it operates in the nature of an inquisition. A committee will be raised to act in secret, first to find an accusation, and next to prove it. If there is now any accusation against the judges, let it be made; let it be made on this floor; and, as the gentleman from New Jersey has observed, let us ascertain, if true, whether it will be a sufficient ground for an impeachment. This will be a correct course, and it will be the only safe course. If, on the contrary, we proceed in the manner proposed, it will be attended with this consequence: at the commencement of every session we shall raise a secret committee, to compose an inquisition, to ascertain whether there are not charges against some public officer, and to search for proofs to justify them. Is the Government of this country founded on this principle? I know that this secret course of procedure is practised by the Spanish Government, and by some others, but I never thought that it would be the practice of this Government. When a charge is made against a public officer, it ought to be boldly made. It ought to be made here, and should be committed to writing. Instead of this being done, there is no charge made. The resolution contains none. It is merely calculated to raise a secret committee. Why? Because the gentleman from Virginia is of opinion that it is proper. Is his opinion, or the opinion of any other gentleman, to govern this House? Are we brought to this? I trust this is not the case. I trust that gentlemen will think it necessary not only to consider his opinion, but to form their own. What can gentlemen say, if they agree to this resolution? That they voted to investigate the conduct of two judges. Why? Because the gentleman from Virginia says it is necessary to investigate. Why investigate? Because the gentleman demands it. This is the language of that gentleman yesterday. Because a gentleman of this House gives his opinion of the course proper to be pursued on this occasion, it does not follow that we are to be governed by it. We may respect it; but we must respect our own opinions still more, if we faithfully discharge our duty. I am sensible that some facts have been mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or rather, that that gentleman has heard a story; but it is mere hearsay.