It accordingly was put, and carried—yeas 58.
Mr. Jackson then moved a postponement of the resolutions until the 1st Monday in December.
Mr. Stanford inquired whether the motion of postponement was not susceptible of a division, so as to apply to each resolution separately.
Mr. J. Randolph hoped the question would be so taken.
Mr. Rodney expressed the same wish, and that the yeas and nays might be taken on each division of the question. He was opposed to a postponement. He should not have risen at this late period but for the warm opposition the resolutions had received from various quarters, and but for his desire to avail himself of the opportunity to state his reasons for giving them a firm support.
It is objected to these resolutions that they are abstract propositions. By abstract principles, I understand axioms unapplied. But when they are applied to facts, they cease to be considered in the abstract. In geometry there are certain elementary principles which are the basis of all reasoning on any proposition in that department of science. So in law there are principles in the abstract while they remain unapplied, and which bear in every case where facts admit of their application. So in politics certain principles are held sacred, either in the view of right, or in relation to the constitution of a State. But when these principles are applied to a given state of things, they cease to be abstract. In the Declaration of Independence there are several abstract principles, such as “that all men are free,” &c. But when applied to a certain state of things, they are no longer abstract. I apprehend, therefore, that my worthy friend from Pennsylvania will, on more mature reflection, perceive that the principles contained in the resolutions bearing on facts cease to be abstract; on facts which it is necessary for us to decide, and against examining the consequences of which no reason can be urged. But, says another gentleman, we have no jurisdiction in the case; we have nothing to do with the act of Georgia of 1795; we have no authority over it. I confess myself really surprised to be assured, over and over again, that the act of 1795 which gives the House all this trouble, is the corner stone of the present claims, and without which there would not be a shadow of claim, is not to be considered as blended with our proceedings. What! when we are called upon to compromise claims, are we not to go to the cause, to the fountain source, and decide whether they have, or have not, a foundation in justice? Put the act of 1795 out of the way, and would we have ever heard of this compromise? Remove it, and would we have a single claimant before us soliciting a compromise? I consider the act, to Georgia, as involving the all-important point; as intimately and indissolubly blended with the question before us. That question is whether we will consent to give five millions to effect a compromise of claims, directly emanating from the act of 1795; and then, as an incidental question, we are obliged to look at the act of 1795. If the House have authority over the main question, ex vi termini, they have authority over every question incidental to it; and common sense teaches us that it is absolutely necessary to determine on the validity of the act of 1795, in order to decide the justice or policy of compromising claims arising out of it.
Having settled, as I conceive, these preliminary points, I will call the attention of the House to the great point on which their decision must turn. Either the act of 1795 or of 1796 is in force. If that of 1795 is in force the claimants have a legal title to unascertained millions. If that act is not binding, they have no claim at all. If that act is of no authority, there is an end of their title. The tree is cut up by the roots, and all its branches fall. They have either then a title to fifty millions, or they have no title at all. Their case cannot be compared to a common saying, which declares half a loaf better than no bread.
Now let us compare these facts and reasonings with the resolutions. When I rose I intended to have taken them up in order, but as I have been diverted by the course of the argument, I shall pursue the track I have taken. One of the resolutions states “that a subsequent legislature of an individual State has an undoubted right to repeal any act of a preceding legislature, provided such repeal be not forbidden by the constitution of such State, or of the United States.”
This is, I think, a plain and clear axiom. Both legislatures flow from the same source, and are armed with equal powers. What one legislature can do, another may undo, if the interest of the public prescribes it. I know an ingenious distinction is taken, as to the power of a legislative body, between municipal acts and those constituting contracts. The distinction holds to a certain degree as to expediency, but not as to power. When a legislative body forms a contract, it is a solemn thing, and it ought not to be touched, except when the private evil arising from its being annulled should rather be endured than the public calamity arising from its continuance. But still the position of the resolution is perfectly tenable. What one legislature has done another may undo; what one has enacted, a subsequent one may repeal.
Let us examine whether there is any thing in the rescinding act of Georgia at variance with the constitution of that State, or the Constitution of the United States. The whole course of the business shows the previous act to have been a violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The Constitution of the United States declares that no State “shall pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” That no contract has been impaired, is evident from attending to the sense of the word. I know of no contract formed, either in a legal or equitable sense. Did the Constitution of Georgia authorize her Representatives to rob the people of their property? Or did it authorize them only to dispose of it for their welfare? If they had a right to dispose of it in a wrongful manner, it knocks up the argument at once. If they were vested with a right to rob and plunder their constituents, I give up the point. But until this is shown I shall remain of opinion that they only had the right of disposing of it for the general good. I am not about to travel through the fruitful wilderness of inquiry disclosed in the progress of this affair. But gentlemen say that we have no evidence of corruption. What do they want more than we possess? The whole business has been referred to a set of Commissioners, whose comprehensive powers embraced an investigation of every claim. They have fully examined the claims under the act of 1795, and they have reported that—