Mr. Wright.—Mr. President, I presumed from the observations of the honorable gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Wells,) that he had not minutely attended to the provisions of this bill, on which the transfer of this stock is made expressly to depend. The treaty has in the most guarded manner secured us in the possession of the ceded territory, as a condition precedent to the payment of the purchase money, and this bill has expressly provided that no part of the stock shall be transferred till the possession stipulated by the treaty shall have been obtained. Not such a possession as the gentleman has said the President may be satisfied with—“the delivery of a twig and turf, or the knocker of a door.” The treaty has defined the possession intended: it is the possession of Louisiana, the island and city of New Orleans, with the forts and arsenals, the troops having been withdrawn from thence. But, sir, from his remarks, it would seem that his objections to this bill had been predicated on his want of confidence in the Executive, as he has expressed his fears that the stock would be transferred, before the prerequisite conditions had been performed. He says, we ought to be satisfied that the possession stipulated by the treaty shall have been delivered up before we pass this bill. Has he forgot that, by the constitution, the President is to superintend the execution of the law? Or has he forgot that treaties are the supreme law of the land? Or why, while he professes to respect this constitution, does he oppose the commission of the execution of this law to that organ of the Government to which it has been assigned by the constitution? Why, I ask, does he distrust the President? Has he not been, throughout the whole of this business, very much alive to the peaceful acquisition of this immense territory, and the invaluable waters of the Mississippi? a property which, but the other day, we were told was all-important, and so necessary to our political existence that if it was not obtained the Western people would sever themselves from the Union. This property, for which countless millions were then proposed to be expended, and the best blood of our citizens to be shed, and which then was to be had at all hazards, per fas aut per nefas, seems now to have lost its worth, and it would seem as if some gentlemen could not be satisfied with the purchase, because our title was not recorded in the blood of its inhabitants. But that this is not the wish of the American people, has been unequivocally declared by their immediate representatives in Congress, as well as by this House, who had each expressed their approbation of the peaceful title we had acquired, by majorities I thought not to be misunderstood. And the gentleman, although he voted for the ratification of the treaty, now again calls on us to investigate the title. It is certainly too late.
Mr. Pickering said, if he entertained the opinion just now expressed by the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Wells,) of the binding force of all treaties made by the President and Senate, he should think it to be his duty to vote for the bill now under consideration. “The constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”—But a treaty to be thus obligatory, must not contravene the constitution, nor contain any stipulations which transcend the powers therein given to the President and Senate. The treaty between the United States and the French Republic, professing to cede Louisiana to the United States, appeared to him to contain such an exceptionable stipulation—a stipulation which cannot be executed by any authority now existing. It is declared in the third article, that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States.” But neither the President and Senate, nor the President and Congress, are competent to such an act of incorporation. He believed that our Administration admitted that this incorporation could not be effected without an amendment of the constitution; and he conceived that this necessary amendment could not be made in the ordinary mode by the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and the ratification by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States. He believed the assent of each individual State to be necessary for the admission of a foreign country as an associate in the Union; in like manner as in a commercial house, the consent of each member would be necessary to admit a new partner into the company; and whether the assent of every State to such an indispensable amendment were attainable, was uncertain. But the articles of a treaty were necessarily related to each other; the stipulation in one article being the consideration for another. If, therefore, in respect to the Louisiana Treaty, the United States fail to execute, and within a reasonable time, the engagement in the third article, (to incorporate that territory into the Union,) the French Government will have a right to declare the whole treaty void. We must then abandon the country, or go to war to maintain our possession. But it was to prevent war that the pacific measures of the last winter were adopted—they were to “lay the foundation for future peace.”
Mr. P. had never doubted the right of the United States to acquire new territory, either by purchase or by conquest, and to govern the territory so acquired as a dependent province; and in this way might Louisiana have become a territory of the United States, and have received a form of government infinitely preferable to that to which its inhabitants are now subject.
Mr. Dayton.—As the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts has quoted what was suggested by me in a former debate, to deduce from it an inference which the information I gave can by no means warrant, I must be allowed the liberty of correcting him. When I said that there existed an essential difference between the French and Spanish officers at New Orleans as to the real boundaries of the province of Louisiana, I did not mean to insinuate that this disagreement extended so far as an opposition to the French taking possession. It was a question of limits only, varying, however, so much in extent as would have produced a serious altercation between those two countries, although closely allied.
The Spanish Governor had taken it upon himself to proclaim that the province lately ceded and about to be given over to France would be confined on the east of the Mississippi to the river Iberville, and the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, or in other words to the island of New Orleans; but the French Prefect on the contrary declared that he neither had nor would give his assent to the establishment of those limits, which would be regarded no longer than until the arrival of their troops.
The same gentleman (Mr. Pickering) has said that the advocates of this measure seem to rely much more upon their power than upon their right, and in this assertion I am compelled to say that he has done us very great injustice. The title of the French is founded upon the often quoted treaty of St Ildefonso, confirmed by the royal order signed by the King of Spain himself, so lately as the 15th October, 1802, directing the delivery of the “colony of Louisiana and its dependencies as well as of the city and island of New Orleans, without any exception, to General Victor, or other officer duly authorized by that Republic to take charge of the said delivery.”
When at New Orleans in July last, I obtained from the best source a translated copy of that royal order, and can aver that it absolutely directs possession to be given without reservation or condition. It is not, and cannot be, denied that the lately ratified treaty of Paris transfers to us completely all the title acquired by France in virtue of the first treaty and order alluded to. We have, then, most incontestably, the right of possession, and our object now is, by passing the bill before us to obtain the possession itself, which we can certainly never effect, consistently with good faith, if the reasonings and objections of my honorable friends from Delaware and Massachusetts should prevail. We are asked by the same gentlemen what will be the consequence if it shall appear that the royal order has been revoked? I answer, first, that it is not in the least degree probable, for neither of them pretend to have heard of such revocation, nor is it intimated in the confidential communications before the Senate. But admitting for argument’s sake that it were revoked, of what avail could it be against a third party, who had in the mean time become a bona fide purchaser? Shall one nation give to another a written, formal evidence of transfer of territory, and revoke it at pleasure, especially after a third shall have been tempted and induced by that very evidence of title to contract for the purchase of it? Would an act so fraudulent be countenanced between individuals in a court of equity? Could it be justified between nations in a high court of honor? The honorable gentleman from Delaware has taken a more delicate ground of objection. He has insinuated that there exists in the knowledge of the Senate, the evidence of a serious opposition to our possessing that country, which, if known to the other branch of the Legislature, would probably have defeated this bill in its progress there. Allusions artfully made in this manner to documents communicated under the injunction of secrecy, place us in an embarrassing situation. Forbidden by our rules to expose the papers referred to, even in argument, we can only declare what impressions they have made upon ourselves. Every Senator must understand him, every one must have heard and read, and weighed deliberately the contents of those documents, and, for myself, I am free to avow my belief, that, if known to every member of the other House, they would have had no effect against this bill, but would rather have quickened and ensured its progress, for such is the influence they have upon me.
Mr. Taylor.—There have been, Mr. President, two objections made against the treaty; one that the United States cannot constitutionally acquire territory; the other, that the treaty stipulates for the admission of a new State into the Union; a stipulation which the treaty-making power is unable to comply with. To these objections I shall endeavor to give answers not heretofore urged.
Before a confederation, each State in the Union possessed a right, as attached to sovereignty, of acquiring territory, by war, purchase, or treaty. This right must be either still possessed, or forbidden both to each State and to the General Government, or transferred to the General Government. It is not possessed by the States separately, because war and compacts with foreign powers and with each other are prohibited to a separate State; and no other means of acquiring territory exist. By depriving every State of the means of exercising the right of acquiring territory, the constitution has deprived each separate State of the right itself. Neither the means nor the right of acquiring territory are forbidden to the United States; on the contrary, in the fourth article of the constitution, Congress is empowered “to dispose of and regulate the territory belonging to the United States.” This recognizes the right of the United States to hold territory. The means of acquiring territory consist of war and compact; both are expressly surrendered to Congress and forbidden to the several States; and no right in a separate State to hold territory without its limits is recognized by the constitution, nor any mode of effecting it possible, consistent with it. The means of acquiring and the right of holding territory, being both given to the United States, and prohibited to each State, it follows that these attributes of sovereignty once held by each State are thus transferred to the United States; and that, if the means of acquiring and the right of holding, are equivalent to the right of acquiring territory, then this right merged from the separate States to the United States, as indispensably annexed to the treaty-making power, and the power of making war; or, indeed, is literally given to the General Government by the constitution.
Having proved, sir, that the United States may constitutionally acquire, hold, dispose of, and regulate territory, the other objection to be considered is, whether the third article of the treaty does stipulate that Louisiana shall be erected into a State? It is conceded that the treaty-making power cannot, by treaty, erect a new State, however they may stipulate for it. I premise, that in the construction of this article, it is proper to recollect that the negotiators must be supposed to have understood our constitution. It became very particularly their duty to do so, because, in this article itself, they have recited “the principles of the constitution” as their guide. Hence, it is obvious, they did not intend to infringe, but to adhere to those principles; and therefore, if the article will admit of a construction consistent with this presumable knowledge and intention of the negotiators, the probability of its accuracy will be greater than one formed in a supposition that the negotiators were either ignorant of that which they ought to have known, or that they fraudulently professed a purpose which they really intended to defeat. The following construction is reconcilable with what the negotiators ought to have known, and with what they professed to intend.