This first article then concludes, that in consequence of this irregular conduct of this respondent, “the said John Fries was deprived of the right secured to him by the eighth article amendatory of the constitution, and was condemned to death, without having been heard by counsel, in his defence.”
In the year 1794, an insurrection took place in four of the western counties of Pennsylvania, with a view of resisting, and preventing by force the execution of these two statutes; and a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, in the year 1795, by William Patterson, Esq., then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, two persons, who had been concerned in the above-named insurrection, namely, Philip Vigol and John Mitchell, were indicted for treason, of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force the execution of the two last-mentioned acts of Congress; and were, after a full and very solemn trial, convicted of the indictments and sentenced to death. They were afterwards pardoned by George Washington, then President of the United States.
In the first of these trials, that of Vigol, the defence of the prisoner was conducted by very able counsel, one of whom, William Lewis, Esq., is the same person who appeared as counsel for John Fries, in the trial now under consideration. Neither that learned gentleman, nor his able colleague, then thought proper to raise the question of law, “whether resisting and preventing by armed force the execution of a particular law of the United States, be a ‘levying of war against the United States,’” according to the true meaning of the constitution? although a decision of this question in the negative must have acquitted the prisoner. But in the next trial, that of Mitchell, this question was asked on the part of the prisoner, and was very fully and ably discussed by his counsel; and it was solemnly determined by the Court, both the judges concurring, “that to resist, or prevent by armed force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, is a levying of war against the United States, and consequently is treason, within the true meaning of the constitution.” The decision, according to the best established principles of our jurisprudence, became a precedent for all courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction; a precedent which, although not absolutely obligatory, ought to be viewed with very great respect, especially by the court in which it was made, and ought never to be departed from, but on the fullest and clearest conviction of its incorrectness.
On the 9th of July, an act of Congress was passed, providing for a valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and an enumeration of slaves throughout the United States; and directing the appointment of commissioners and assessors for carrying it into execution; and on the 4th day of July, in the same year, a direct tax was laid by another act of Congress of that date, on the lands, dwelling-houses, and slaves, so to be valued and enumerated.
In the months of February and March, A. D. 1799, an insurrection took place in the counties of Bucks and Northampton, in the State of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of resisting and preventing by force the execution of the two last-mentioned acts of Congress, and particularly that for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses. John Fries, the person mentioned in the article of impeachment now under consideration, was apprehended and committed to prison, as one of the ringleaders of this insurrection; and at a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, A. D. 1799, he was brought to trial for this offence, on an indictment for treason, by levying war against the United States, before James Iredell, Esq., then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, who presided in the said court, according to law, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, who sat in the said circuit court as assistant judge.
In this trial, which was conducted with great solemnity, and occupied nine days, the prisoner was assisted by William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, Esqs., two very able and eminent counsellors; the former of whom, William Lewis, is the person who assisted, as above mentioned, in conducting the defence of Vigol, on a similar indictment. These gentlemen, finding that the facts alleged were fully and undeniably proved, by a very minute and elaborate examination of witnesses, thought proper to rest the case of the prisoner on the question of law which had been determined in the cases of Vigol and Mitchell, above mentioned, and had then been acquiesced in, but which they thought proper again to raise. They contended, “that to resist by force of arms a particular law of the United States, does not amount to levying war against the United States, within the true meaning of the constitution, and therefore is not treason, but a riot only.” This question they argued at great length, and with all the force of their learning and genius; and after a full discussion at the bar, and the most mature deliberation by the Court, the learned and excellent judge who then presided, and who was no less distinguished by his humanity and tenderness towards persons tried before him, than by his extensive knowledge and great talents as a lawyer, pronounced the opinion of himself and his colleague, “that to resist, or prevent by force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, does amount to levying war against them, within the true meaning of the constitution, and does, therefore, constitute the crime of treason:” thereby adding the weight of another and more solemn decision to the precedent which had been established in the above-mentioned cases of Vigol and Mitchell.
Under this opinion of the Court on the question of law, the jury, having no doubt as to the facts, found the said John Fries guilty of treason on the above-mentioned indictment. But a new trial was granted by the Court, not by reason of any doubt as to the correctness of the decision on the question of law, but solely on the ground, as this respondent hath understood and believes, that one of the jurors of the petit jury, after he was summoned, but before he was sworn on the trial, had made some declaration unfavorable to the prisoner.
On the 11th day of April, 1800, and from that day until the 2d day of May in the same year, a circuit court of the United States was held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, before this respondent, then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania. At this court the indictment on which the said John Fries had been convicted as above mentioned, was quashed ex officio by William Rawle, Esq., then attorney of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, and a new indictment was by him preferred against the said John Fries, for treason of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force in the manner above set forth, the execution of the above-mentioned acts of Congress, for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and the enumeration of slaves, and for levying and collecting a direct tax. This indictment, of which a true copy, marked No. 1, is herewith exhibited by this respondent, who prays that it may be taken as part of this his answer, being found by the grand jury on the 16th day of April, 1800, the said John Fries was on the same day arraigned thereon, and plead not guilty. William Lewis, and Alexander James Dallas, Esqs., the same persons who had conducted his defence at his former trial, were again at his request assigned by the Court as his counsel; and his trial was appointed to be had on Tuesday the 22d day of the last-mentioned month of April.
After this indictment was found by the grand jury, this respondent considered it with great care and deliberation, and finding from the three overt acts of treason which it charged, that the question of law arising upon it was the same question which had already been decided twice in the same court, on solemn argument and deliberation, and once in that very case, he considered the law as settled by those decisions, with the correctness of which, on full consideration, he was entirely satisfied; and by the authority of which he should have deemed himself bound, even had he regarded the question as doubtful in itself. They are moreover in perfect conformity with the uniform tenor of decisions in the courts of England and Great Britain, from the Revolution in 1688 to the present time, which, in his opinion, added greatly to their weight and authority.
It was for these reasons that on the 22d day of April, 1800, when the said John Fries was brought into court, and placed in the prisoners’ box for trial, but before the petit jury were impanelled to try him, this respondent informed the above-mentioned William Lewis, one of his counsel, the aforesaid Alexander James Dallas not being then in court, “that the Court had deliberately considered the indictment against John Fries for treason, and the three several overt acts of treason stated, therein: that the crime of treason was defined by the Constitution of the United States. That as the Federal Legislature had the power to make, alter, or repeal laws, so the judiciary only had the power, and it was their duty, to declare, expound and interpret the Constitution and laws of the United States. That it was the duty of the Court, in all criminal cases, to state to the petit jury their opinion of the law arising on the facts; but the petit jury, in all criminal cases, were to decide both the law and the facts, on a consideration of the whole case. That there must be some constructive exposition of the terms used in the constitution, “levying war against the United States.” That the question, what acts amounted to levying war against the United States, or the Government thereof, was a question of law, and had been decided by Judges Patterson and Peters, in the cases of Vigol and Mitchell, and by Judges Iredell and Peters, in the case of John Fries, prisoner at the bar, in April 1799. That Judge Peters remained of the same opinion, which he had twice before delivered, and he, this respondent, on long and great consideration, concurred in the opinion of Judges Patterson, Iredell, and Peters. That to prevent unnecessary delay, and to save time on the trial of John Fries, and to prevent a delay of justice, in the great number of civil causes depending for trial at that term, the Court had drawn up in writing their opinion of the law, arising on the overt acts stated in the indictment against John Fries; and had directed David Caldwell, their clerk, to make out three copies of their opinion, one to be delivered to the attorney of the district, one to the counsel for the prisoner, and one to the petit jury, after they shall have been impanelled and heard the indictment read to them by the clerk, and after the district attorney should have stated to them the law on the overt acts alleged in the indictment, as it appeared to him.”