Mr. Hopkinson.—Mr. President: We cannot remind you, and this honorable Court, as our opponents have so frequently done, that we address you in behalf of the majesty of the people. We appear for an ancient and infirm man, whose better days have been worn out in the service of that country which now degrades him; and who has nothing to promise you for an honorable acquittal but the approbation of your own consciences. We are happy, however, to concur with the honorable Managers in one point; I mean the importance they are disposed to give to this cause. In every relation and respect in which it can be viewed, it is, indeed, of infinite importance. It is important to the respondent to the full amount of his good name and reputation, and of that little portion of that happiness the small residue of his life may afford. It is important to you, Senators and judges, inasmuch as you value the judgment which posterity shall pass upon the proceedings of this day. It is important to our country, as she estimates her character for sound, dignified, and impartial justice, in the eyes of a judging world. The little, busy vortex that plays immediately round the scene of action, considers this proceeding merely as the trial of Judge Chase, and gazes upon him as the only person interested in the result. This is a false and imperfect view of the case. It is not the trial of Judge Chase alone. It is a trial between him and his country, and that country is as dearly interested as the judge can be, in a fair and impartial investigation of the case, and in a just and honest decision of it. There is yet another dread tribunal to which we should not be inattentive. We should look to it with solemn impressions of respect. It is posterity; the race of men that will come after us. When all the false glare and false importance of the times shall pass away; when things shall settle down into a state of placid tranquillity, and lose that bustling motion that deceives with false appearances; when you, most honorable Senators, who sit here to judge, as well as the respondent who sits here to be judged, shall alike rest in the silence of the tomb, then comes the faithful, the scrutinizing historian, who, without fear or favor, will record this transaction; then comes a just and impartial posterity, who, without regard to persons or to dignities, will decide upon your decision. Then, I trust, the high honor and integrity of this Court will stand recorded in the pure language of deserved praise, and this day will be remembered in the annals of our land, as honorable to the respondent, to his judges, and to the justice of our country.
We have heard, sir, from the honorable Managers who have addressed you, many harsh expressions. I hope, sir, they will do no harm. We have been told of the respondent’s unholy sins, which even the heavenly expectation of sincere repentance cannot wash away; we have been told of his volumes of guilt, every page of which calls loudly for punishment. This sort of language but pursues the same spirit of asperity and reproach which was begun in the replication to our answer. But we come here, sir, not to complain of any thing; we come expecting to bear and to forbear much. It does, indeed, seem to me, that the replication filed by the honorable Managers on behalf of the House of Representatives and of all the people, carries with it more acrimony than either the occasion or their dignity demanded. It may be said that they have resorted for it to English precedent, and framed it from the replication filed in the celebrated case of Warren Hastings. There is, however, no similarity between that case and ours. Precedents might have been found more mild in their character, and more adapted to the circumstances of our case. The impeachment of Hastings was not instituted on a petty catalogue of frivolous occurrences, more calculated to excite ridicule than apprehension, but for the alleged murder of princes and plunder of empires. If, however, the choice of this case as a precedent for our pleadings, has exposed us to some unpleasant expressions, it also furnishes to us abundance of consolation and hope. There, the most splendid talents that ever adorned the British nation, were strained to their utmost exertion to crush the devoted victim of malignant persecution. But in vain; the stern integrity, the enlightened perception, the immovable justice of his judges, stood as a barrier between him and destruction, and safely protected him from the fury of the storm. So, I trust in God, it will be with us.
In England, the impeachment of a judge is a rare occurrence. I recollect but two in half a century. But, in our country, boasting of its superior purity and virtue, and declaiming ever against the vice, venality, and corruption of the Old World, seven judges have been prosecuted criminally in about two years. A melancholy proof either of extreme and unequalled corruption in our Judiciary, or of strange and persecuting times amongst us.
The first proper object of our inquiries in this case is, to ascertain with proper precision what acts or offences of a public officer are the objects of impeachment. This question meets us at the very threshold of the case. If it shall appear that the charges exhibited in these articles of impeachment are not, even if true, the constitutional subjects of impeachment; if it shall turn out on the investigation that the judge has really fallen into error, mistake, or indiscretion, yet if he stands acquitted in proof of any such acts as by the law of the land are impeachable offences, he stands entitled to discharge on his trial. This proceeding by impeachment is a mode of trial created and defined by the constitution of our country; and by this the Court is exclusively bound. To the constitution, then, we must exclusively look to discover what is or is not impeachable. We shall there find the whole proceeding distinctly marked out; and every thing designated and properly distributed necessary in the construction of a court of criminal jurisdiction. We shall find, 1. Who shall originate or present an impeachment. 2. Who shall try it. 3. For what offences it may be used. 4. What is the punishment on conviction. The first of these points is provided for in the second section of the first article of the constitution, where it is declared that “the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.” This power corresponds with that of a grand jury to find a presentment or indictment. In the third section of the same article, the Court is provided before whom the impeachment thus originated shall be tried: “The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.” And the fourth section of the second article points out and describes the offences intended to be impeachable, and the punishment which is to follow conviction; subject to a limitation in the third section of the first article.
I offer it as a position I shall rely upon in my argument, that no judge can be impeached and removed from office for any act or offence for which he could not be indicted. It must be by law an indictable offence. One of the gentlemen, indeed, who conduct this prosecution, (Mr. Campbell,) contends for the reverse of this proposition, and holds that for such official acts as are the subject of impeachment no indictment will lie or can be maintained. For, says he, it would involve us in this monstrous oppression and absurdity, that a man might be twice punished for the same offence—once by impeachment, and then by indictment. And so most surely he may; and the limitation of the punishment on impeachment takes away the injustice and oppression the gentleman dreads.
The House of Representatives has the power of impeachment; but for what they are to impeach, in what cases they may exercise this delegated power, depends on other parts of the constitution, and not on their opinion, whim, or caprice. The whole system of impeachment must be taken together, and not in detached parts; and if we find one part of the constitution declaring who shall commence an impeachment, we find other parts declaring who shall try it, and what acts and what persons are constitutional subjects of this mode of trial. The power of impeachment is with the House of Representatives—but only for impeachable offences. They are to proceed against the offence in this way when it is committed, but not to create the offence, and make any act criminal and impeachable at their will and pleasure. What is an offence, is a question to be decided by the constitution and the law, not by the opinion of a single branch of the Legislature; and when the offence thus described by the constitution or the law has been committed, then, and not until then, has the House of Representatives power to impeach the offender. So a grand jury possesses the sole power to indict; but in the exercise of this power they are bound by positive law, and do not assume under this general power to make any thing indictable which they might disapprove. If it were so, we should indeed have a strange, unsettled, and dangerous penal code. No man could walk in safety, but would be at the mercy of the caprice of every grand jury that might be summoned, and that would be crime to-morrow which is innocent to-day.
What part of the constitution then declares any of the acts charged and proved upon Judge Chase, even in the worst aspect, to be impeachable? He has not been guilty of bribery or corruption; he is not charged with them. Has he then been guilty of “other high crimes and misdemeanors?” In an instrument so sacred as the constitution, I presume every word must have its full and fair meaning. It is not then only for crimes and misdemeanors that a judge is impeachable, but it must be for high crimes and misdemeanors. Although this qualifying adjective “high” immediately precedes and is directly attached to the word “crimes,” yet, from the evident intention of the constitution and upon a just grammatical construction, it must be also applied to “misdemeanors.” Observe, sir, the crimes with which these “other high crimes” are classed in the constitution, and we may learn something of their character. They stand in connection with “bribery and corruption;” tried in the same manner and subject to the same penalties. But if we are to lose the force and meaning of the word “high” in relation to misdemeanors, and this description of offences must be governed by the mere meaning of the term “misdemeanors,” without deriving any grade from the adjective, still my position remains unimpaired, that the offence, whatever it is, which is the ground of impeachment, must be such a one as would support an indictment. “Misdemeanor” is a legal and technical term, well understood and defined in law; and in the construction of a legal instrument we must give to words their legal signification. A misdemeanor or a crime, for in their just and proper acceptation they are synonymous terms, is an act committed or omitted, in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it. By this test let the conduct of the respondent be tried, and, by it, let him stand justified or condemned.
Does not, sir, the Court, provided by the constitution for the trial of an impeachment, give us some idea of the grade of offences intended for its jurisdiction? Look around you, sir, upon this awful tribunal of justice—is it not high and dignified, collecting within itself the justice and majesty of the American people? Was such a court created—does such a court sit to scan and punish paltry errors and indiscretions, too insignificant to have a name in the penal code, too paltry for the notice of a court of quarter sessions? This is indeed employing an elephant to remove an atom too minute for the grasp of an insect. Is the Senate of the United States, solemnly convened, and held together in the presence of the nation, to fix a standard of politeness in a judge, and mark the precincts of judicial decorum?
If I am correct in my position that nothing is impeachable that is not also indictable, for what acts then may a man be indicted? May it be on the mere caprice or opinion of any ten, twenty, or one hundred men in the community; or must it not be on some known law of the society in which he resides? It must unquestionably be for some offence, either of omission or commission, against some statute of the United States—or some statute of a particular State, or against the provision of the common law. Against which of these has the respondent offended? What law of any of the descriptions I have mentioned has he violated? By what is he to be judged, by what is he to be justified or condemned, if not by some known law of the country; and if no such law is brought upon his case—if no such violation rises on this day of trial in judgment against him, why stands he here at this bar as a criminal? Whom has he offended? The House of Representatives—and is he impeached for this?
I maintain as a most important and indispensible principle, that no man should be criminally accused, no man can be criminally condemned, but for the violation of some known law by which he was bound to govern himself. Nothing is so necessary to justice and to safety as that the criminal code should be certain and known. Let the judge, as well as the citizen, precisely know the path he is to walk in, and what he may or may not do. Let not the sword tremble over his unconscious head, or the ground be spread with quicksands and destruction, which appear fair and harmless to the eye of the traveller. Can it be pretended there is one rule of justice for a judge and another for a private citizen; and that while the latter is protected from surprise, from the malice or caprice of any man or body of men, and can be brought into legal jeopardy only by the violation of laws before made known to him, the latter is to be exposed to punishment without knowing his offence, and the criminality or innocence of his conduct is to depend not upon the laws existing at the time, but upon the opinions of a body of men to be collected four or five years after the transaction? A judge may thus be impeached and removed from office for an act strictly legal, when done, if any House of Representatives, for any indefinite time after, shall for any reason they may act upon, choose to consider such act improper and impeachable. The constitution, sir, never intended to lay the judiciary thus prostrate at the feet of the House of Representatives, the slaves of their will, the victims of their caprice. The judiciary must be protected from prejudice and varying opinion, or it is not worth a farthing. Suppose a grand jury should make a presentment against a man, stating that most truly he had violated no law or committed any known offence; but he had violated their notions of common sense—for this was the standard of impeachment the gentleman who opened gave us—he had shocked their nerves or wounded their sensibility. Would such a presentment be received or listened to for a moment? No, sir. And on the same principle, no judge should be put in jeopardy because the common sense of one hundred and fifty men might approve what is thus condemned, and the rule of right, the objects of punishment or praise, would thus shift about from day to day. Are we to depend upon the House of Representatives for the innocence or criminality of our conduct? Can they create offences at their will and pleasure, and declare that to be a crime in 1804, which was an indiscretion or pardonable error, or perhaps an approved proceeding in 1800? If this gigantic House of Representatives, by the usual vote and the usual forms of legislation, were to direct that any act heretofore not forbidden by law, should hereafter become penal, this declaration of their will would be a mere nullity; would have no force and effect, unless duly sanctioned by the Senate and the approbation of the President. Will they then be allowed, in the exercise of their power of impeachment, to create crimes and inflict the most serious penalties on actions never before suspected to be criminal, when they could not have swelled the same act into an offence in the form of a law? If this be truly the case, if this power of impeachment may be thus extended without limit or control, then indeed is every valuable liberty prostrated at the foot of this omnipotent House of Representatives; and may God preserve us! The President may approve and sign a law, or may make an appointment which to him may seem prudent and beneficial, and it may be the general, nay the universal sentiment that it is so; and it is undeniable that no law is violated by the act. But some four or five years hence there comes a House of Representatives whose common sense is constructed on a new model, and who either are or affect to be greatly shocked at the atrocity of this act. The President is impeached. In vain he pleads the purity of his intention, the legality of his conduct; in vain he avers that he has violated no law and been guilty of no crime. He will be told, as Judge Chase now is, that the common sense of the House is the standard of guilt, and their opinion of the error of the act conclusive evidence of corruption. We have read, sir, in our younger days, and read with horror, of the Roman Emperor who placed his edicts so high in the air that the keenest eye could not decipher them, and yet severely punished any breach of them. But the power claimed by the House of Representatives to make any thing criminal at their pleasure, at any period after its occurrence, is ten thousand times more dangerous, more tyrannical, more subversive of all liberty and safety. Shall I be called to heavy judgment now for an act which, when done, was forbidden by no law, and received no reproach, because in the course of years there is found a set of men whose common sense condemns the deed! The gentlemen have referred us to this standard, and being under the necessity to acknowledge that the respondent has violated no law of the community, they would on this vague and dangerous ground accuse, try, and condemn him. The code of the Roman tyrant was fixed on the height of a column, where it might be understood with some extraordinary pains; but here, to be safe, we must be able to look into years to come, and to foresee what will be the changing opinions of men or points of decorum for years to come. The rule of our conduct, by which we are to be judged and condemned, lies buried in the bosom of futurity, and in the minds and opinions of men unknown, perhaps unborn.