Mr. Bradley then renewed his motion as before, for striking out and inserting after the 13th line; this amendment he thought of great importance, as under the constitution as it now stands the Vice President must be a person of the highest respectability, well known, and of established reputation throughout the United States; but if the discriminating principle prevails without some precautions such as the amendment proposed, that assurance would be lost; and he should not be surprised to hear of as many candidates for Vice President as there are States, as the votes for President would be offered in truck for votes for Vice President, and an enterprising character might employ his emissaries through all the States to purchase them, and your amendment lays the foundation for intrigues. He was desirous that he who is to be set up as candidate for the Vice President should as at present be equally respectable, or that there should be none—that at least he should be the second man in the nation; adopt the designating principle, without the most guarded precautions, and you lose that assurance.
Mr. Hillhouse accorded with the gentleman’s amendment, as it naturally grows out of the principles of the report. There was not a word in the constitution about voting for the Vice President, no vote in fact is given for such an office; the alteration to designation alters the whole thing; and as the gentleman has expressed, will send the Vice President’s office into market to be handed about as change for the candidate supported by larger States; he would prefer leaving the choice of President and Vice President at once to the larger States than take it in this way. In calm times any government may work well, but he wished in calm times to provide against storm. If we designate any, then designate both and on equal terms.
Mr. Jackson said, that though coming from a small State he had not been instructed, and was therefore at perfect liberty to act according to the best of his judgment; though his State was now, in regard to population, small, and though it were to remain so, he could have but one opinion on this subject. He saw abundance of reason for preferring three to five. The constitution under the present form has directed the choice to be made from five. But the reason of this was consistent with the result to be produced; the electors were to vote for two persons indiscriminately, but with the restriction of voting for one only belonging to the State where the vote was given. The voting for two would necessarily bring forward four candidates, and a fifth possibly, for we saw in the two elections before the last that there was one more than the four, though in each case the fifth had but one vote; he alluded to the vote for Mr. Jay. In the amendment proposed you are called upon to designate for each office, and there can be little apprehension of having more than two or three principal candidates; and for twenty years to come he had no apprehension of a greater number of candidates if this amendment prevails.
Mr. Wright.—We need not be told in this house, that the constitution was the result of a compromise, or that care was taken to guard the rights of each State; these things we must be very ignorant, indeed, not to know. But does it therefore follow that it is not susceptible of amendment or correction under experience? Does it follow, because, for mutual interest and security, this compromise was made, that we are precluded from effecting any greater good? No man would accuse him of a wish to see the interest of any State impaired. But we can preserve the spirit and intention of the constitution in full vigor, without impairing any interests. And this is to be done, by the discriminating principle; it fulfills the intention, and it forefends the recurrence of that danger from which you have once escaped. By this principle, each elector may name his man for each office, and this can be done whether the number be three or five. For the latter number he was disposed; because already adopted by the other House, and he did not wish to delay its progress. If we were to form a constitution, he would provide that there should be only two candidates presented to the House. But he did not rely on any number so much as on the discriminating principle.
Mr. Nicholas.—Several gentlemen profess much reluctance to make any change in the constitution; he would make no such profession; and though he should be as jealous of improper alterations, or the introduction of principles incompatible with Republican Government, he would not hesitate to make any alteration calculated to promote, or secure the public liberty upon a firmer basis; nay, if it could be made better he would expunge the whole book. Gentlemen who are for adhering so closely to the constitution, appear not to consider that a choice of President from the number three, is more in the spirit of the constitution than from five; and preserves the relation that the election of two persons, under the present form, holds to the number five. A reason equally forcible with him was, that, by taking the number three instead of five, you place the choice with more certainty in the people at large, and render the choice more consonant to their wishes. With him, also, it was a most powerful reason for preferring three, that it would render the Chief Magistrate dependent only on the people at large, and independent of any party or any State interest. The people held the sovereign power, and it was intended by the constitution that they should have the election of the Chief Magistrate. It was never contemplated as a case likely to occur, but in an extreme case, that the election should go to the House of Representatives. What, he asked, would have been the effect, had Mr. Jay been elected when he had only one vote? What, he would ask, would be the impression made upon our own people, and upon foreign nations, had Mr. Aaron Burr been chosen at the last election, when the universal sentiment was to place the present Chief Magistrate in that station? He did not mean any thing disrespectful or invidious towards the Vice President, he barely stated the fact, so well known, and asked, what would be the effect? Where would be the bond of attachment to that constitution which could admit of an investiture in a case so important, in known opposition to the wishes of the people? The effect would be fatal to the constitution itself; it would weaken public attachment to it, and the affectation, if alone for the small States, would not have been heard of in the deep murmur of discontent.
An adjournment was now called for and carried.
Tuesday, November 29.
Amendment to the Constitution.
The order of the day being called up on the amendments to the constitution, a considerable time elapsed, when
Mr. Dayton rose and said, that since no other gentleman thought proper to address the Chair, although laboring himself under a very severe cold, which rendered speaking painful, he could not suffer the question to pass without an effort to arrest it in its progress; and should consider his last breath well expended in endeavoring to prevent the degradation which the State he represented would suffer if the amendment were to prevail.