Actuated by the best motives, with the honest view of purifying the fountain of justice, and restoring the characters of the American bench, they are now engaged in the unpleasant, but indispensable task of bringing to exemplary punishment a judge who has offended against the letter and the spirit of the constitution, and the well-known statutes of Congress; who has violated the bounden duties of his office, and that high legislative act, which, to the sanction of a law, added the solemnity and obligation of an oath.
In this important undertaking they are contending not for themselves, but for posterity; not for those in power, but those whom power has forsaken. Against all the wild theories of new-fangled opinions and the monstrous iniquity of exploded doctrines, they wish to teach a lesson of instruction to future judges that, when intoxicated by the spirit of party, they may recollect the scale of power may one day turn, and preserve the scales of justice equal.
It appears that Fries had been tried in the year 1799, before Judges Iredell and Peters, and convicted of the crime of high treason. His counsel afterwards moved for a new trial, on the ground that one of the jury had been prejudiced against him—that he had not in fact been an impartial juror in the case. The Court, consisting of the same judges, upon argument, ordered a new trial to be had. A new trial, according to the best authorities, is “a rehearing of the cause before another jury, but with as little prejudice to either party as if it had never been heard before.” In this light Judge Chase should have considered it. He ought to have gone to Pennsylvania with a mind totally unprejudiced, and viewed every circumstance of the case with the utmost impartiality. The very circumstance which produced the second trial ought to have put him sufficiently on his guard. When a new trial has been directed, to use the language of the respondent in his answer, “solely on the ground that one of the jury” (a single man out of twelve) “after he was summoned, but before he was sworn on the trial, had made some declarations unfavorable to the prisoner,” how ought an impartial judge to have felt and to have acted? Mr. Chase, let it be recollected, presided in a court composed of but two members. With this lesson before his eyes, we find the respondent forming an opinion in his closet on the law of treason, applicable to the case of poor Fries, and not satisfied with making up his own mind on this subject, he took care to bind the judgment of his associate, by obtaining his approbation of that opinion, which he reduced to writing for the purpose. This irregular and reprehensible measure was adopted before the hour of trial arrived, when the man whose life was at stake was to be heard on a subject that involved his existence. This bold step in the path to conviction, has been defended on plausible grounds, and by subtle refinements.
The respondent in his answer and the learned counsel in their defence, have endeavored to prove that this conduct was not only right, but perfectly proper and correct. Among the various pretexts eagerly laid hold of to justify this novel procedure, they urge as a reason for prejudging and despatching a capital case, the multiplicity of civil business pending in the same court! I will forbear to inquire into the facts on this point, though I believe there is not a spark of testimony to prove the allegation to its full extent, because, if the docket had been loaded with civil suits, it would form no excuse for hurrying through a criminal trial, on the issue of which the life of a fellow-citizen depended. That cause must be bad indeed that requires to be propped by such miserable expedients. When I first read this passage in the answer, it struck me with astonishment, and excited a burst of indignation which it is my duty to repress. “A multitude of civil business is depending, and therefore I must make up my mind conclusively on the law in a capital case, before the proper season arrives, without hearing a single word from the prisoner or his counsel in defence!” The learned judge certainly did not reflect on the effect of such an excuse, which instead of palliating his conduct, aggravates it. That he was in a great hurry, every part of his conduct proves. From the opinion, a copy of which is annexed to his answer, it would appear that he did not intend to make it public, at least until after the jury had been sworn and Fries was on his trial. In that we find these expressions: “The Court heard the indictment read on the arraignment of the prisoner some days past, and just now on his trial, and they attended to the overt acts stated in the indictment.”
This honorable Court will recollect that the whole current of the testimony proves, and the defendant in his answer admits, that he delivered the papers containing this ex parte opinion before Fries’s trial commenced. Such was his eagerness to despatch the case, with a view, he says, of reaching expeditiously the civil list. As if gifted with the spirit of intuition and with an infallible judgment, he seems not to have proceeded on the principle of castigatque auditque, but to have improved even upon that model, considering it not necessary for him to hear arguments at any stage of a cause, for the purpose of forming a correct opinion. His counsel ask us whether it be a fault in a judge to have a profound knowledge of the law, which will enable him to decide promptly any question that may occur; and the respondent said, on Fries’s trial, that “he had an opinion in point of law as to every case which could be brought before the Court, or else he was not fit to sit there.” Yet, when Callender’s trial was progressing, we find this same judge, upon a common point of practice relative to a challenge to the jury, calling out for Coke on Littleton to be brought into court before he could make up his mind on the subject.
The aid of precedent has been called in to justify this wide departure from principle, and it is contended that the opinion was correct in point of law. My honorable friend (Mr. Randolph) has detected and exposed the fallacy of this species of justification. I will remark that a great and respectable character (Lord Mansfield) has observed, that he is a most unrighteous and wicked judge who decides without hearing both sides—even when he decides correctly—because his judgment is the effect of chance or accident, and not the result of a fair, full, and impartial investigation. Precedents, let me observe, do not make the law, they are merely evidence of it; nor is the law to be absolutely decided by precedents, judicandum est legibus, non exemplis. “If a judge conceives that a judgment given by a former court is erroneous, he ought not in conscience to give the like judgment, he being sworn to judge according to law,” says Lord Chief Justice Vaughan. But Judge Chase declares that, had he differed in opinion from former precedents, even in a capital case, he should have held himself bound by them. But here let me ask, what are those precedents to which he subscribes? It is not my intention to go at full length into the discussion of them, or comment at large on the law of treason. My object is, on this interesting occasion, to enter a solemn protest against doctrines which would entail on us all the constructive treasons of another country, and to assign in a few words the reasons of my opinion. I am not to be deterred from my duty by the assertion that no counsel of eminence would controvert the principles laid down by the respondent in his ex parte opinion, more especially when characters of such high standing at the bar as Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas, have honorably and conscientiously opposed such monstrous doctrines. The Western insurrection in Pennsylvania was materially different from the momentary disturbances in the counties of Bucks and Northampton. The precedents which arose from one could not be applicable to the other, and the cases of Mitchell and Vigol, which have been cited, are readily distinguished from that of Fries.
In the first, the combination was formed and organized to seize all records and papers, and to destroy all offices, to expel all officers in the whole survey. The insurgents traversed the country armed, seized papers, attacked offices, and drove officers out of the country.
They seized and imprisoned the marshal, who escaped and returned to Philadelphia by a circuitous route.
They assembled at Cooche’s fort, consulted on the attack upon Colonel Neville’s house, marched thither in military array, summoned him to surrender by a flag, set fire to his house, and destroyed his records. They assembled at Braddock’s field; deliberated on taking the garrison at Pittsburg; marched thither with that avowed object; but finding the garrison prepared for defence they filed off.