It has of late, Mr. President, become fashionable to attach very little importance to the office of Vice President, to consider it a matter but of small consequence who the man may be; to view his post merely as an idle post of honor, and the incumbent as a cipher in the Government; or according to the idea expressed by an honorable member from Georgia, (Mr. Jackson,) quoting, I believe, the language of some Eastern politician, as a fifth wheel to a coach; but in my humble opinion this doctrine is both incorrect and dangerous. The Vice President is not only the second officer of Government in point of rank, but of importance, and should be a man possessing and worthy of the confidence of the nation. I grant, sir, should this designating mode of election succeed, it will go very far to destroy, not the certain or contingent duties of the office, for the latter by this resolution are considerably extended, but what may be much more dangerous, the personal consequence and worth of the officer; by rendering the Electors more indifferent about the reputation and qualification of the candidate, seeing they vote for him but as a secondary character; and which may occasion this high and important trust to be deposited in very unsafe hands. By a provision in the first section of the second article of the constitution, “in case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President”—and he is constitutionally the President, not until another can be made only, but of the residue of the term, which may be nearly four years; and this is not to be supposed a remote or improbable case. In the State to which I have the honor to belong, within a few years past, two instances have happened of the place of Governor becoming vacant, and the duties of the office, according to the constitution of that State, devolving upon the Speaker of the Senate. We know well too, generally speaking, that before any man can acquire a sufficient share of the public confidence to be elected President, the people must have long been acquainted with his character and his merit; he must have proved himself a good and faithful servant, and will of course be far advanced in years, when the chances of life will be much against him. It may indeed, owing to popular infatuation, or some other extraordinary causes, be the ill fate of our country, that an unworthy designing man, grown old and gray in the ways of vice and hypocrisy, shall for a time dishonor the Presidential chair, or it may be the fortune of some young man to be elected, but those will rarely happen. The convention in constructing this part of the constitution, in settling the first and second offices of the Government, and pointing out the mode of filling, aware of the probability of the Vice President succeeding to the office of President, endeavored to attach as much importance and respectability to his office as possible, by making it uncertain at the time of voting, which of the persons voted for should be President, and which Vice President; so as to secure the election of the best men in the country, or at least those in whom the people reposed the highest confidence, to the two offices—thus filling the office of Vice President with one of our most distinguished citizens, who would give respectability to the Government, and in case of the Presidency becoming vacant, having at his post a man constitutionally entitled to succeed, who had been honored with the second largest number of the suffrages of the people for the same office, and who of consequence would be probably worthy of the place, and competent to its duties. Let us now, Mr. President, examine for a moment the certain effect of the change about to be made, or what must be the operation of this designating principle, if you introduce it into the constitution. Now the Elector cannot designate, but must vote for two persons as President, leaving it to circumstances not within his power to control which shall be the man: of course he will select two characters, each suitable for that office, and the second highest in vote must be the Vice President; but upon this designating plan the public attention will be entirely engrossed in the election of the President, in making one great man. The eyes of each contending party will be fixed exclusively upon their candidate for this first and highest office; no surrounding object can be viewed at the same time, they will be lost in his disc. The office of President is, in point of honor, profit, trust, and influential patronage, so infinitely superior to any other place attainable in this Government, that, in the pursuit and disposal of it, all minor considerations will be forgotten, every thing will be made to bend, in order to subserve the ambitious views of the candidates and their friends. In this angry conflict of parties, amidst the heat and anxiety of this political warfare, the Vice Presidency will either be left to chance, or what will be much worse, prostituted to the basest purposes; character, talents, virtue, and merit, will not be sought after in the candidate. The question will not be asked, is he capable? is he honest? But can he by his name, by his connections, by his wealth, by his local situation, by his influence or his intrigues, best promote the election of a President? He will be made a mere stepping-stone of ambition. Thus, by the death or other constitutional inability of the President to do the duties of the office, you may find at the head of your Government, as First Magistrate of the nation, a man who has either smuggled or bought himself into office; who, not having the confidence of the people, or feeling the constitutional responsibility of his place, but attributing his elevation merely to accident, and conscious of the superior claims of others, will be without restraint upon his conduct, without that strong inducement to consult the wishes of the people, and to pursue the true interests of the nation, that the hope of popular applause, and the prospect of re-election, would offer. Such a state of things might be productive of incalculable evils; for it is, as I fear time will show, in the power of a President of the United States to bring this Government into contempt, and this country to disgrace, if not to ruin.
Mr. Plumer said that he had generally contented himself with expressing his opinion by a silent vote, but on a question which affected the rights of the smaller States, (one of which he had the honor to represent,) he requested the indulgence of the Senate to a few observations.
He said the constitution had provided only two methods for obtaining amendments, and both are granted with great caution. If two-thirds of the several State Legislatures apply, Congress shall call a convention who are to propose amendments, which, when ratified by the conventions of three-fourths of the States, will be valid. If this mode is adopted, Congress have nothing to do but to ascertain the fact, whether the necessary number of States require a convention. If they do, a convention must be called. The State Legislatures are only to apply for a convention. They can neither propose nor decide the amendments.
The other mode is, if two-thirds of both Houses of Congress deem it necessary to propose amendments, and three-fourths of the State Legislatures ratify them, they are valid. This is the present mode. The State Legislatures have nothing to do till after Congress has proposed the amendments, and then it is their exclusive province either to ratify or reject them. But they have no authority to direct or even request Congress to propose particular amendments for themselves to ratify. Instructions on this subject are therefore improper. It is an assumption of power, not the exercise of a right. It is an attempt to create an undue influence over Congress. It is prejudging the question before it is proposed by the only authority that has the constitutional right to move it. If these instructions are obligatory, our votes must be governed, not by the convictions of our own judgments, or the propriety and fitness of the measure, but by the mandates of other Legislatures. This would destroy one of the checks that the constitution has provided against innovation. State Legislatures may, on some subjects, instruct their Senators; but on this, their instructions ought not to influence, much less bind us, to propose amendments, unless we ourselves deem them necessary.
The Senate consists of two members from each State; and in this case, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Senate are necessary. A majority of the Senate constitutes a quorum to do business, but that quorum is a majority of all the Senators that all the States are entitled to elect. This applies with equal force to the term “two-thirds of the Senate.” But in cases where from necessity a speedy decision is requisite, and where the concurrence of two-thirds is required, the constitution is explicit in confining that two-thirds to the members present, as in cases of treaties and impeachments; and also a fifth of the members present requesting the yeas and nays. If amendments can be constitutionally proposed by two-thirds of the Senate present, it will follow that twelve Senators, when only a quorum is present, may propose them against the will of twenty-two Senators.
This amendment affects the relative interest and importance of the smaller States. The constitution requires the Electors of each State to vote for two men, one of whom to be President of the United States. This affords a degree of security to the small States against the views and ambition of the large States. It gives them weight and influence in the choice. By destroying this complex mode of choice, and introducing the simple principle of designation, the large States can with more ease elect their candidate. This amendment will enable the Electors from four States and a half to choose a President, against the will of the remaining twelve States and a half. Can such a change tend to conciliate and strengthen the Union?
This amendment has a tendency to render the Vice President less respectable. He will be voted for not as President of the United States, but as President of the Senate, elected to preside over forms in this House. In electing a subordinate officer the Electors will not require those qualifications requisite for supreme command. The office of Vice President will be a sinecure. It will be brought to market and exposed to sale to procure votes for the President. Will the ambitious, aspiring candidate for the Presidency, will his friends and favorites promote the election of a man of talents, probity, and popularity for Vice President, and who may prove his rival? No! They will seek a man of moderate talents, whose ambition is bounded by that office, and whose influence will aid them in electing the President. This mode of election is calculated to increase corruption, promote intrigue, and aid inordinate ambition. The Vice President will be selected from some of the large States; he will have a casting vote in this House; and feeble indeed must his talents be, if his influence will not be equal to that of a member. This will, in fact, be giving to that State a third Senator.
In the Southern States the blacks are considered as property, and the States in which they live are thereby entitled to eighteen additional Electors and Representatives—a number equal to all the Electors and Representatives that four States and a half are entitled to elect. Will you, by this amendment, lessen the weight and influence of the Eastern States in the election of your first officers, and still retain this unequal article in your constitution? Shall property in one part of the Union give an increase of Electors, and be wholly excluded in other States? Can this be right? Will it strengthen the Union?
Mr. Tracy.—I shall attempt to prove, sir, that the resolution before us contains principles which have a manifest tendency to deprive the small States of an important right, secured to them by a solemn and constitutional compact, and to vest an overwhelming power in the great States. And, further, I shall attempt to show that, in many other points, the resolution is objectionable, and, for a variety of causes, ought not to be adopted.
As I shall be obliged, in delineating the main features of this resolution, to mention the great States in the Union as objects of jealousy, I wish it to be understood that no special stigma is intended. “Man is man,” was the maxim expressed in an early part of this debate, by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Butler,) and in application to the subject of government, the maxim is worthy to be written in letters of gold. Yes, sir, “man is man,” and the melancholy truth that he is always imperfect and frequently wicked, induces us to fear his power, and guard against his rapacity, by the establishment and preservation of laws, and well-regulated constitutions of government. Man, when connected with very many of his fellow-men, in a great State, derives power from the circumstance of this numerous combination; and from every circumstance which clothes him with additional power, he will generally derive some additional force to his passions.