Mr. Dennis.—Mr. Chairman: As a resolution analogous in all its leading features to those now under consideration, was submitted to the consideration of a former Congress, by a gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Bacon,) and as that resolution was put at rest by a very decisive majority, I had not expected that its ghost would have risen up at so early a day to haunt the people of Columbia, or to interrupt the deliberations of this body. That the gentleman who has offered these resolutions has acted from the best lights of his own understanding, and has believed the object intended to be thereby effectuated is both within the pale of our constitutional authority, and politically expedient, it is not for me to question. To me, however, they appear unconstitutional and politically inexpedient, and I will moreover add, cruel, unjust, and tyrannical, in their operation on the people of this district.
In order to ascertain the extent of our power on the subject, we must resort to the eighth section of the first article of the constitution. Here we find that, amongst other powers therein enumerated, it is declared as follows: “That Congress shall have the power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the General Government,” &c. This clause contemplates, first, a place to be acquired, lying at the time within the jurisdiction of some of the States, but which was to be put out of their control and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Government. This was to be done in order that a permanent seat might be established, which should not be liable to be changed by legislative caprice; and in order that the jurisdiction over the place in which its operations were to be conducted might be, like the Government itself, the property of the whole people of the Union, and free from the influence of any one of its component parts.
This appears to be as much a part of the constitution, that you should always have this federal district, as that there should be a Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary Department.
2d. It points out the manner in which this district shall be acquired, and the agents who are to be instrumental in the acquisition. The convention, on behalf of the people of the United States, who are the principals, appoint Congress the attorney in fact to receive the conveyance, and constitute the Legislatures of the States from whom the cession or conveyance is to be made similar agents to make it. The several agents have performed their respective offices, the district has been acquired in conformity with the authority given, the right to the property vested in the American people, and possession held of it by us, for their benefit for whose use it was acquired. All the power which was given as to the acquisition of the territory has been exhausted, and no other power remains but that of exercising over it exclusive legislation. To explain and illustrate this subject to the most ordinary capacity, let me compare the transaction to a case in common life. If I give a man a power of attorney to purchase for me a tract of land, in a particular district of country, of a specified quantity of acres, leaving it to him to make the location, and he accordingly make a purchase, and I consent to the act, receive the conveyance, and take possession of it, can my agent afterwards make another choice, divest me of my right, and reconvey the property without my consent? No man will answer this question affirmatively; and yet it is clear there is a perfect similitude between the cases, and that Congress are agents acting in this case under a limited authority and confined in the exercise thereof to a specific object. That Congress are special agents, and not vested with a general power over every possible case, is manifest from the whole tenor of the constitution; and I will lay down in this instance a rule which has been generally recognized as the standard, by which to test the extent of constitutional authority in any given case. It is, that Congress can exercise no power on any subject but what is expressly delegated and specifically enumerated in the constitution, or necessary and incidental to the execution of the specified powers. What is their power in the present instance? To accept a cession and exercise over it exclusive legislation. Can you infer from hence a power of retrocession? To do so is at war with the amendment of the constitution, which declares that all powers not given to the General Government are retained by the States or the people respectively. Was not the power confined to the acceptance of the district directed to be procured for a specific purpose, and when so acquired, to continue an object over which Congress, as a permanent body, might always have it in their power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction? Can you then claim the power of reconveying the district and receiving one as often as your caprice may dictate, or of divesting your successors of the same control over this district which we may exercise ourselves? The power is not expressly delegated, nor is it a necessary power to carry into effect any power given; for it will not be contended, but we may exercise all our powers and perform all our duties, and still retain the jurisdiction over the district.
This district has been completely severed from Maryland and Virginia, and has been erected into two counties by the name of Washington and Alexandria, and forms, at this time, no more a part of the territorial limits of Maryland and Virginia, than of New Hampshire or Georgia; and you may by the same authority that you propose to reannex them to those States, unite them to Delaware or Jersey, and put the people, many of whom never were citizens of Maryland or Virginia, under the jurisdiction of the Emperor of Hayti.
But, Mr. Chairman, are the people of the territory unworthy of a moment’s consideration, and will their remonstrances against the measure be altogether disregarded? Let us take a retrospective view of the circumstances under which they were seduced from their parent State, and the manner in which they consented to dissever the civil and political bonds by which they were formerly connected. What induced them to alienate their native allegiance, and with a generous confidence to submit themselves to your authority? First, the constitution held out a pledge and formed the basis of the contract, involving a promise, that if the people living in the district of country which should be fixed upon for the seat of Government, would give up the rights possessed under the government of the States to which they belonged, they should for ever remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. By the act of Congress accepting the cession, the territory received is declared to be the place fixed on for the permanent seat of the Government, and the States ceded for ever the jurisdiction of the persons and soil within the same to Congress, for the purpose of exercising therein exclusive legislation. Finally, you assume the government, establish your own systems, and annul those of the States. Confiding in the premises, they gave up the control of their persons, and some of them divided with you their property. They came to you with one consent, and hailed your arrival here as the most fortunate epoch in the annals of their country—and now, will you set them adrift without deigning to listen to their prayers?
This being the seat of Government, where all the representatives of the nation are collected, and who, from the responsibility which they owe to their respective constituents and to the whole people of the United States, are under every moral and political tie to do justice, and to protect the rights and interests of the people here; here every citizen of the district has access to every member, and he may personally communicate his wants, his wishes, and solicit his particular patronage of his interest; and instead of being confined, like a district of country in the remote parts of the Union, to a single member, who may not possess the talents to explain its interests to the legislative body, the citizen of this place may make a selection out of the whole of the members to whom he may choose to confide his application. Like the seat of Government in all other places, without having any actual representation, this district will have more than its equal share of influence, and its weight will always be felt more sensibly in the Legislative Councils of the nation than the remote parts of the Union. Our theoretical philosophers, however, not only contend that in order to make these people free and happy, we must force liberty upon them, whether they will have it or not, but that even with respect to the conveniency or inconveniency of being governed by this body and the States of Maryland and Virginia, they are incapable of judging for themselves.
But is there no conveniency resulting to them from having all their concerns brought within the narrow limits of ten miles square? Is there no conveniency in having their own courts of justice at their very doors, instead of travelling to Richmond and Annapolis? It is an old-fashioned idea perhaps, but it is one which very generally prevails, even at the present day, that to bring justice home to every man’s door, is a great political and civil blessing; and in this respect the people of this place enjoy an advantage which is unknown to any other people in the world.
The great advantages contemplated as likely to result from being represented in the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, and the powers of self-government which it is supposed may result from the measure, are merely ideal. What weight will the district on the Virginia side of the Potomac have in the large body of the Legislature of that State, when they will only form a part of the county of Fairfax, and have a share in choosing two members to the Assembly? The same question might be asked in relation to the district of country formerly comprehended in the counties of Prince George and Montgomery, in Maryland. They would be regarded with a jealous eye; a sort of aliens, who were forced, contrary to their remonstrance, to submit to their respective jurisdictions.
Mr. Early.—Mr. Chairman, the resolutions which we are now called upon to decide, possess a high degree of importance, not only from their object, and the consequences likely to result, but also from certain principles which have been contended for, as applying themselves to the subject. In the outset of the discussion we are met with objections upon constitutional principles against our right. We have been told by the people of this district, that we cannot recede the territory of which they are inhabitants without their consent; and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Dennis) has told us to-day that the proposed recession cannot be made without the consent of the people of the whole United States.