The members of the convention who framed the Constitution of the United States looked forward to a day when it would become necessary to fix a place which should become the permanent seat of the Government. By reference to the eighth section of the first article of the constitution, we see it clearly expressed that Congress shall have power “to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States.”
This article, with all others contained in that instrument, after publication for the consideration of the people of the United States, was adopted, and became a part of the constitution. In pursuance of this object, Congress, on the 16th of July, 1790, passed an act, entitled “the cession act,” in the words following, to wit:
“That a district of territory, not exceeding ten miles square, to be located as hereafter directed, on the river Potomac, at some place between the mouths of the Eastern branch and Conococheague, be, and the same is hereby accepted for the permanent seat of the Government of the United States.”
Congress accepted a cession of ten miles square for the express purpose, and on the express condition of exercising exclusive legislation and jurisdiction, and this, too, agreeably to the spirit and meaning of the constitution and law, thus forming a compact which Congress has no right to violate. All the States in their Legislative capacity, and the people of the United States, including the inhabitants of this territory, are bound by this compact, which compact is as strong as the constitution itself.
Mr. Findlay observed that, after what his colleague (Mr. Smilie) and others had said in favor of the resolutions for a retrocession of the territory, exclusive of the city, he had not expected to hear any objection to the resolutions on arguments derived from the constitution; the resolutions for receding the territory to the States who had made the original cession might, he thought, have been fairly combated, on the ground of expediency; on this ground only did the resolutions before the committee rest. He gave the credit, however, to the gentlemen opposed to the resolutions, for their ingenuity in taking the most tenable ground, though not directly involved in the question, but he acknowledged it was indirectly connected with it. If we had not a right to retrocede, the Representatives of the United States undoubtedly might decline to exercise jurisdiction, for whatever the rights of the people were, the Legislature must be free to act or not to act. If this is not the case, it could not be a sovereign Legislature; Congress itself, in this case, would act by compulsion.
He said that, though a member of the ratifying convention of Pennsylvania, and of the Legislature of that State, and of Congress since that time, he did not remember ever to have heard it suggested that Congress was not vested with the same discretion in this case as in others, expressed in similar terms. He had, indeed, of late, heard several members say that Congress was obliged to establish a permanent seat, &c., but, in taking a review of the constitution, he found no such expressions. The word permanent was not in that instrument, nor any other expression that made it the duty of Congress to establish a permanent seat, more than to establish a permanent excise, direct tax, or bankrupt law. The word permanent, however, he found in an act of Congress, but certainly not authorized by the constitution; and this present Congress had equal power to make a retrocession as that Congress had to accept. He said it was not necessary to prove to the members of this committee that laws, in their nature, were not permanent, but changeable with circumstances, and that Congress had by the constitution equal powers with any other Congress. That, from the express words of the constitution investing this power in Congress, and from its analogy to the investiture of other powers, no argument could be drawn against the resolutions; that every argument of that kind he had heard was not taken from the words of the constitution, but from constructions given to it which he conceived the words would not bear, and which would have a ruinous effect applied to other powers expressed in similar words. That he did not consider himself bound by what other gentlemen fancied the constitution meant or intended, but by what it said.
Mr. F. said it had been frequently asked what more difficulty there was in legislating for ten miles square, than for the city alone. In answer to this, he asked those members to recollect how many applications had been made, how many laws have been passed, how many days have been occupied in legislating for other parts of the district than the city. He would ask what the people would lose by being receded to the States to which they formerly belonged, and what they gain by the members of Congress, who have no common interest with them, nor even acquaintance with them or their peculiar circumstances, and liable to be imposed on by every one with whom they converse, legislating for them? He said that it had not been made to appear that the people would suffer any loss by agreeing to the resolutions, and that, as it was indubitably evident that the public would gain advantage, he hoped they would be agreed to. He had early observed that there were nearly as many interfering interests in this ten miles square, as in the whole United States; the members of the committee would recollect that several of the most tedious debates, accompanied with the greatest irritation, that had taken place this session, arose from such subjects.
Mr. Boyd said, that, although some gentlemen had left the constitutionality of the proposed measure out of the question, he was not satisfied any more on that point than he was of its expediency. The constitution was to him the polar star by which his course through the sea of politics would be regulated. The constitution had been formed by a convention composed of delegates from the several States of the Union, and was afterwards adopted by State conventions, on behalf of themselves and the people. He had been a member of his State Legislature, when they passed a law ceding a part of their territory, well knowing that if Congress did accept it, by the constitution, they must and would exercise exclusive legislation over such district. He was well aware at that time of the consequence of accepting a district of territory not exceeding ten miles square, as laid down in the section so often alluded to; and he did believe that that consequence would be, that Congress must exercise exclusive legislation whenever they accepted the ceded district. The idea of recession was not taken up at that time. The States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, made offers of cession under the terms of the constitution. A partial cession was accepted by Congress from Maryland and Virginia. If a new disposition is to be made of this district, he did not see why Congress might not convey it to any of those States which had proffered to comply with the constitutional suggestion, and receive from the same another territory in lieu thereof. This statement he made merely to show the absurdity of recession, as it had presented itself to his mind.
Mr. Nelson meant to lay his opinion before the committee, because it appeared to be the habit of members to assign reasons for voting, without expecting to make any impression upon others. He considered the present question of the greatest magnitude to the United States generally; and of peculiar importance to his immediate constituents. He thought he should be able to show, to the satisfaction of every member present, that the removal of the seat of Government, which would be the consequence of recession, was not only inexpedient, but also unconstitutional. If he was successful in making out his point, that it was unconstitutional, he presumed the question of expediency need not be argued; the measure would be set at rest, and not a member would be found to give it his support. But, if he should prove unfortunate in this respect, which however appeared to his mind as true as that two and two make four, he might have reference to the question of expediency.
Previous to an inquiry into the constitutionality of the proposed project, he would just observe that constitutions themselves were things of recent date. Before the American Revolution the word itself was never fully understood. Lexicographers who attempted to define it never could agree. There was no practice whereupon to try its meaning. No power on earth had a constitution before the American States. True, England has long boasted of possessing a constitution, and so satisfied were her statesmen and politicians of the reality of this imaginary being, that they have extolled it to the skies. The glorious Constitution of England, her pride, and the envy of the world! Fine words truly; but where is the thing itself to be found? Is it reduced to writing? No. Who has seen it? No man. Is it known to any man? If it be, no two agree as to what the boasted Constitution of Britain is. How different, how honorably different, is the American Constitution! With us it is reduced to writing. It is in every man’s hand; it is known to the whole world, and every citizen agrees in its true and legitimate meaning. He would take this opportunity of expressing his voice, and of holding up his hand in resisting the doctrine of construction and inference formerly set up, whereby the tenor and effect of that invaluable instrument was likely to be changed. He knew that artful and ingenious men might twist and turn, and make it, like the word republican, to mean any thing or nothing, as best suited their nefarious designs. But this declaration and these attacks upon the body of that sacred work, were introduced by insinuating and artful lawyers, aided by the villany of judges, and accepted by men employed in the administration of our public and most important national affairs.