Congress is incompetent to the decision of this question. Nor is such decision necessary. I will, however, make one or two inquiries, and state one or two principles, which are applicable to the subject, which at the same time will go to strengthen the ground I have taken as to color of title in the claimants, and the policy of extinguishing their claims.
Can a legislature rescind a contract made by its predecessors?
Writers on national law make a distinction between laws which operate in the nature of contracts, and those which have no such operation. Every enlightened and reasonable man will subscribe to the opinion that a pledge of the public faith, given by the competent authority, ought to be irrevocable. Laws which pledge the faith of the community, which create contracts, which vest rights in individuals or in corporate bodies, it may safely be assumed as a general principle, are irrepealable. Laws of merely municipal operation are alterable or repealable at the pleasure of the existing legislature.
Can the judicial power declare a legislative act void, as having been passed by means of corruption?
Different opinions have existed in our country as to the right claimed by the judiciary, of deciding upon the constitutionality of laws. The better opinion seems to be, that from the nature of our Government, and the very terms of the constitution itself, by which that instrument is declared to be the supreme law of the land, the judges not only ought to exercise that power, but that they cannot avoid its exercise. If I am not mistaken, some gentlemen, who deny that the judges possess this right, are prepared to invest them with the more dangerous one of setting aside a legislative act on the ground of corruption. To admit that the judiciary may examine into the motives of the Legislature in passing laws, or that they may receive and decide upon evidence tending to prove corruption in the legislative body, would certainly be going much further than those have gone who have claimed for that department the right of deciding upon the constitutionality of laws. Suppose a trial of title between a person claiming under the act of Georgia, of 1795, and another claiming under the United States, and suppose evidence offered to the Court to prove the corruption of the Legislature of Georgia, in what a peculiar situation the judges would be placed? And would they listen for a moment to an application for the admission of such evidence? It may well be doubted. Do not then the present claimants possess a very strong color of title? Is it not prudent to extinguish claims of this description?
Were claims, or the pretended claims of the present claimants, in any manner recognized by the act of cession of the territory in question from Georgia to the United States? And,
Do justice and policy, or either justice or policy, require that the whole or any part of the five millions of acres, reserved by the act of cession from Georgia to the United States, for the purpose of satisfying claims of a certain description against Georgia, in reference to the said territory, should be appropriated for the purpose of satisfying the claims of the present claimants?
I have anticipated the principal arguments in favor of the equity of the claims, and the policy of a compromise with the claimants. The memorialists state that their claims were particularly contemplated by the Commissioners, both of the United States and of Georgia. They have offered us no evidence of this fact, and we are not to take it for granted. Indeed, I am far from thinking it my duty either to advocate or answer the pamphlet of the memorialists, and I shall make but this single allusion to it. Whatever may be its merits, it has had no influence upon my mind in forming my opinion. An examination of the official documents upon our tables will evince, however, that by a very strong implication, if not by express provision, these claims have been recognized, both by the act of cession, and by the law of Congress passed in consequence.
The gentleman from Virginia has expressed his surprise that the Chairman of the Committee of Claims had contented himself with reporting facts and principles, and that he has not adopted the novel procedure of reporting something tantamount to an elaborate speech in favor of the claims. As the speech of the gentleman from Virginia is unfortunately destitute of argument against the claims, and as it might be possible to deduce from it reasons in their favor, it might perhaps be proper for him to print it and annex it to the report, as a substitute for that which he thinks the chairman ought to have subjoined for the edification of the House. My feeble optics have been able to discover but one attempt at argument, which is in those observations which relate to the Message of the President, and the proceedings of Congress, on the act of Georgia, in 1795, and which, it is contended, were notice, to purchasers and to the world, of fraud. At that time, it was not suspected that fraud had been committed, and the reason for those proceedings was, that the United States possessed, or were supposed to possess, certain claims to the territory. There are certain subtile, sublimated, ethereal, heaven-descended geniuses, the soft and silken texture of whose minds would suffer infinite discomposure from the contact of that rude and knotty thing—an argument. That gentleman is not of this description. Too often have we witnessed his argumentative powers to entertain this idea. I regret that he has declaimed instead of reasoning upon this occasion, as I believe that argument, particularly upon important subjects, is more useful than mere declamation. From motives which I cannot develope, for I ascribe improper views to no one, the present is attempted to be made a party question. The people are told that the Capitol has become a scene of political and private iniquity, of fraud and federalism; that the majority, of their Representatives are committing a stupendous robbery upon the public patrimony, and their indignation is invoked upon the plunderers. What facts exist to justify these denunciations? Are we about to barter away the rights and interests of the people? Are we about to be guilty of a wanton waste of the public property? Are we guilty of political apostasy? No such thing. We are about to make arrangements for carrying into effect a solemn stipulation in the treaty with Georgia, and a solemn act of our predecessors, by devoting a part of the five millions of acres, specially reserved for that purpose, for which the United States never paid a cent, and never will pay a cent, to the extinguishment of the colorable claims of equitable claimants. Yet we are told that this act of equity, good faith, and good policy, is a stupendous crime, compared with which the flagitious acts of the former “unprincipled administration” dwindle into “petty larcenies.” I am a republican—a democratic republican. I was opposed to the general system of that administration. But I do not think it magnanimous, or honorable, malignantly to triumph over fallen foes. Nor do I dread the union of honest men. It can be dreadful only to the dishonest.
It is said that the circumstance that one of the great officers of the Government is numbered among the claimants, ought to scatter consternation through this House. It is unnecessary for me to undertake a vindication of the character of that gentleman. Does his office divest him of the common rights of a citizen? Does it deprive him of the right of petitioning the National Legislature? But his contracts are resorted to for the purpose of proving that he has extended his official influence within our walls. Unfortunate, indeed, is the application of this argument. By the report upon the table, it appears that three members are contractors, and we all see that two of them are opposed to the present claims.