Mr. F. said that, so far, the bargain and sale were fair and legal; whether it was a good bargain or a bad one, was the look-out of the purchasers; if it was a bad one Government would have given them no relief. Had nothing extraordinary, or out of the common road, taken place, he believed the attention of Congress would never have been called to the subject. Soon, however, after this contract was made, the Legislature of Georgia declared the contract, and the law under which it was made, to be void or annulled; and in a short time after, a convention of that respectable State disapproved of the constitutional act of the Legislature; but as long as we pay respect to constitutional obligations and the distribution of the powers of government, and as long as we respect the Federal Constitution, which expressly asserts that no ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made, we must agree that one session of a legislature cannot annul the contracts made by the preceding session. If that could be done, the patent for his own plantation might also be set aside, for he acknowledged it is worth more now than the price that he paid for it. This doctrine had never been entertained even in the Revolutionary period. At that solemn period, all contracts were protected.
Mr. F. said that he cheerfully acknowledged that the amount of land sold under the law of Georgia of 1795, was so enormous as that, if that State had been a separate and wholly independent government, would have justified, in some degree, an agrarian law; and if the fraud and corruption attested by ex parte testimony was true, would have justified the most exemplary punishment of those who suffered themselves to be corrupted, or who defrauded the commonwealth, and this would have proved a defect in the contract itself; but no such thing appears to have taken place. The judge, who is said to have received $13,000 for his vote, was not impeached, nor the members who are said to have given, or received bribes, indicted. It appears to have been so contrived that the State or citizens of Georgia, should suffer no loss—that the loss and reproach should be transferred to people at the greatest possible distance. He gave credit, however, to the Legislature of Georgia, which met in the year 1796, for making an extraordinary exertion to free themselves from an extraordinary evil. It was a laudable testimony against corruption and fraud, but no court of justice had yet, by deciding on it, acknowledged it to be law, and it was too slow for warning others at a distance against titles originating under the law of 1795.
The annulling law of 1796 had all the effect that any citizen, at that period, could have wished. Congress took possession of the government of the western parts of Georgia, the parts in which the lands in question lay, and erected a territorial government, without the consent of that State, and passed a law authorizing the President to enter into a negotiation with Georgia on the principles of compromise, for the right of soil. The compromise eventually succeeded, and an act of cession took place between the United States and the State of Georgia. In this act of cession, or convention, it was provided that the claims in the counties of Bourbon and Washington, bordering on the Mississippi river, &c., should be protected, and that five millions of acres, or part thereof, should, by the United States, be applied to satisfy, quiet, or compensate, the claims now before the House, and that if they were not so applied, they should revert to the State of Georgia.
On these conditions, Mr. F. said, did Georgia surrender her right of soil. Agreeably to these conditions were the Commissioners of the United States authorized to make and receive proposals, but the commissioners were not authorized to conclude the agreement, they did report to Congress, and in that report, they state that the claimants cannot, in their opinion, recover by law. This is well founded, because no action can be brought against the United States, nor, since the amendment made to the constitution respecting the suability of States, against a State. Therefore this fund, viz: the five millions of acres, set apart by the Convention of Georgia, to quiet, satisfy, or compensate these claims, must be either applied to that purpose, or revert to the State of Georgia, or the faith of the United States must be sacrificed.
Mr. F. said, that from this view of the subject, he had made up his mind to vote in favor of the report of the Committee of Claims. That he had not made up his mind lightly, that he had been prepossessed against it, but it becoming his duty to decide, he had thrown aside these prepossessions, and examined the case with all the coolness and deliberation of which he was capable, and would give his vote, as he had made up his mind, without consulting or relying on the opinions of others, for he was responsible only for his own opinion.
Mr. Gregg.—I rise, Mr. Speaker, to congratulate the House, on the question being at length brought within such narrow limits. The validity of the title appears to be nearly abandoned, and the advocates of the resolution seem now disposed to rest its defence almost entirely on the ground of expediency. For my own part I have always felt satisfied with the report of the commissioners, so far as it respects the question of title. They have investigated the subject with more diligence and attention than can well be bestowed on it by members of this House, and being men distinguished for their abilities and of high official standing, their opinion, certainly, should have great weight. That opinion, as recorded in their report, is, that the title of the claimants cannot be supported. In this opinion I most heartily concur, for I can never be induced to believe that an act so marked with fraud and corruption as the act of Georgia, under which the claimants pretend to derive their title, has been fully proved to be, can vest a title either in law or in equity.
The question of title being given up, any remarks respecting the weight that ought to attach to the rescinding act passed by the Legislature of Georgia, in 1796, will be unnecessary. On that part of the subject I will only just observe, in reply to one of my colleagues, (Mr. Findlay,) who has stated that act to be without precedent, and that one Legislature cannot repeal an act of a preceding Legislature where it involves a contract, that there is one instance at least of such an act, and that instance is in the State in which he and I live. The case to which I allude, is an act passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, for repealing the charter of the Bank of North America. This act, if I am not mistaken, was passed when my colleague was a member of the Legislature, and I believe received his support.
But, leaving the question of title, good policy, say gentlemen, requires us to pass the resolution. In this sentiment, they and the commissioners appear to unite. The commissioners acknowledge that the title of the claimants cannot be supported, and yet undertake to recommend a compromise, by stating “that the interest of the United States, the tranquillity of those who may hereafter inhabit that territory, and certain equitable considerations which may be urged in favor of most of the present claimants, render it expedient to enter into a compromise on reasonable terms.” Now, I would ask, how is the interest of the United States to be promoted by giving five millions of acres of land to persons acknowledged not to have a good title in law, and none in equity? If our interest is to be promoted in this way, we may soon get rid of all our land. Claimants will not be wanting, if it is to be got for asking.
With respect to the equitable considerations which have been urged so strenuously in favor of the present claimants, I must acknowledge they have not appeared to me so very forcible. The innocence of the claimants has been painted in strong and glowing colors. They have been represented, not only as innocent, but innocent through ignorance. One of my colleagues, in particular, has dilated largely on this idea, and applied it especially to the New England purchasers. In evidence of this, he has referred to the case of the Connecticut intruders in the State of Pennsylvania. But in this allusion he was certainly extremely unfortunate. The case might be cited to prove a position exactly the reverse. The fact is, that these intruders have for many years, by their superior skill and address, held their lands in defiance of the State; and, from appearance, I believe will continue to hold them, without making any compensation to the State; and this instance may serve to show the impropriety and inefficiency of governments pretending to compromise with individuals. The measures pursued by the State of Pennsylvania relative to these claimants have generally been of this description. They have produced no advantage to the State, and have always been converted by the intruders into arguments in favor of their claims. I do know of one case that goes far to prove that there are some persons in the Eastern States extremely uninformed in matters relating to land. The case to which I allude is recent, having occurred but a few days ago. A petition was presented by a gentleman from Vermont, signed by a number of persons, praying to be permitted to form a settlement on the public lands lying north-west of the river Ohio. On a motion for referring it to a committee, a member from the same State rose and opposed the reference, assigning as a reason, that if the petition should so far receive the countenance of the House as to be referred, the petitioners would instantly commence the sale of rights. Now, if there are people so extremely ignorant as to purchase rights of this description, they certainly ought to be pitied. But will any person say that the present claimants belong to this class? No, sir; they are men experienced in business, by all accounts well versed in transactions relating to land, and as little liable to be imposed on as perhaps any equal number of persons that could be selected.
But it is said they could not have knowledge of the circumstances under which the act of Georgia of 1795 was passed; that they became purchasers before such information could possibly reach them. This certainly cannot be seriously insisted on. Will gentlemen look at the deeds conveying the titles, and then say the purchasers had no notice? Evidence, if not of the fraud, at least that there was something wrong in the business, is stamped on the very face of all the conveyances.