The great check imposed upon executive power was a popular mode of election; and the true object of jealousy, which ought to attract the attention of the people of every State, is any circumstance tending to diminish or destroy that check. It was also a primary intention of the constitution to keep executive power independent of legislative; and although a provision was made for its election by the House of Representatives in a possible case, that possible case never was intended to be converted into the active rule, so as to destroy in a degree the line of separation and independency between the executive and legislative power. The controversy is not therefore between larger and smaller States, but between the people of every State and the House of Representatives. Is it better that the people—a fair majority of the popular principle—should elect executive power; or, that a minor faction should be enabled to embarrass and defeat the judgment and will of this majority, and throw the election into the House of Representatives? This is the question. If this amendment should enable the popular principle to elect executive power, and thus keep it separate and distinct from legislation, the intention of the constitution, the interest of the people, and the principles of our policy, will be preserved; and if so, it is as I have often endeavored to prove in this debate, the interest of the smaller States themselves, that the amendment should prevail. For, sir, is an exposure of their Representatives to bribery and corruption (a thing which may possibly happen at some future day, when men lose that public virtue which now governs them) an acquisition more desirable than all those great objects best (if not exclusively) attainable by the election of executive power by the popular principle of the Federal Government, as the constitution itself meditates and prefers?
So far, then, the amendment strictly coincides with the constitution and with the interests of the people of every State in the Union. But suppose by some rare accident the election should still be sent into the House of Representatives, does not the amendment then afford cause of jealousy to the smaller States? Sir, each State has but one vote, whether it is large or small; and the President and Vice President are still to be chosen out of five persons. Such is the constitution in both respects now. To have enlarged the number of nominees, would have increased the occurrence of an election by the House of Representatives; and if, as I have endeavored to prove, it is for the interest of every State, that the election should be made by the popular principle of Government and not by that House, then it follows, that whatever would have a tendency to draw the election into that House, is against the interest of every State in the Union; and that every State in the Union is interested to avoid an enlargement of the nominees, if it would have such a tendency.
To illustrate this argument, I will repeat a position which I lately advanced, namely, that the substance of a constitution may be effectually destroyed, and yet its form may remain unaltered. England illustrates it. The Government of that country took its present form in the thirteenth century; but its aspect in substance has been extremely different at different periods, under the same form. Without taking time to mark the changes in substance which have taken place under the form of Kings, Lords, and Commons, it will suffice to cast our eyes upon the present state of that Government. What are now its chief and substantial energies? Armies, debt, executive patronage, penal laws, and corporations. These are the modern energies or substance of the English monarchy; to the ancient English monarchy they were unknown. Of the ancient, they were substantial abuses; for, whether these modern energies are good or bad, they overturned the ancient monarchy substantially, without altering its form. Under every change of Administration these abuses proceeded. The outs were clamorous for preserving the constitution, as they called it; for, though divorced from its administration, the hope of getting in again caused them to maintain abuses, by which their avarice or ambition might be gratified upon the next turn of the wheel; just as in Prussia, where divorces are common, nothing is more usual than for late husbands to affect a violent passion for a former wife, if she carried off from him a good estate! And the ins, fearing the national jealousy, and the prepossession against amending the form of Government, and meeting new abuses by new remedies, brought no relief to the nation. So that under every change of men abuses proceeded.
The solution of this effect exists in the species of political craft similar to priestcraft. Mankind were anciently deprived of their religious liberty by a dissemination of a fanatical zeal for some idol; in times of ignorance, this idol was of physical structure; and when that fraud was detected, a metaphysical idol in the shape of a tenet or dogma was substituted for it, infinitely more pernicious in its effects, because infinitely more difficult of detection. The same system has been pursued by political craft. It has ever labored to excite the same species of idolatry and superstition for the same reason, namely, to conceal its own frauds and vices. Sometimes it sets up a physical, at others a metaphysical idol, as the object of vulgar superstition. Of one, the former “Grand Monarch of France;” of the other, the present “Church and State” tenet of England is an evidence. And if our constitution is to be made like the “Church and State” tenet of England, a metaphysical political idol, which it will be sacrilege to amend, even for the sake of saving both that and the national liberty; and if, like that tenet, it is to be exposed to all the means which centuries may suggest to vicious men for its substantial destruction, it is not hard to imagine that it also may become a monument of the inefficacy of unalterable forms of political law to correct avarice and ambition in the new and multifarious shapes they are for ever assuming.
It has been urged, sir, by the gentlemen in opposition, in a mode, as if they supposed we wished to conceal or deny it, that one object of this amendment is to bestow upon the majority a power to elect a Vice President. Sir, I avow it to be so. This is one object of the amendment; and the other, as to which I have heretofore expressed my sentiments, is to enable the Electors, by perfecting the election of a President, to keep it out of the House of Representatives. Are not both objects correct, if, as I have endeavored to prove, the constitution, in all cases where it refers elections to the popular principle, intended that principle to act by majorities? Did the constitution intend that any minor faction should elect a Vice President? If not, then an amendment to prevent it accords with, and is representative of, the constitution. Permit me here again to illustrate by an historical case. England, in the time of Charles the Second, was divided into two parties—Protestants and Papists—and the heir to the throne was a Papist. The Protestants, constituting the majority of the nation, passed an exclusion bill, but it was defeated, and the minor Papist faction, in the person of the Duke of York, got possession of executive power. The consequences were, domestic oppressions and rebellions, foreign wars occasionally for almost a century, and the foundation of a national debt, under which the nation has been ever since groaning, and under which the Government will finally expire.
Had the majority carried and executed the proposed exclusion of James II. from executive power, the English would have escaped all these calamities. Such precisely may be our case. I beg again that it may be understood that, in this application, I speak prospectively and not retrospectively.
But it is far from being improbable, that in place of these religious parties, political parties may arise of equal zeal and animosity. We may at some future day see our country divided into a republican party and a monarchical party. Is it wise, or according to the intention of the constitution, that a minor monarchical faction should, by any means, acquire the power of electing a Vice President, the possible successor to executive power? Ought a republican majority to stake the national liberty upon the frail life of one man? Will not a monarchical Executive overturn the system of a republican Executive? And ought the United States to shut their eyes upon this possible danger until the case shall happen, when it may be too late to open them?
Sir, let us contemplate the dreadful evils which the English nation have suffered from the cause of investing executive power in a man hostile to the national opinion, and avoid them. They suffered, because their exclusion bill was abortive. Election is our exclusion bill. Its efficacy depends upon its being exercised by a majority. It is only a minority which can render election insufficient to exclude monarchical principles from executive power. It is against minority that election is intended to operate, because minority is the author of monarchy and aristocracy.
Shall we, sir, be so injudicious as to make election destroy the principle of election by adhering to a mode of exercising it, now seen to be capable of bestowing upon a minority the choice of a Vice President? Shall we make election, invented to exclude monarchy, a handmaid for its introduction? Or shall we, if we do not see monarchy at this day assailing our republican system, conclude that it never will; although we know that this system has but two foes, of whom monarchy is one? No, sir, let us rather draw instruction from the prophetic observations of a member of the English House of Commons, whilst the bill for excluding James II. was depending, who said:
“I hear a lion in the lobby roar,