Thus much, sir, for the nature of the transactions between the agents of the United States and the ex-Bashaw, prior to the year 1804, when Commodore Barron with his squadron were sent into the Mediterranean, and when he was vested with discretionary powers to avail himself of Hamet’s co-operation, and referred to Mr. Eaton as an agent sent out by Government for that purpose.
This discretionary power of Commodore Barron, the chairman of the committee has this day strongly contended was altogether unlimited, and such is the idea given of it in the report; but this I apprehend to be a mistake of the utmost importance. It is in direct contradiction to the statement of the President’s Message, and to the testimony of Commodore Barron himself. The President’s Message says:
“We authorized Commodore Barron, then proceeding with his squadron, to enter into an understanding with Hamet, if he should deem it useful; and as it was represented that he would need some aid of arms and ammunition, and even of money, he was authorized to furnish them to a moderate extent, according to the prospect of utility to be expected from it. The instructions of June 6th, to Commodore Barron, show that a co-operation only was intended, and by no means a union of our object with the fortunes of the ex-Bashaw; and the Commodore’s letters of March 22, and May 19, prove that he had the most correct idea of our intentions.”
Thus, sir, the discretionary power of Commodore Barron, to avail himself of Hamet’s co-operation, was not unlimited—neither by the intention of the Executive, nor in his own understanding. It was limited both as to the nature of the engagement he was to contract, and as to the sum appropriated for the purpose; co-operation is a term of reciprocal import—it certainly means that there should be some operation on both sides. The operation in this case by sea, was to be conducted entirely and exclusively by the squadron of the United States. Hamet Bashaw could contribute, and was expected to contribute, nothing to that. His operation was to be by land; and, upon principles of ordinary reciprocity, it might have been required that this also should be exclusively at his expense. The Government, however, were willing to furnish him some aid even there. And the sum of twenty thousand dollars had been appropriated for that purpose. This was going as far as prudence would warrant, or as good faith could require. Hamet himself could have entertained no other expectation, since, in his letter to Mr. Eaton, of 3d January, he says: “Your operations should be carried on by sea; mine by land.” And even after the peace was made, in his letter to Mr. Eaton, of 20th June, he acknowledges, as clearly as language can express it, that the failure of co-operation was not on our part, but his own; that his means had not been found to answer our reasonable expectations; and that he was “satisfied with all our nation has done concerning him.”
If Hamet, after the capture of Derne, was totally unable to command any resources, or bear any part in co-operation with us, how can it be said that he would, without the hazard of a repulse, have marched to the throne of Tripoli, had he been supported by the co-operation of our squadron? But, further, I ask what were the means, what were the resources, of this sovereign prince, from the hour when Mr. Eaton received his orders to withdraw from him? The event, sir, is worth a thousand arguments. He could not support himself a day. He was compelled to take instantaneous refuge on board our vessels, and was saved from destruction only by being brought away. Does this look like marching to the throne of Tripoli?
I am aware, sir, that the report has very explicitly declared that no blame ought to attach to Commodore Barron; but it has also declared that a wasting sickness, and consequent mental as well as bodily debility, had rendered him totally unable to command the squadron; that to this cause alone may be attributed the final failure of the plan of co-operation; that Mr. Lear appears to have gained a complete ascendency over him, thus debilitated by sickness; or rather that Lear, having assumed the command, in the name of the Commodore, paralyzed every military operation by sea and land; and they go so far as to impute to Mr. Lear all the letters of Commodore Barron, subsequent to that of 21st of March, 1805. If the gentleman from Maryland considers all this, sir, as perfectly respectful to the Commodore, I can only say that it appears in a different light to me, nor do I imagine it will bear that complexion to the person immediately interested in it. But the chairman of the committee has gone yet further. He has told you, in so many words, that the Commodore was reduced to a state of perfect childhood; has represented him as equally incapable of thought and of action; in a mere state of dotage. And all this upon what evidence? Why, because, in one of his letters, Commodore Barron says he is unable to write with his own hand; and because, from the 19th to the 22d of May, there appear among the documents, five letters, long letters, says the gentleman, and yet the Commodore’s secretary had an inflammation in his eyes.
Monday, April 7.
The bill, entitled “An act further to alter and establish certain post roads, and for other purposes,” was read the second time, and referred to Messrs. Anderson, White, and Stone, to consider and report thereon.
Importation of Slaves.
Mr. Wright communicated a resolution of the Legislature of the State of Maryland instructing their Senators and Representatives in Congress to use their utmost exertions to obtain an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to prevent the further importation of slaves; whereupon, Mr. Wright submitted the following resolutions for the consideration of the Senate: