Mr. Macon.—Mr. Chairman, I feel myself bound by the call which has been made by three gentlemen from Pennsylvania, (Messrs. Gregg, Smilie, and Findlay,) with whom I have long been in the habit of friendship, a friendship on my part sincere, to state the reasons which will govern my conduct on this occasion; whether they may be satisfactory to others or not, they are perfectly so to me. That a difference of opinion subsists between the members with regard to the measures best adapted to the present crisis of our affairs, is evident from the number of resolutions on your table. An attempt has been made to liken this resolution to one agreed to in 1793; but are they alike? I think not. That was general, and operated alike on every part of the Union, while this, in my opinion, is special, and will only operate on one part of the Union; and this partial operation will be severely felt by that section of the country which I in part represent. Besides this clear difference in the two resolutions, will not all the three gentlemen agree that there is a great and striking difference in our affairs with Great Britain—in 1793 and now? Her motives may be as unfriendly now as then; but I speak of facts known to all, not of motives; she then held the western posts, she then detained an immense property belonging to the Southern people, both in violation of the treaty of peace. She then instigated the Indians to war on the frontiers, and then, as at this time, impressed our sailors and captured our vessels; besides, the United States had not then relinquished the principle, that free ships should make free goods. In relinquishing this principle, they, in a great measure lost sight of the carrying trade, by peaceable means; but, if gentlemen wish to turn to Europe, they will find that, in 1793, the treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz were in force. Let the facts which I have stated be compared with those of the present day, and all must confess that there is a very considerable difference. I have said this much to show that there is no analogy in the facts of the present time and those of 1793, and that there is no change of opinion in me. If, however, I am mistaken, it is an honest mistake.
This nation, in my opinion, must take her choice of two alternatives: to be happy and contented without war, and without internal taxes; or to be warlike and glorious, abounding with what is called honor and dignity, or in other words taxes and blood. If it be the first, the people will continue to enjoy that which they have hitherto enjoyed—more privileges than have fallen to the lot of any nation with whose history we are acquainted; they will, as they have done, live plentifully on their farms, and such as choose, will carry on a fair trade, by exchanging our surplus productions for such foreign articles as we may want. If we take the other ground we shall, I fear, pursue the same career, which has nearly, or quite ruined all the other nations of the globe. Look at the people of England, legally free, but half their time fighting for the honor and dignity of the Crown, and the carrying trade, and see whether they have gained any thing by all their battles for the nation except taxes, and these they have in the greatest abundance. Look also at France, before the Revolution, and we shall see a people possessing a fertile country and fine climate, having the honor to fight, and be taxed as much as they could bear, for the glory and dignity of the grand monarque. Let us turn from these two great nations, and view Switzerland during the same period; though not powerful like the others, we shall see the people free and happy without wars, contented at home, because they had enough to live comfortably on, and not overtaxed. The history of these three nations ought to convince us that public force and liberty cannot dwell in the same country.
I mean not to impute improper motives to any one, nor to examine the Journal after changes, though I am perfectly willing to have it thumbed over, from the day I took a seat in the House to the present, after my name; and if, on examination, it shall appear that I have changed my political principles, or have not uniformly adhered to them, I am willing to bear the name of a political hypocrite. I have formerly been, on very great questions, in very small minorities; on a most important question, in a minority not sufficient to command the yeas and nays. I will say no more on this subject; nothing can be more disagreeable than to talk about one’s self, and nothing could justify it but the call which has been made; perhaps I have already said too much on it, but it was impossible to say less.
The dispute with Great Britain is most unquestionably for the carrying trade; a trade which is less beneficial to the nation than any other, and a trade which has produced most of our disputes with foreign nations, and it is the only trade that requires expensive protection. Will any one contend that this trade is half as important as the coasting trade? This cannot and will not be contended, for every one knows that the coasting is the best trade. It not only exchanges the products of one part of the nation for those of another, but it also tends, by making us better acquainted with each other, to connect us more intimately, and to make every part harmonize for the public good. The trade which I consider the next best for a nation to carry on, is the direct trade for home consumption, by which the surplus produce of one country is exchanged for that of another; and in this as in every branch of trade, this great rule will be adhered to—buy cheap and sell dear if you can. With the coasting and direct trade agriculture is more nearly connected than with any other. But a nation may be agricultural without being commercial. The Swiss cantons and Milan were of this description, and it may be remarked that Milan is the most populous country in Europe. China is said to be of the same character; but, as little is known of that country, I shall not quote it to establish a fact which is clearly established by the other two. A country may also be commercial without being highly agricultural, as was the case with Venice and some other European powers. But let us pursue that system which our own experience has proved to be the best for the United States; for, since the adoption of the present constitution, and before this day, we have had trying times. It will be remembered, that during the French Revolution, we had complaints against France. Her government issued orders of which we justly complained; one of them, I believe, declared all the productions and manufactures in Great Britain to be contraband of war; this, if executed, would have nearly cut off all communication with a nation with whom we carried on the greatest trade. What did we then do? We sent ministers to France, with two of whom she refused to have any intercourse, but pretended to be willing to negotiate with the other. All the ministers finally returned home, and we took half-way measures against her, which are the worst of all measures, and which produced a sort of half war, which I believe injured us more than her—for besides the actual expense, which may be estimated at not less than $10,000,000, it nearly ruined the agricultural people by reducing the price of produce; flour it reduced from twelve and fourteen dollars per barrel to six; and tobacco, from ten and twelve dollars per hundred to three; and it had no doubt the same effect on other articles of exportation. And how were we relieved from these evils? We again sent ministers, who were received, and they made a treaty. Besides what has been before stated of the conduct of Great Britain, it will not be forgotten that she declared all France in a state of blockade, and this order would have cut off all commercial intercourse with her, who then wanted much of our produce. To Great Britain, also, a minister was sent, and he made a treaty. I am now desirous that the same steps should be pursued before we adopt decisive measures. We once laid an embargo, of which we tired. This shows the necessity of acting cautiously, and of taking no measures which we cannot adhere to. All the gentlemen who have supported the resolution now under consideration, have expressed doubts whether it would produce greater effects on Britain or ourselves. This is surely doubting its policy, and if its policy be doubted by its friends, what ought to be the result of our inquiries, especially when it is believed that its adoption will materially injure one part of the country, and that part entirely agricultural? Does the public good, about which we have heard so much, require that a measure which its friends seem to think of doubtful policy, ought to be adopted, when none can doubt but it will injure, if not sacrifice, the real interest of a part of the community? Examine the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and it will, at one glance, show from what quarter the great export is made to Great Britain; cut off the import, and you will lessen the price of the export, if it shall be exported. But we are told that we are bound to protect commerce, meaning, I suppose, that this resolution must be adopted. Then if we are really bound, and there is no discretion, nothing of expediency, there is no occasion for this investigation. But gentlemen well know, that on every question, discretion may and will be exercised. But have we really done nothing for commerce and navigation? On this subject I can confidently appeal to those most interested. What, since the adoption of the present constitution, has made this the second commercial nation in the world? Before that we had but little claim to the character of a commercial people. Have not the protecting duties on the tonnage of foreign vessels, and on goods imported in them, produced the effect? They have secured to our vessels the carrying our own productions, which encourages navigation in proportion to their bulk. Let gentlemen inquire the number of cargoes which tobacco and cotton alone furnish the American vessels. Besides this encouragement given to navigation, has not a law been passed to favor the fisheries, and thereby to form sailors for the use of the merchant service? It may be right here to observe that I neither approved nor voted for that law, but no attempt has ever been made to repeal it. This is the encouragement by which, during a time of peace, we have become the second commercial nation in the world, and this too in the short space of time since the adoption of the present constitution—say, if you please, since the 3d of March, 1789. One consequence, a little curious, is produced by this encouragement, which is this: When Europe is at peace, the protecting duties prevent any competition by foreign vessels to carry our productions, and when at war, so many of our vessels carry for the belligerent nations, that freight is nearly as high with us as it is with them, so that what the agricultural people pay in time of peace to encourage, they lose the benefit of when Europe is at war, and when it is most wanted.
Among the arguments urged to show the effect of this measure on Great Britain, one is that it will ensure us a powerful aid in that country; that the British merchants and manufacturers, whose interests will be seriously affected, will give you all their assistance. This argument has been completely answered by a gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Early.) But if gentlemen really calculate to make friends on the other side of the water, it seems to me that a different plan would produce more effect. Cut off all intercourse between them and us, and adhere to the plan long enough, and you will find the merchants and manufacturers of England joined by all the inhabitants of the West Indies, to have the intercourse opened. The Assembly of Jamaica have acknowledged that they cannot get supplies in plenty except from the United States; but this plan would operate as much on beef, pork, fish, and flour, as on tobacco or cotton. But this would be too strong for them, while they are desirous to adopt a measure which will have the same effect on cotton and tobacco. What is this but a sacrifice of a part of the agricultural interests of the country to what they believe will be a protection for the carrying trade? I should like it quite as well if the attempt was not to be made solely at the risk of one part of the Union. The evil is felt in one part, but the remedy is to be applied in another. Adopt general measures, which will operate equally in every part of the country, and if the shoe is to pinch, let it pinch all alike, and all will then be willing to have it off as soon as possible.
I am willing to acknowledge that a dollar got by this carrying trade, and made the property of the nation, is just as good as a dollar got any other way, even by the cultivation of land. But does it follow from thence that you are to make more sacrifices to get the dollar in that way than it is worth? I think not. The adoption of the resolution, besides its unjust and partial operation, will considerably affect the revenue, and no ways and means are proposed to meet any deficiency. On the present question we risk a revenue of ten millions of dollars raised on the consumption of foreign articles in the Union, to gain—what? (I speak only of revenue) an additional sum of $850,000, which additional sum you will lose as soon as you depart from your neutrality. It is asked again and again, if we have not a right to the trade about which so much has been said? If the doctrine that free ships should make free goods had obtained, there could be no doubt on the question; but I mean not to examine the right but the effect of the resolution; nor do I mean to deny that the trade is of some use to the nation. Merchants would not so anxiously pursue it, if they made no profit by it; and their profit adds to the national stock, and may affect the price of native articles offered for sale. I am also willing to acknowledge that a cargo of flour or any other native production sent to the West Indies, and there fairly exchanged for sugar, and the sugar brought home, that the sugar is as much ours as the produce of our own soil, and this sugar so obtained we have a right to carry to those that may want it. But the question before the committee is not a question of right, but of expediency. Is the protection which will be given to this carrying trade, by the adoption of the resolution, of that sort and of such certainty, as to justify the adoption of a measure, which will operate excessively hard on one part of the Union? The right of deposit at New Orleans before we purchased the country, was certainly as well established as our right to carry coffee and sugar to France and Spain, or any where else—it was a right acknowledged by treaty. But when the deposit was refused, what did we do? we took pacific measures, and succeeded. We heard then much about honor and dignity, and that it was our duty to enforce our right by arms; but notwithstanding all this, we adopted no measure like the present; we then acted for the general welfare. Does it follow, because I am opposed to the resolution, that I am unwilling for our citizens to own vessels? It does not. I am willing they may have as many as they please, and do as they please with them, so that they do not involve the nation in war by them. On this subject the interests of the husbandman in New Hampshire and Georgia are the same.
The gentleman who introduced the resolution expressed a wish that no party or geographical feelings should be brought into the debate. If there was no cause for geographical feelings, why then wish, or why anticipate them? Let the report of the Secretary of the Treasury be examined, and it will be seen that there is cause for this feeling; indeed, the statement, made from that document by a gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Early) must have convinced all of the partial operation of the resolution. On the first page of the report it appears, that the annual exports to Great Britain and her dependencies are estimated at about $15,690,000, of which sum, tobacco and cotton alone make $8,860,000; it also appears, that we exported to the dominions of Great Britain in Europe, for each of the three years ending on 30th September:—in 1802, the sum of $12,066,521; and that cotton, tobacco, rice, pitch, tar and rosin, made of that sum $8,485,762; in 1803, the sum of $16,459,264, and that the same articles made of that sum, $11,912,493; in 1804, the sum of $11,787,659, and that the same articles made of that sum, $9,443,807. These articles are selected, because they are the produce of one section of the Union. The same part of the country produces the following articles in common with other parts of the nation, but the proportion of each is not known:—flour, wheat, beef, pork, staves, heading, boards, plank, scantling, timber, flaxseed, skins, wax, hams, bacon, turpentine, spirits, lard, and Indian meal, and I may add, pickled fish; some of these articles are carried to the Middle and perhaps to the Eastern States, and are there exported, or consumed; and, if consumed, enable them to export more of their own productions.
It has also been said, that if we adopt the resolution, and cannot get what we want from Great Britain, we will manufacture for ourselves. This sounds well on this floor, but I very much doubt the practicability of making this nation manufacture for itself, while we have land enough for every industrious citizen to become a landholder, and a cultivator of the soil. Connecticut and Massachusetts have tried the experiment, and both without success, and both on articles in which it was most likely to succeed; if these States, with their population, could not succeed, what chance of success is there in other States? The practicability ought to be satisfactorily shown before we enter on the plan. It may, as has been said, prevent our wives from wearing silk gowns, and ourselves from wearing broadcloth; whether it will produce this effect is quite uncertain; fashion is as great a tyrant as any we have to contend with; it will, I fear, be difficult to destroy its influence by legislating. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Smilie) and myself, plain as we are, are both obliged in some degree to yield to it; we can no more contend with it, than we can fly to Europe.
I come now to that part of the subject where every man must feel the injury done to his fellow-citizens; I mean the impressment of our seamen. Is there a father who does not feel this? No; not one in the nation; and that man who shall devise a certain remedy for this evil, will deserve the thanks of his country; he will, indeed, be its greatest benefactor; he, like the impressed sailor, will have a place in the tenderest part of the hearts of his countrymen. If a plan to prevent this injury was only made known, the very knowledge of the plan would put an end to the injury. But can gentlemen seriously believe that the adoption of the resolution will produce this effect? The means are not adequate to the end, I conceive; at least, it remains to be shown that they are. I will, without hesitation, state what I believe to be the best remedy for the evil. It is this: to agree with Great Britain that neither country shall employ the sailors of the other; and to agree, also, on the proof that shall be required on both sides; we might expect that Great Britain would adhere to an agreement of this kind, because it would be her interest to do so, and on her interest alone, I should rely. In considering this subject, we must look at things as they really are, and not as we would wish them to be. The British Government exercise the right, or rather the power, of impressing their sailors; and, I believe, in time of war, of prohibiting their going into foreign service. Under these circumstances, it may be advisable for us not to employ them, notwithstanding we may do it with their consent, especially if it would prevent their impressing our countrymen. If the merchants really be the friends of the American sailors, they would willingly agree to such a regulation. If they would not be willing, is it not clear they would employ British sailors at the risk of having ours impressed? On this subject it might not be improper to state that I have been informed, in some parts of the world, certificates of persons being American citizens are sold, and that the market has been well supplied. I have also been informed that a British officer in Philadelphia actually procured one for the purpose of enabling him to go home. This favored Great Britain. I have given this information, to show that others, besides citizens, may obtain certificates. Impressments, I fear, can only be prevented by negotiation; indeed, I have heard that the two Governments have been engaged on this interesting subject. I hope it will be resumed, and that it will end in securing to our countrymen their safety on the ocean.
We are told that the nation calls for strong measures, that the President has recommended them, and that men of the greatest talents think them requisite. This may be true, but as I have neither seen nor heard of this call of the nation, and as I do not know the opinions of others, I shall certainly pursue my own. The first Message of the President to Congress, most unquestionably pointed as strong towards Spain as it did to Great Britain; and, hitherto, but little has been said about the usage we received from her. But the recommendation of the President alone, is not always a good reason for legislating, I apprehend, because every President has recommended subjects for the consideration of Congress, on which no act was ever passed. If ever the liberties of this nation are destroyed by strong measures, it will be when the recommendation of the President shall alone be deemed good cause for their adoption. At present, we have choice of all the resolutions on the table, notwithstanding all that has been said in favor of the one now under consideration. No doubt can be entertained, but the mover of each thinks his own the best. From the number, it would seem there was no difficulty in finding remedies for the injuries we have received.