The first was agreed to—ayes 54, noes 37.
The second was agreed to—ayes 75; and
The third was agreed to without a division.
When the committee rose and reported their agreement to the resolutions.
The House immediately considered the report.
On concurring with the Committee of the Whole in their agreement to the first resolution,
Mr. Fisk said he sincerely regretted it was not in his power to vote for this resolution. He regretted there was no such principle in the constitution as is prescribed. Such a principle not being in the constitution, he did not conceive it in the power of the House to make the provision. It was not, in his opinion, in their power to say a man should not hold a seat in that House who was not prohibited by the constitution. It was on this ground only he was against the resolution under consideration.
Mr. J. Randolph.—I think the gentleman from Vermont may in perfect consistence with the principle he has laid down, which I do not mean at present to contest, give his vote in favor of this resolution. He says that this House has not a right to make a disqualification which the constitution itself does not attach to the tenure of a seat on this floor; that the constitution draws a line between the qualification and disqualification of a member, and that this House has no right to alter them. What do we propose to do? To add a new disqualification? No; to do that which the constitution put in our hands, which it not only authorizes but enjoins upon us. The constitution declares that each House shall be the judge of the qualification of its members. It is clearly, then, the duty of the House to expound what is or is not a disqualification; and we are now only about to declare what is such a disqualification—merely to expound the constitution on this head. I know some gentlemen are startled at the idea of expounding the constitution. But do we not do this every day? Is not the passage of every act a declaration on the part of this House that a decision upon it is among their constitutional powers? Or, in other words, is it not an exposition of the constitution? So, in this instance, I will suppose a man returned to serve as a member of this House, and that he is declared, for some reason, to be disqualified from holding a seat. This, according to the gentleman, would be expounding the constitution. We propose doing no more than saying, if the Secretary of State, or Chief Justice, should come here, they cannot hold a seat. We say that an abuse exists under the constitution, and offer a remedy.
I have heard some quibbling about the meaning of the word “officer.” What is the meaning of office? Agency; it is the office of a man’s cook to dress his dinner, of a tailor to supply him with clothes; and it is the office of a contractor to fatten on the land—to acquire lordships, demesnes, baronies—extensive territory—by the advantage he derives from holding the public money, in virtue of his contract. But it is asked, if a contractor is an officer; and whether he can be impeached? because, under the constitution, all civil officers are liable to impeachment. Would you impeach the Marshal of the District of Columbia? It may be answered that you may impeach him, but that you would not probably do so, because that would be breaking a butterfly on the wheel. Would you impeach a deputy postmaster? And yet when the postmaster at New York accepted his appointment, did he not vacate his seat in the Senate? There is no doubt a contractor is an officer pro tempore—it is not an office in perpetuity, but created for a time, and for a particular purpose. And I will ask, if it is not more dangerous to the independence of the two Houses to admit commissioners and contractors within their walls than officers with legal salaries and appointments? If we are to admit either, I say, give me the legal officer, with a determinate salary and definite powers, rather than the contractor who may gain thousands and tens of thousands of dollars by a single job. But, if the gentleman from Vermont is of opinion that a contractor is not an officer, under the constitution, I hope he will join me in another vote, on an amendment which I shall beg leave to offer—this goes only to purge these walls, not those of the other House. I mean an amendment declaring void all contracts made with members of either House, and on this principle: between the sessions of the Legislature it is possible for a member to receive a lucrative job, by which he may put thousands in his pocket, and which being completed in the recess, and there being nobody to take cognizance of it, it will be impossible to apply a remedy. But, I hope this construction, which, so far as relates to our own House, we have an undoubted right to make, will obtain as the true construction of the constitution.
But it is said that this House, and Houses which may hereafter meet, may give the constitution a different construction. No doubt of it; and this may operate to the end of time. A former House passed a sedition law; a subsequent House deemed the law unconstitutional. It is true they did not declare it so, and I am sorry for it; but there is no doubt of the fact. Now, we may pass a sedition law again to-morrow, and the people rise up against it, and send different members to represent them. The people may again slumber; as long as you keep your hands from their pockets, they will keep their eyes from yours; and, in the same way, this law may be repealed. I can, therefore, see no force in this objection. The courts of justice undertake to expound the constitution, and shall not the House of Representatives be as competent to do this as any court of justice? I will suppose a case, that of a man condemned under the Sedition law by a tribunal of justice. Suppose men of different principles come on the bench, would they hesitate to reverse the preceding decision of the court? Indisputably not. Here, too, then, we would behold varying and repugnant decisions.