I beg pardon for detaining the House so long. I will, however, endeavor to express the remaining ideas I have to offer in a few words. There is another consideration which renders this bill highly objectionable. I consider the case as now at issue, whether the United States is under a military or civil government, or, in other words, whether the military government is subject to the civil power, or the civil authority to the military. I conceive that a case has occurred, in which the military has not only usurped the civil authority, but in which it has usurped nothing short of omnipotent power; and I consider this bill as calculated to give a softening and smoothing over to this usurpation; and on this ground I cannot assent to it. Suppose this bill either to pass or not to pass, what has been the practice under the constitution? By the expression, under the constitution, I do not mean conformably to it. Men have been taken up by a military tribunal, and have been transported contrary to law. I say transported, for if a man can be transported from the district where the offence with which he is charged was committed, he may also be deported to Cayenne, or transported to Botany Bay. And even you yourself, (addressing the Speaker,) if such acts be sanctioned by this bill, in your passage from this House to your lodgings, may be arrested, put on board a vessel and carried whithersoever the military authority may choose. To this I will never give my consent. It has been very well remarked by my colleague, that this is not the first case in which an insurrection has occurred in the United States, but that it is the first case in which an attempt has been made to suspend the precious privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
I put it to any man, whether, now that we have received information of the extent of this conspiracy, and when we find that Catiline, Cethegus, and Lentulus, have not as many brother conspirators as themselves, this conspiracy is equal to that in Pennsylvania in 1794 or 1795? In physical force it is not comparable to it, however in intellectual talent it may be. I conceive then that according to the Constitution of the United States, there is but one case in which the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended, and I should not go into this view of the subject, if it had not been misstated by all those who have preceded me in the debate. My view of the subject is this—that this privilege can only be suspended in cases in which not merely the public safety requires it, but that the case of the public safety requiring it, must be united with actual invasion or actual rebellion. Now, with whatever epithets gentlemen may dignify this conspiracy, I am not even of the opinion of the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. R. Nelson)—I think it nothing more nor less than an intrigue—and I am happy that I can declare on the honor, not of a soldier, but of a citizen, that I believe it to be a foreign intrigue, availing itself of domestic materials for answering its purposes, and poor indeed must be the soil of this, or of any other state of society, which would not furnish such materials.
A gentleman from Massachusetts has stated to the House that the organization and administration of the Government, at this time, forbids the apprehension of any abuse being made of the powers delegated under this law. Surely, sir, the gentleman could not mean to urge this as any thing new. He must have known, if he had consulted history—as doubtless he has—that the king de facto, and the administration de facto, are always above suspicion. That there never was a proposition brought forward, that did not find a majority ready to say, There is surely no danger of any improper use of this power in our time, for we are all honorable men, and we would not delegate it, if an improper use could be made of it; and that, if we reject a measure, we ought not to do it so much on account of ourselves, as on account of those who come after us. And what will those who come after us say of us? They will follow our example, and declare that the character of their forefathers was above every doubt and every suspicion. Now, for myself, I beg leave to be permitted to disclaim every argument of this kind. I do not, indeed, consider it fair to introduce such an argument. Let us take up the question on its own merits and demerits, without any allusion or reference to our own virtues, or the degeneracy of posterity. For myself, I have no hesitation in saying that I will not grant this power at any time, except under the most imperious necessity; and I say this without any disrespect to this honorable body, or to any of the public functionaries. Take man as he is, and in his best estate, you find him an animal prone to abuse and corruption. There does not exist a single constitution or law in the world, that does not enforce this salutary truth.
I shall consider this bill, if it passes, as establishing a new era in the Government. When I was a boy, I recollect to have consulted such chronological tables as I could get access to. I recollect to have read, that at a certain time, monarchy was abolished in Rome; a little while after, the first Dictator was named; then the second Dictator—and I believe, as in a case of apoplexy, she scarcely got over the third fit. I believe a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus might have, here, the same effect as the establishment of the first Dictatorship at Rome. In what situation would it place yourselves and the citizens of this country? It would leave them at the mercy, not merely of a justice of the peace, but at the mercy of every subaltern officer of the army and navy. I believe it would comport as much with the safety and interest of this confederacy to give us power to send these people off, as to put this power in their hands. I believe we should be as trustworthy as they. And, let me ask, what compensation to an innocent man, to a man of honor and feeling, to a man of character, who should be tied neck and heels and sent off to New Orleans, and who should ultimately be proved to be innocent—I ask what compensation it would be to him to bring an action of damages? Against whom? A man without visible property? And what action? An action on the most mercenary principle. To be indemnified in his fame by dollars and cents. The injury would be irreparable. At present, all stand under the law. If any one offend, let him be brought under it. But, in this way, to put a man in an oyster boat, or skipper, and transport him to a distance from the place of his arrest, and then say he shall have a remedy, in case of his innocence, against an inferior officer, is absurd. If we pass such a bill, which God forbid! it should contain a large appropriation, and Government should be obliged to make good the injured party—to afford him redress. I say they should grant a large appropriation, for it is not for men with epaulets and gold buttons to make reparation. If the bill passes, we are told it will be but temporary. Why, the Sedition law was but temporary; and I think, sir, (alluding to the Speaker,) you were one of those who aided its passage—much against your will—by being present at the altar when it was more than once re-enacted. As to its three months continuance, I consider that as one of the most objectionable features of the bill—as a bait to the trap; as the entering wedge. If it is made reconcilable to the interests and feelings of this House to pass it for three months, do you think we will then feel the same lively repugnance to it that we now do? No! It has been truly said, that no man became perfectly wicked at once; and it may be affirmed, with equal truth, that a nation is never enslaved at once. Men must be initiated by degrees, and their repugnance must be gradually overcome. Let me state a case. It is proposed to extend the time of service of the Executive Magistrate from four, to five, or eight years, or for life. If it be prolonged for a term, do you believe we shall stop at its expiration? No! Once extended for life, he will then claim the power to choose his successor, and the hereditary principle will follow. This is the old trick. Let me, however, tell gentlemen that old birds are not to be caught with chaff, though, unfortunately for them, the mass of mankind does not consist of old birds. Pass one other law, and I would quit the country. A twin brother to this same bill was introduced into the British Parliament in 1794; and that bill to prevent seditious assemblies, was brought forward for about as good reasons as this. According to it, if four or five persons assembled, and refused on the notice of a magistrate, to disperse, they were considered guilty of sedition, and were dispersed by force. These two bills form a complete tyranny—and tyranny of the most odious kind, because established under the mask of liberty. Was the tyranny of Robespierre less intolerable, oppressive, or odious, because inflicted in the name of the people, than a like tyranny in Turkey, under the Grand Seignor and his Muftis? Take one other thing along with you. These two fatal wounds, inflicted on the liberties of the English nation, were inflicted by the man who came forward in the character of a reformer—by the man who came forward as the advocate of a Parliamentary reform; from which circumstance he acquired that popularity which enabled him to inflict those deadly wounds on the liberty of his country.
Having said so much with regard to the principle, permit me to add one word on the details of the bill. There is a departure in it from the known, accustomed, and received language of the constitution, in the use of the word “authority.” The words are “warrant or authority.” The expression is, in my opinion, too lax. Perhaps, we may be told, that the bill may be amended on the third reading. But my objection to the principle contained in it is such, that I will not consent to carry to a third reading that which under no amendment can be rendered palatable to my taste. Mr. R. concluded by observing that he had so far exhausted himself that he was unable to go on.
Mr. Smilie.—I shall not detain the House long by the remarks which I propose to make on this subject. I shall waive all observations on the mode of proceeding on this occasion—whether we shall reject the bill on its first, or suffer it to go to a second reading. The question is now put, and I am called upon to give my vote, either in the affirmative or negative. I, therefore, feel under a necessity to put my negative upon it. I consider this one of the most important subjects upon which we have been called to act. It is a question which is neither more nor less than, whether we shall exercise the only power with which we are clothed, to repeal an important part of the constitution? It is in this case only, that we have power to repeal that instrument. A suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is, in all respects, equivalent to repealing that essential part of the constitution which secures that principle which has been called, in the country where it originated, the “palladium of personal liberty.” If we recur to England, we shall find that the writ of habeas corpus in that country has been frequently suspended. But, under what circumstances? We find it was suspended in the year 1715, but what was the situation of the country at that time? It was invaded by the son of James II. There was a rebellion within the kingdom, and an army was organized. The same thing happened in the year 1745. On this occasion it was found necessary to suspend it. In latter times, when the Government had grown more corrupt, we have seen it suspended for an infinitely less cause. We have taken from the statute book of this country, this most valuable part of our constitution. The convention who framed that instrument, believing that there might be cases when it would be necessary to vest a discretionary power in the Executive, have constituted the Legislature the judges of this necessity, and the only question now to be determined is, Does this necessity exist? There must either be in the country a rebellion or an invasion, before such an act can be passed. I really doubt whether either of these exist. I really doubt whether a single law of the United States has been, as yet, violated. I will not say this is the fact; but I do not know any thing to prove the contrary. But, supposing that a rebellion does exist, we are then left at liberty to decide whether it is such a one as to endanger the peace of society to such a degree that no ordinary remedy will answer. If an ordinary remedy will not, it may be our duty to apply an extraordinary one. What is this mighty business? What is the opinion of the Executive as to its danger? Does he consider it dangerous? It is a little remarkable that, in every instance under the British Government, the proposition of such a measure originated with the Executive, while here, without any intimation of danger from the Executive, we propose, on our own suggestion, to suspend one of the most valuable privileges that is secured to the citizen. Let us attend to the communication of the President on this subject. He states that, according to his information, the persons concerned in the conspiracy depend on receiving two kinds of aid; foreign aid, and aid derived in their own country. After giving his opinion of the foreign aid expected, he says:
“On the whole, the fugitives from the Ohio, with their associates from Cumberland, or any other place in that quarter, cannot threaten serious danger to the city of New Orleans.”
The President declares that, in his opinion, there is no danger to be apprehended. With regard to foreign force, he states his reasons for thinking there is no danger. As the Message is in the hands of every gentleman, there can be no necessity for me to read it. But he explicitly declares, from the state of our relations with other nations, there can be no danger from that quarter. This being the deliberate opinion of the Executive Magistrate, who is more deeply responsible on this occasion than any other member of the Government, is it not most extraordinary that we should attempt to take steps which can only be justified in the last resort? Are gentlemen aware of the danger of this precedent? This is the first attempt ever made under the Government to suspend this law. If we suspend it when the Executive tells us there is no danger, on what occasion may it not be suspended? Let us suppose that it shall be suspended on this occasion, what will be its effect? Parties will probably for ever continue to exist in this country. Let us suppose a predominant party to conjure up a plot to avenge themselves. Do not gentlemen see that the personal liberty of all their enemies would be endangered? I mention this to forewarn gentlemen of the dangerous ground before them. I do not say that our country may not, at some future day, be in such a situation as to justify such a suspension, but I have never yet seen her in such a situation, and, at this moment, I think it does not exist. When we see the great body of the people so firmly attached to their Government, ought we to be thus alarmed on beholding a few desperate and unprincipled men attempting to stir up an insurrection? There is another consideration which will induce me to give my hearty negative to this bill. If foreign nations see that we are obliged, under such circumstances, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, will it not show that the constitution is incapable of supporting itself, without the application of the most dangerous and extraordinary remedies?
Mr. Dana.—I understand that the question is, whether the bill shall be rejected on its first reading, without passing through the ordinary forms of proceeding. In such cases, the ordinary question is, Is there any thing in the bill proper for the House to deliberate upon? If they are of opinion that it can be modified in such a way as to ensure its passage, it ought to go to a Committee of the Whole. This was my opinion when the motion was first made to reject the bill. I was disposed to vote against the question, although the bill went to repeal the constitution. I have been accustomed to view the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the most glorious invention of man. I was notwithstanding, however, from a respect to the other branch of the Legislature, disposed to investigate the subject—to examine whether there was any necessity for it. As, on the one hand, I was inclined to believe that the judgment of the Senate had, on this occasion, been tinged by a strong abhorrence of rebellion; so I was willing, on the other, to take time to guard myself against an equally strong feeling of abhorrence of dictators. But, on one principle, I cannot agree to consider this bill as a proper subject of investigation, for one moment. I perceive, on further examination of the bill, that the Senate have provided for its suspension in cases where persons have been already presented. Had it been confined to future arrests, I might have agreed to deliberate on it, but viewing it in the light of an ex post facto law, I must give it my instantaneous negative. There is another principle which appears to me highly objectionable. It authorizes the arrest of persons, not merely by the President, or other high officers, but by any person acting under him. I imagine this to be wholly without precedent. If treason was marching to force us from our seats, I would not agree to do this. I would not agree thus to destroy the fundamental principles of the constitution, or to commit such an act, either of despotism or pusillanimity. Under this view of the subject, I am disposed to reject the bill, as containing a proposition on which I cannot deliberate.