Mr. J. proceeded to observe that if any officer will violate the constitution and take the responsibility, it is in vain to make laws in order to prevent it. But were there no circumstances to justify Wilkinson? He saw treason lurking on every side. There are cases in which necessity affords a complete palliation. The President’s Message does not confirm the declaration of the gentleman from Delaware, that there were no grounds for a charge against Alexander. [Mr. J. here read Wilkinson’s affidavit.] Does it not show that they are all linked together? Wilkinson believed, and no doubt justly, that these persons could not be safely imprisoned at New Orleans. When it appeared that the judges, at least one of them, was desirous not to oppose the treason, it would have been madness in the extreme to have left the traitors there, and especially when it was expected that Burr would soon arrive with a powerful force.
The relief for abuses of the writ of habeas corpus is in trial by jury. This is the best relief. But the violator is also liable to impeachment, and is amenable to the Government. The outrages spoken of have a remedy—the privilege of the writ is amply secured; if the constitution has been broken, a law would also have been broken in the same circumstances. Mr. J. then concluded by announcing his determination to vote against the reference of the resolution.
Several members were rising to speak, when an adjournment was moved and carried—yeas 60.
Wednesday, February 18.
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The House resumed the consideration of the motion of Mr. Broom, depending yesterday at the time of adjournment.
Mr. Elliot.—Mr. Speaker, gentlemen have generally been disposed, and I think with propriety, to consider the subject in two points of view. First, to examine the merits of the proposed resolution upon general principles, abstracted from all connection with events that have occurred, either recent or distant. Secondly, to consider the propriety of exercising the supreme legislative power, to preclude the recurrence of events which have sacrificed for a time “the holy attributes of the constitution,” to borrow the language of the great violator of the constitution himself, at the shrine of military power.
Upon the first point, gentlemen who have expressed their sentiments, have been unanimous, or nearly so, in declaring that legal provisions of the kind now contemplated ought to be made, at a proper time, if those now existing are insufficient and inoperative. Those who have told us that the British statutes upon the subject of the writ of habeas corpus are in force in the United States, or even that it is doubtful whether they are so or not, need not have told us that they are not professional men; it was a work of supererogation. No professional man could for a moment entertain the idea that the statutes of Great Britain are laws of the United States. The question may be considered as undetermined, whether the common law of England, or any part of it, which has not been expressly recognized by our constitution and statutes, is law in the United States, considered in their federal character; it is at least well known that upon that question, a unanimous opinion does not exist in the first judicial tribunal of our country. For one, I do not believe that the United States, as the United States, possess any code of common law. I know of no laws of the Union but the constitution and statutes. That constitution and those statutes have recognized, or rather referred to certain portions of the common law, and particularly to certain technical common law terms and rules, as rules of practice in the federal courts; and beyond those the courts have common law powers. At all events, we have not adopted any of the British statutes, and particularly, and by mere implication too, statutes highly penal in their operation. The doctrine is too absurd to be countenanced, upon serious reflection, by any man of common discernment. The constitution has declared that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety shall require it.” But neither the constitution nor your laws have made it a positive duty of the courts to issue the writ in any particular case; still less have they secured the performance of that duty by any penal sanctions. Can it then be improper to provide means to coerce the courts and officers of the United States in this particular, and to leave to all the citizens, at all times and under all circumstances, such an invaluable constitutional privilege? Very few will deny or doubt the propriety of the measure. But many will say that it is ill timed, and the question of time naturally introduces us to the second scene of discussion.
It is said that it is improper at the present period to agitate the question now under consideration. In my apprehension the objection is a very strange one. The constitution has just been violated by the commander of your army; violated at the point of the bayonet, and in more than one or two of its most essential articles. In addition to the celebrated part of that instrument which prohibits the suspension of the habeas corpus, except by the supreme civil power, in crises of great national danger, several of those amendatory articles which peculiarly secure the rights of the citizen, and the adoption of which, on that account, were necessary to reconcile the majority of the people to the original constitution itself, have been disregarded and derided by a military chieftain. I allude to the following articles, all of which have been violated in most of their essential provisions:
“Art. 4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.