Mr. Randolph said he was decidedly of opinion that the gentleman from Kentucky ought to have an opportunity of taking the sense of the House on his motion: he therefore withdrew the resolution under consideration: when
Mr. Rowan moved the resolution as above stated.
Mr. Bacon said, notwithstanding the evidence which had just been read, he would give the reasons why he could not yet vote for this House to act in any manner on this subject, more especially as proposed by this resolution. It was not to be concealed that the impressions made upon his mind by the statement of the gentleman from New Orleans were very considerable; but the impressions which that or any other statement were calculated to make, were very different from the question of what it was their duty to do in relation to it. He hoped that they would not be so much impressed by it (for it contained a great deal he must confess) as to suffer it to impel them into a path wide of their constitutional limits. He did not mean to express a definite sentiment as to the guilt or innocence of the officer involved.
He would not, under the privilege of his seat, on the one hand blazon the merits of General Wilkinson to the world, nor on the other, declare that he had sufficient evidence of his guilt. He would leave it to the unbiased decision of the proper tribunal.
Mr. B. observed the other day, and would now repeat it, that it was not within their power to adopt the resolution then under consideration, or that now offered by the gentleman from Kentucky. He then and now conceived that the offence with which General Wilkinson was charged, might be cognizable by more than one department—certainly by the Executive, from his being a military officer. He could say nothing about the inquiry now instituted one way or the other; for if the constitution did not authorize them to complete an inquiry, they had no right to interfere with it, being the exclusive province of the Executive. It struck him further, that if the facts in this statement should be proven on a full examination to be true, (and he did not call its correctness in question, for he had heard the same things from other people,) he could not see why it was not a case cognizable by a judicial tribunal. The constitution expressly forbade any person holding an office under the United States to take a pension or donation from a foreign power. The act of receiving money from a foreign power, therefore—the charge made against General Wilkinson—was a crime against the supreme law of the land, and cognizable by the judicial authority. If, therefore, we could, as proposed, instruct, request, or in any manner interfere with the Executive with respect to that portion of the inquiry which appertains peculiarly to the Executive, as the only power competent to remove this officer, why may we not in the same manner interfere with the jurisdiction or cognizance of the Supreme Court? He could see no difference; with equal justice they could interfere with one as with the other.
Gentlemen who were in favor of an inquiry in this form, could not have considered the subject so maturely as they ought. This was a Government of distributive powers. One class had been delegated to the Representative body, one to the Executive, and another to the Judiciary. If they once began each to invade the other’s jurisdiction, the distributive system was destroyed. It has been said that we are the Representatives of the people; that it is our duty to see that the Republic take no harm. This expression was calculated perhaps to captivate the public ear, and acquire popularity, as well as to captivate the House. But whatever they might think of what ought to have been provided, they ought to consider what was. I do not think, because we may on this, or any other occasion, suppose that we could do a great deal of good, we ought to take any steps towards effecting an object until we contemplate our particular powers in relation to that object. It has been said that this House is the grand inquest of the nation. I do not know what is meant by this expression; but if I understand the meaning of the term, it conveys the same meaning as grand jury. Now, Mr. B. said, he could not agree to any position that this House was legitimately, on general subjects, the grand inquest of the nation. With respect to impeachments, and in that case alone, were they the grand jury, for then the two Houses acted in a judicial capacity—this House being the grand inquest to inquire, and the Senate being the petit jury to judge of their presentment. Now, if this House were the grand inquest to inquire into this, or a similar case, in which an inquiry might seem to be conducive to the interest of the nation, and were to present a result, where was the jury to judge of the truth of their verdict? Was it to be tried by the Senate? That was not pretended to be the course.
On all these accounts, therefore, whatever was the impression which the paper this morning laid on the table might be calculated to produce on their minds, he thought they ought sedulously to attend to the constitutional limits of their duty, and not conclude, merely because they might in any case act beneficially, that they had the power to act in such case.
He had before observed, that he would not express an opinion; but he would say that an inquiry ought to be had; it will, it must be had, and it should be a full and impartial inquiry. If the inquiry which had been instituted were but the semblance of an inquiry, for one it would not satisfy him, or the people, or the nation; it ought not to satisfy them. Gentlemen had said that a military court of inquiry would not be competent. Mr. B. did not know what might be their particular power as to sending for persons; but if that court had not sufficient power, it was in the power of the House to clothe them with it. He thought they might, though he would not say that they ought to do this. As a court of inquiry might have been, or could be, clothed with this power; and, adverting to what he had before said, that it was a case cognizable by a judicial tribunal; and if so, that a judicial tribunal had all the power that this House could exercise in any criminal case, and more than they had in this, he should vote against every resolution going to express a conviction that this House had any power or right whatever to act on a subject solely within the constitutional right of the Executive or Judiciary.
Mr. Randolph said, if the gentleman who had just sat down had not given his hasty impressions, but left his good understanding free to operate, his objections to the resolution would have vanished. The great mistake made by every gentleman who opposed this measure on constitutional grounds, was this: that they looked upon an inquiry made by this House, through the organ of one of its committees, as leading to the punishment of the individual implicated, and that where this House was not competent to inflict punishment, it was incompetent to make inquiry; this was the great stumbling-block, which had impeded their apprehension. But he would ask the gentleman from Massachusetts whether this House was not competent to make an inquiry for its own legislative guidance? Was it not competent, as well in its capacity of supervisor of the public peace, as to obtain a guide for its own actions, to inquire into this matter? Was not the House clothed with the power of disbanding the army? Now, suppose a committee of the House, upon inquiry, were to report, perhaps, that not only the Commander-in-chief, but the whole mass of the army, were tainted with foreign corruption, or were abettors of domestic treason, could any man assign to himself a stronger reason than this for breaking an army on the spot? Did not the gentleman know, or rather did he not feel, that this House had the right of refusing the supplies necessary for the army? And could a stronger reason be given for a refusal to pass the military appropriation bill than that they were nourishing an institution which threatened our existence as a free and happy people? Let me, if it is in order, ask the gentleman from Massachusetts to turn his attention to the proceeding of which we have official notice in another branch of the National Legislature, an inquiry into the conduct of one of its own members. Did they not all know that that man’s offence was punishable by a civil tribunal? But the inquiry was not there made with a view to a trial, not to usurp the powers of the judiciary, but to direct that body in the exercise of its acknowledged legislative functions. Inasmuch as they possessed the power to expel one of their own members, to amputate the diseased limb, they possessed the power, and exercised it, to make an inquiry. Now, the gentleman from Kentucky had just as much right to institute an inquiry which might lead to the exercise of the legislative powers of this House, which might cause the disbanding of the present army, the erection of another, or the refusal of supplies, as to institute an inquiry into the conduct of a member with a view to his expulsion, or of an Executive officer, with a view to impeach him before the Senate.
Mr. R. therefore presumed that any inquiry which this House might choose to make into the conduct of any officer, civil or military, was not an interference with the powers of any of the co-ordinate branches of Government; they were left free to move in their own orbits. If a crime had been committed against the statute law of the United States by such officer, the judiciary were as free to punish it as it was free to punish a member of this House, into whose conduct, upon suspicion of treason or misdemeanor, inquiry had been made, with a view to his expulsion. The Executive likewise was left free to exercise his discretion; he was left free to dismiss this officer, to inquire into his conduct himself, either with his own eyes or ears, or by a military court; to applaud, or censure.