The Militia.
On motion of Mr. M. Clay, the House went into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill more effectually to provide for the national defence by the militia of the United States.
The first section being read, as follows:
“That all the militia of the United States, liable to do duty, over twenty-one and under —— years of age, shall be deemed and held in requisition, and called the junior class of militia. And the President of the United States shall be, and he hereby is, authorized, on the appearance of national danger, to order out the same, or any part thereof, to any part of the United States or their Territories, for not more than one whole year at any one time. And whensoever a part of the said junior class shall, by the President of the United States, be called into actual service, such call shall commence with those that are lowest in number, as to age first, and so in rotation: the same shall not be compelled to do duty a second time until the whole of the said junior class shall have served one tour; and when called into the actual service of the United States, they shall be armed and equipped by the United States. For this purpose two hundred thousand stand of arms complete, shall be deposited in such places as the President of the United States shall direct, and whensoever the whole, or any part of the said junior class of militia, shall be called into actual service by the United States, and shall be armed and equipped by the same, it shall be lawful, and they, and each of them, are hereby permitted to retain the said arms and accoutrements, as their own property, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.”
Mr. M. Clay said it was necessary to fill the blank in the first section, before they proceeded any further, and it was incumbent on those who were friends to this project, to show that there were defects in the militia law as it now stood; and, if they could prove to the House that the system offered was better than the old one, he presumed there could be no objection to the bill under consideration. At all events he wished gentlemen to take a serious view of the subject; it was a great national question, on which the salvation of the country depended. He would endeavor to bring forward the best testimony that could be had to prove that the present system was defective, and he hoped he should be able to do it. I will commence with the adoption of the constitution under which we are now acting. We find that President Washington always kept this subject in the view of the National Legislature. This shows that there was something in his opinion to do; it was not his business to tell us what it was, but ours to find out. If gentlemen will take up the Presidential communications from the commencement of the Government, they will find that the subject has been uniformly recommended by each successive President of the United States to the present time. I state this as a strong evidence that, in their opinion, a change was wanting somewhere. Next to this I will call your attention to the communications made from the State Executives to their Legislatures. We find also, that the State Legislatures, almost every year, and in every session, have had the subject under their consideration, and turned it over in one way or the other. This proves that there is in their opinion some defect. We must now remedy that defect if we can; it behooves us to do so; and if I shall be fortunate enough to point out the propriety and mode of making this alteration, I shall have done my duty. We will go further back than the adoption of the constitution; we do not recollect the whole body of the militia ever to have been brought into action to such effect as our strength of numbers would have warranted, if the militia had been properly organized; there was a defect somewhere, which should be remedied without going either to one extreme or another. If gentlemen will turn their eyes to the bill on the table, they will find that our project is to steer between the two, not to harass the militia, but to render them fit for efficient service, by taking only those that can be best spared from home, and, when in actual service, can be most relied on. History itself furnishes no instance, let the mode of warfare be what it might, where the whole body of the militia were ever called into actual service, and kept there for any length of time to advantage. If there was much marching and fighting, the old men with families would soon find the way home; they could not be relied on for a length of time. I remember often to have heard this complaint made before the Revolutionary war; when we were at war with the Indians. Nay, further, if we go among the savages, we find that they do not all turn out to battle, and leave their women and children only behind; they take neither old nor young men, I mean their lads, to battle, but such only as may be useful in the field.
When we recur to the times of the Revolution, which every old gentleman recollects, and every young one has heard of, every one then in service will attest the fact, that wherever the body of the militia were called on to march, old and young together, the old men soon found their way into the hospital; they would complain of old rheumatisms, &c.; they would often fatigue and break down the young men by imposing on them the additional burden of their knapsacks.
My object is to leave at home the senior and minor classes as much as possible; nothing but imperious necessity and imminent danger should call them to the field, and that within their own State, or in the neighboring State. I wish not to derange the state of society, which must be the case if the whole body of the militia are called out at once. During the last war, we saw not only fields and neighborhoods, but whole States, laid waste from being deprived of their cultivators. I wish to avoid this evil; I wish to leave men enough at home to cultivate the earth and take care of the crop. It is well known to gentlemen of the Revolution, that while we lay at Valley Forge, in Pennsylvania, at Middlebrook, in New Jersey, and at other places, we were almost in a state of starvation, because all hands, meaning the whole body of the militia, had been called out, and cultivation and manufactures neglected. I have seen (and an awful sight it was) not less than five thousand men on parade at a time, in the midst of winter, almost naked, without shirts or shoes; of times have I seen them march on the frozen ground barefoot, marking their footsteps with blood as they marched. At the times here spoken of, the Army was reduced to the awful necessity of going into the adjacent country and threshing out the grain from the straw, and, while thus engaged, the poor and almost naked women, with their helpless babes crying round them, would ask, with tears running down their withered cheeks, for God’s sake not to take all, telling the soldiers that that was their all, and when that was gone they must starve; that they had no money, nor wherewith to get money. Now, my object is to avoid such another scene—not only on this account, but in some of the Southern States, we have an internal enemy, an enemy within our own families. There should always be a sufficient force left at home to awe and keep that enemy down. By taking out the junior class only, we shall always have a sufficient number left to quell and keep down insurrection at home. We shall presently show that we have a sufficient number of young men under the age of twenty-six and over twenty-one, to meet the enemy whenever they are called on. We have three great points of assault, New York, Charleston, and New Orleans, and I shall I trust be able to show that we have a sufficient number of young men of the junior class to keep up a continual force, if necessary, to meet all attacks. It behooves me now to show what disposition I intend to make of the minor class—young men under twenty-one years of age. It is not my intention that they shall be called into service, except in case of the utmost necessity, and then only within their own State. We find, from report, that to be the rock on which the Emperor of France has split. He takes his men when in their infancy, from the age of eighteen. They ought to be left until they are twenty-one, to lay in a sufficient stock of information to carry them into life. Let them learn trades or attend to their studies; for we consider the trade or profession which a man learns in his youth, whether mechanical or mental, as a fortune; and therefore we do not wish to interrupt them until they have completed their studies or trades, except imperious necessity should require it. It is necessary that every man should have somewhat from which he may receive subsistence during his passage through life. During his minority he lays up by learning a trade or profession, a principal, the interest of which supports him after he attains the age of twenty-one. We also well know that young men under twenty-one cannot stand hardship; they may do some service; they may march about a little, but their system is not matured; they cannot undergo fatigue. We also know that it will almost take two men of eighteen years of age, each, to cope with one of twenty-five in bodily strength.
We shall now proceed to show the numbers of each class, as nearly as they can be ascertained from the census of 1800. We have taken the authority of the best statistical writers for the progressive numbers.
The census of 1800 gave of males from twenty-six to forty-five, 432,193. I am not very particular as to fractions, they being of little consequence. The annual increase from 1790 to 1800 was about three and one-half per cent., which we will assume for the increase since the last census, being seven years. This will give us an increase since 1800 of 105,882, which added to the number by the last census, makes 538,075. From these deduct, unfit for service, as nearly as we can ascertain, 35,000 or 40,000. We have taken, for the sake of equal numbers, 38,075; which leaves 500,000 men, who may be relied on if the danger should be so great as to call for all men over twenty-six and under forty-five.
By the census of 1800, those over twenty-one and under twenty-six, were between 190,000 and 200,000 men. To this add, for the increase since, by the rule just laid down, 49,400; which will make 249,000, under twenty-six and over twenty-one. Deduct from this number 8,000 or 9,000, for those unfit for service. For the sake of round numbers deduct 9,000; which will leave 240,000 able men. We will suppose wanting at any one time, 30,000 or 40,000 at each of the three great points I have mentioned, which would still leave enough at home to supply the succession and deficiencies. Out of this class of men, then, between twenty-one and twenty-six, could be called out sufficient for service, at any one time, from 90,000 to 100,000, and leave double that number still in requisition. If, however, it should be thought that 240,000 would not be a sufficient number, we have only to take all under twenty-seven instead of twenty-six. Those between twenty-six and twenty-seven, added to the others, would form a body of 280,000 men, without taking any under twenty-one or over twenty-seven. It is about this time of life, twenty-six or twenty-seven, when a man begins to know mankind; they have then sown their wild oats, as we generally say; they then wish to settle and see a family rising up before them; they feel vigorous, and wish to show their activity and strength, in running, tumbling, and wrestling; they think themselves great men; they wish to travel and see the world; they have a roving disposition. This is the moment to lay hold of them and make them good soldiers. I know well that it will be said by some that it is an invidious distinction to stop at twenty-six or twenty-seven. Why may not the same be said of stopping at forty-five or beginning at eighteen? It is said that this classification will tear up the old militia system. I do not care how soon it is plucked by the roots; we have had enough of it. Why persist in a system which we cannot get along with? What is the consequence? To show what that is, it is only necessary to read the report of the Secretary of War. Under an exertion of all the energies of the commanding officers, after the insult of the 22d of June last, on the Chesapeake; after the Executive officers had exerted themselves to procure the best information upon the subject of the militia held in requisition, what is the result? The report just mentioned will show that you cannot rely with confidence on the militia in its present state; nor can you on volunteers. The last will do for a moment at the commencement of a war. In case of invasion they will do very well for the moment. They do not go out with a view of brushing their own coats, washing their shirts, and to cook their victuals; they expect to call for the best of every thing at every house. Some gentlemen volunteers went down lately to Norfolk from Petersburg and Richmond. They conceived themselves on a level with the officers; it would not do; they came home disgusted, and you will not get them to go again. What was the case during the last war? When a large troop of volunteers was raised (I know the fact, I had a brother among them, and can therefore speak of it) they came prancing to General Washington. The old General asked them what they could do? “Fight for our country,” said they. “Will you go into camp with the Army and do regular duty?” They answered “No.” “You have my thanks, then, gentlemen,” said the veteran, “go home again.” This was only to make a show, they intended nothing else; they may do for a moment; but there must be method and regularity in our Army. It will not do to have a large body of men collected for any purpose without it. And therefore it is, that as the great mass of our militia now stand, no reliance can be placed upon them. It will not answer to rely on regular troops. It is easy enough to raise a standing army, but it is difficult to disband them. We had at the close of the last war an awful testimony of the truth of this. Nothing but the vast weight of character of General Washington, who, descending from his high office of Commander-in-chief, mixed with them as a brother soldier, could have prevented them from revolting. See what a clamor is now raised, and rumors afloat through the country, about your standing army of 3,000 men. Get a man sufficiently popular for Commander-in-chief of a large standing army, and what sort of government should we soon have? We may shudder even to think of what might be the result. Look at the contrary side, as now proposed to regulate the militia. You take them from the bosom of their families for one year. At the end of that term they will be anxious to return home. Mutiny will not arrest them. With avidity they will return; a tear of joy will bid them welcome.