Mr. Love said, to a proposition having for its object the removal of the embargo, at the first moment the public interests would permit, he had presumed there would have been no objection made either on that floor or by any man in the nation. In this presumption, said Mr. L., I am extremely sorry to be disappointed, and more especially so as the mode of opposition calls for a reply from those who have been the advocates of the system of policy pursued by the Government, during the embarrassing crisis it has been compelled to encounter.
The proposition before the committee is so familiar to those who have been long in the habits of legislation, from the frequent exercise of the general principle on which it rests, that nothing not already obvious to the minds of the greater part of this honorable body, I am sure, can be said in support of it. In the observations therefore, sir, which I shall trouble the committee with, it will not be necessary to say more than shall be proper in answer, only, to the objections which have been made at this time, to the exercise of the power contemplated by the resolution.
I have heard no argument yet urged against the right of delegating in any situation, or under any circumstances, the exercise of special powers which are acknowledged to be vested in a more general view essentially in the Legislature. The argument, if urged to such an extent, would evidently defeat itself, and go to destroy the operations of this or any other Government deriving the source of its authority from a Legislature. Our constitution has enjoined many duties on Congress, which without a delegation of the powers thus vested in it, could never be effected. An objection to the resolution under discussion on so broad a ground, would have been too obviously untenable. The question has not been thus directly met; but in opposition to the constitutionality of the delegation of power contemplated, a distinction has been taken between the authority which should be given to suspend a law, already in operation, and one which has not yet commenced its operation.
I listened, sir, with every possible attention to the argument made on this distinction. I am obliged to say there was no reason intelligible to my mind, offered in support of it. I will content myself therefore with expressing the opinion that the circumstance of a postponed or present operation, cannot make a difference in the principle. In both cases the authority which delegates the agency is the same, it is the act of every branch of the Legislature, and there can be no distinction which would not apply to one equally with the other. It may in the manner of its exercise be assimilated to the powers of a Legislature to repeal a law already in existence, in contradistinction to the power of repealing one, the operation of which had been suspended. If such a position could be sustained (as a proper inference from our constitution) it would be vain; for if the Legislature have the right of repealing a law, they might in the same breath that they would repeal this, enact another which should provide in a manner so far in conformity with the practice acknowledged to be correct, as to be entirely exempt from the objection urged on the ground of this distinction.
When I compare the limited nature of the power now proposed to be delegated, with those almost unbounded trusts which it has been the constant practice of the Legislature to confide in the Executive Department, I cannot help feeling at a loss to account for the present opposition on any grounds of consistency. Those delegations of authority have not been confined in practice to either of the political parties which have at different times given a tone to the Government. The gentleman from Tennessee, who has introduced the resolution, has mentioned several instances in which this has been done; permit me to add others, in which it appears to me the principle has been carried further than in the present case.
By the constitution, the power of borrowing money is in express terms exclusively vested in Congress. Yet this has been only exercised by a delegation of it, from the commencement of the Government till the time has ceased when it was necessary to exercise it. I hope, sir, it may never be necessary to do it again; but if it should, I ask gentlemen how it will be effected but by the intervention of an agency, although the words of the constitution permit Congress only “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.”
Other powers of great importance, solely confided to Congress, have been delegated, and not as now contemplated, in a restricted and limited degree, but in terms of the broadest and most absolute discretion; many instances have occurred of this in constant succession ever since the revolution, in political opinion, which has taken place in the Legislature of the Union; for scarcely were the Republicans warm in their seats before they made a delegation of the power to the President, more unlimited in principle and more dangerous in practice than that now advocated, for suspending the operation of the embargo law. In 1802 he was authorized to organize a military corps. In February, 1803, he was authorized to cause to be built several vessels of war, if the exigencies of the service should require it. In 1804 the same powers were repeated, and many others, equally dangerous and equally necessary, were delegated both these years. In March, 1805, he was authorized to permit or interdict at pleasure foreign vessels from coming into our ports. Compare the discretion either in extent or importance vested by those laws, with that now contemplated, and on the ground of precedent we are more than justified; even in the present session we have delegated the power of suspending or continuing a law, now certainly in operation, by authorizing the President to build and equip, or not, at his discretion, a number of gunboats, or he may, under the influence of the like discretion, for ever desist from the execution of it.
If this body is supposed to act under the regular impulse of any political principles, it appears to me, sir, that the numerous precedents to be found in our statutory code ought to have an effect. In those which I have mentioned, and many others which have been enumerated by the gentleman from Tennessee, the President was vested with the right, ad libitum, to continue, suspend, or terminate the operation of a law. In the present one the discretion is limited to the contingencies of peace in Europe, a suspension of hostilities, or such conduct and assurances on the part of the belligerents who have invaded our commercial rights, as will enable our vessels to pass with our produce in safety to a foreign market.
Let us now examine, sir, the other constitutional objection made by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Randolph,) that Congress have not the power to lay an embargo. If indeed this novel position be correct, the question is at an end, and the people of the United States would be justified in the resistance the argument invites. I had indeed understood the gentleman, as others near me did, to found his idea of the unconstitutionality of this embargo, on the circumstance of the laws imposing it being unlimited as to time. He defined an embargo to mean an inhibition for a limited time, and this unlimited nature of the present embargo was dwelt on by him with peculiar emphasis; but when a gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. Johnson,) who followed him, had ably exposed the fallacy of this distinction, and completely sent the argument home to its author, the distinction was abandoned by explanation. I understand the explanation of the gentleman; but as the object in pressing the unlimited quality of this embargo on the sensibility of the nation, cannot be mistaken, I have too, sir, for reasons alike obvious, thought it proper to mention it.
But, sir, as to the power to lay an embargo. The first motives for a union of the States, imply this as indispensable. It would be enough to show it to be a measure of general defence and protection, to give Congress a right to act on the subject; as such, sir, it expressly ranks among the provisions assigned as the great causes for the adoption of the Federal Constitution; for in the preamble to this instrument, the people say, they have adopted it in order “to provide for the common defence and general welfare.”