Mr. Milnor said when he had made the motion for the indefinite postponement of the bill, he had supposed that the sense of the House had been fully expressed on it; but as it appeared that the motion would occupy much time in debate, and as some gentlemen had thought proper to insinuate that the motion was made for the purpose of avoiding meeting a direct question on the bill, he now rose to withdraw the motion.
The question was then stated on the first amendment made in Committee of the Whole, viz: to strike out so much as requires the sale of all the gunboats.
Mr. Mumford hoped that the frigates would not be laid up in ordinary. He said he was no politician by profession; he had been called from mercantile pursuits against his inclination, but he had always understood that government was instituted for the protection of the citizen. He was chagrined when he saw the events unfolding in the Old World, and witnessed such a paralyzing system going on in his own country. He had hoped that some system would have been adopted for the protection of our commerce at sea. If gentlemen were determined to abandon the ocean altogether, he begged to know it in time before merchants were totally ruined, for it was impossible at present to carry on any commerce whatever. The part of the country which he represented (city of New York) felt it strongly; agriculture would feel it sooner or later. The enormous captures made of their property had reduced merchants to the alternative of staying at home, or having no commerce but with Great Britain. If gentlemen are disposed to surrender commerce to the discretion of the belligerents and retire from the ocean, it is time to know it. Mr. M. said he was no motive-monger; he never arraigned gentlemen for their motives. We have heard gentlemen say, "millions for defence and not a cent for tribute;" and a noble and popular sentiment it was. It seemed now to be reversed with them, and a plain translation of their speeches was, "millions for tribute; not a cent for defence." Various projects had been offered. Some gentlemen were for putting down the whole Army and Navy; others were for a sort of snail system, alarmed at the least apprehension of danger. Viewing the subject as he did, Mr. M. entreated that gentlemen would consent to protect commerce. The island of St. Domingo now possessed seventeen armed vessels. They were gaining strength daily, and what was the situation of our Southern borders? If our naval force was entirely withdrawn from the ocean, it was impossible for an army of militia to defend the mouth of the Chesapeake. He understood that two vessels were now building in Chesapeake Bay for St. Domingo. He knew that the Haytian agents had been in this country for the purpose of purchasing vessels. Under all these circumstances was it wise and prudent to discharge the Navy? He presumed the best course would be to put to sea what little navy we have to protect our own coasters, for they would be necessary without any view to commerce in the European seas. Under every view, instead of laying up those vessels in service, Mr. M. said he hoped that gentlemen would consent to fit out every vessel in the possession of the United States, and send them out to protect American commerce.
A motion having been made by Mr. Smilie to amend the bill so as to place the Navy on the footing on which it stood in 1806—
Mr. Dana said he was not for pausing with merely replacing the former system; he was also for guarding against the waste of public property and treasure which had taken place in the Naval Establishment. He believed that for the number of fighting men afloat the United States had been put to a much greater expense than was necessary. He was not speaking, he said, of our having few brave men on the water, nor of the great sums given anywhere to those who give us their blood; but the system of the navy-yards, he believed, required a thorough reform. If he was to judge of the general economy on board the frigates and smaller vessels from the little he had seen of them, he must set it down for certain that waste did not exist on board the vessels after they were fitted for service, and manned, and officered. As far as he had an opportunity to observe, he had marked a strong sense of subordination, and the practice of command at the same time sustained with gentleman-like propriety, without any unnecessary torture or rigor. In all this business, Mr. D. said, where you employ warriors, whether by land or water, that department called the staff, the agents, purveyors of supplies, &c., is the branch of the service to which you most look for waste. On merely casting the eye along the decks of our vessels, the conduct of the officers, and the manner in which the men behaved, indicated a sort of conduct which appeared to him incompatible with waste, laxity of discipline, or want of attention to duty. Generally speaking, the civil branch of the service was the reverse of this. Mr. D. adverted to the mode of equipping vessels, and reprobated the scrambling, which he had understood often took place for equipments, as incompatible with methodical arrangement, and correct distribution of supplies. It was wasteful and inconsistent with regular accountability. It was not the course pursued in the navy-yards of other nations. The commander of a man of war in other countries was not permitted to go into a navy-yard; he could not there claim to have every thing new on board his vessel. When every man was suffered to manage as he would, there was no security for the economical conduct of an establishment; for the more anxious was each commander to have his own vessel exclusively well equipped, the more would the public suffer. He was, therefore, for adopting some system of rigorous retrenchment—what it should be he did not know. In the nature of the thing he was confident it could be done; without it there must be much waste. At present, therefore, he was against striking out the frigates from the Naval Establishment. A reform in the expense was the great desideratum, not the abolition of the Navy.
Mr. D. said he would submit to the House one consideration: the appearance which the passage of such a bill would present to the world after the resolutions passed at the commencement of the present session. For his own part, indeed, he had deemed it useless to make declarations of national independence, or to resolve against submission; but at the commencement of the session a resolution had been passed respecting what had taken place between Executive and the British Minister, and then Congress had pledged themselves to call forth the whole force of the nation to stand by and support the President. He had supposed this unnecessary, improper, and exceptionable in some respects. But at the same session, when the controversy was chiefly respecting maritime privileges, if they should not only reduce but sell the Navy, what would the world say, when they had seen the beginning and end of the session? Would it be possible that foreign powers could look up with any reverence to their acts? We shall, said he, be reduced to such a situation that even the apprehension of our hatred could not insure respect from foreign Governments, if we suffer our conduct to be so completely at war with our own acts. In order to possess some appearance of respectability in the estimation of others, the most expedient course would be to establish economy and provide for a less profuse distribution of the public moneys, but to retain the public armed vessels, that we may be in the condition for effectual service whenever it is deemed expedient. By this course we may save more of property as well as character than by an abolition of the Navy; and if we save both it is better than to save the one and lose the other.
In allusion to a remark of Mr. Mumford against the bill, Mr. D. said that in regard to what was formerly said respecting millions for defence and not a cent for tribute, that doctrine was a very good one, but it had no connection with crawling within ourselves in time of danger—with the terrapin policy—with drawing in head and claws so that no part of the body should be exposed; and those who were for that course, (because really they had not provided any shell,) could not very well appeal for their justification to the doctrine of "millions for defence and not a cent for tribute," and yet he believed that the gentleman from New York himself had voted for that system of terrapin defence. Although, said Mr. D., I was against that thing, yet there were men distinguished for talents and worth, and who are eminent in the councils of their country, who entertained sentiments widely different. This policy was borrowed from the colonial system; we did not assume the spirit of a nation, perhaps; we recollected what we had done before when we were colonies, and perhaps gentlemen thought the efforts of children might succeed when they had attained to manhood. It was a delusion. If gentlemen, however, now see through their error, their desire to correct it ought not to be condemned.
Mr. Bassett was of opinion with Mr. D. that reform rather than reduction of the Naval Establishment ought to be their object. He was glad to find that when the Navy was brought into view, other ideas than those of mere commerce began to be associated with it. Heretofore it had only been advocated as a means for the protection of commerce. Mr. B. said he lived in a district which was sensibly alive to the benefits of a navy. The district which he represented had within it more water than land. It therefore became essential to the defence of his constituents that they should have a floating protection. It was impossible, in the nature of things, that they could be defended but by a floating defence. Surely there could be no gentleman in the House who was not sensible of the necessity of protection! It might be a favorite point in a monarchy to keep the country unprotected, and thus under the control of the Government, but the motto of Republics should be universal justice, equal rights, and common defence. He asked gentlemen to look at the magnitude of the object of defending our seacoasts, which could not be less than three thousand miles in extent, and, taking into consideration the sides of our navigable rivers, that extent would be doubled. If gentlemen would but for a moment consider the immense space which was exposed, they would see all the importance of securing an adequate defence. The House had been told, and certainly very truly, that there was a maritime force rising in our neighborhood. The House had been told, also, and told correctly, too, that at least two large vessels were building in their own waters for the use of that growing maritime power. At the very moment, said Mr. B., that we know that the blacks of St. Domingo are building vessels, shall we dispose of Our public armed vessels? Let me ask who will buy them when put into the market? Who but Christophe and Petion? It is reduced to a certainty that if we put them now to the hammer, they must go in that direction. I ask gentlemen seriously to weigh that consideration.
The situation of our Navy is at present sufficiently reduced. We have only five frigates in actual service. The Chesapeake, for want of repairs, is now in harbor. If gentlemen are anxious that she should be laid up in ordinary, I would accord in it; but I would prefer to leave this subject entirely to the discretion of the Executive. I know, sir, how apt a proposition of this sort is to be met by a suggestion of Presidential confidence; but when we come to consider our particular situation, that we are putting it into the power of the President, not to add to the burdens of the people, but to relieve them, that will be thought a sound argument to justify the course of leaving the whole matter to the discretion of the President. The wisdom of the last and of the present Congress has kept in service five frigates. We cannot remain in session at all times; and we are at this moment, extremely doubtful as to the aspect our affairs will assume as to foreign nations. I would ask gentlemen if former experience does not warn us that if we have an accommodation with one belligerent, it will but lead to a wider breach with the other? But if this occurrence does not take place, and every thing should turn out happily, my proposition would leave it in the power of the Executive to secure the public against loss. The expense is not drawn upon us by the Executive, but it is such as the wisdom of the National Legislature has thought proper to incur. Therefore I think it fair to consider the subject in this way. As we are about to separate, and as present appearances would not warrant our giving up any species of protection, we shall be justified in giving a discretionary power to the Executive to put down such part of the Naval Establishment as he may in future think it justifiable to part with.
I am not one of those who think the expense of the Navy a sufficient argument for disposing of it altogether. I have been asked what has the Navy done. I can answer for a large portion of my constituents, that it has kept them quiet in mind. Is it not important that the men who live on the seaboard should know that we have a force to repel attack? What sort of attack have we cause to expect? A serious invasion? Certainly not. The sort of attack which we ought to guard against is the predatory attack, made at small expense, to our great injury. If we do away the naval system entirely, our whole seacoast will be liable to be ravaged. A single frigate, a single privateer, a single pirate, might come into your waters and injure your citizens to a considerable amount. It has been mentioned, and I have seen an official intimation of it, that two or three vessels, in the shape of pirates, had stopped vessels at the mouth of the Mississippi. The force now embodied on the ocean is not more than adequate to the security of the nation against predatory warfare. I am willing, notwithstanding this, to leave it to the Executive discretion to lessen the burden.