About the same period, to wit, towards the seventeenth century, when France settled the isle Dauphine and the Mobile, Spain erected a fort at Pensacola. But Spain never pushed her actual settlements or conquests further west than the bay of Pensacola, whilst those of the French were bounded on the east by the Mobile. Between those two points, a space of about thirteen or fourteen leagues, neither nation had the exclusive possession. The Rio Perdido, forming the bay of the same name, discharges itself into the Gulf of Mexico between the Mobile and Pensacola, and, being a natural and the most notorious object between them, presented itself as a suitable boundary between the possessions of the two nations. It accordingly appears very early to have been adopted as the boundary, by tacit if not express consent. The ancient charts and historians, therefore, of the country so represent it. Dupratz, one of the most accurate historians in point of fact and detail of the time, whose work was published as early as 1758, describes the coast as being bounded on the east by the Rio Perdido. In truth, sir, no European nation whatever, except France, ever occupied any portion of West Florida, prior to her cession of it to England in 1762. The gentlemen on the other side do not indeed strongly controvert, if they do not expressly admit, that Louisiana, as held by France anterior to her cession of it in 1762, reached to the Perdido. The only observation made by the gentleman from Delaware to the contrary, to wit, that the island of New Orleans being particularly mentioned could not for that reason constitute a part of Louisiana, is susceptible of a very satisfactory answer. That island was excepted out of the grant to England, and was the only part of the province east of the river that was so excepted. It formed in itself one of the most prominent and important objects of the cession to Spain originally, and was transferred to her with the portion of the province west of the Mississippi. It might with equal propriety be urged that St. Augustine is not in East Florida, because St. Augustine is expressly mentioned by Spain in her cession of that province to England. From this view of the subject I think it results that the province of Louisiana comprised West Florida, previous to the year 1762.
What is done with it at this epoch? By a secret convention of the 3d of November of that year, France ceded the country lying west of the Mississippi, and the island of New Orleans to Spain; and by a contemporaneous act, the articles preliminary to the definitive Treaty of 1763, she transferred West Florida to England. Thus at the same instant of time she alienated the whole province.
Posterior to this grant, Great Britain, having also acquired from Spain her possessions east of the Mississippi, erected the country into two provinces, East and West Florida. In this state of things it continued until the peace of 1783, when Great Britain, in consequence of the events of the war, surrendered the country to Spain, who for the first time came into the actual possession of West Florida. Well, sir, how does she dispose of it? She re-annexes it to the residue of Louisiana; extends the jurisdiction of that Government to it, and subjects the Governors or commandants of the districts of Baton Rouge, Feliciana, Mobile, and Pensacola, to the authority of the Governor of Louisiana, residing at New Orleans; whereas the Governor of East Florida is placed wholly without his control, and is made amenable directly to the Governor of the Havana. And I have been credibly informed that all the concessions or grants of land, made in West Florida, under the authority of Spain, run in the name of the government of Louisiana, You cannot have forgotten that about the period when we took possession of New Orleans, under the Treaty of Cession from France, the whole country rung with the nefarious speculations which were alleged to be practising in that city, with the connivance, if not actual participation of the Spanish authorities, by the procurement of surreptitious grants of land, particularly in the district of Feliciana. West Florida, then, not only as France has held it, but as it was in the hands of Spain, made a part of the province of Louisiana, as much so as the jurisdiction or district of Baton Rouge constituted a part of West Florida.
What, then, is the true construction of the Treaties of St. Ildefonso and of April, 1803, from whence our title is derived? If an ambiguity exist in a grant, the interpretation most favorable to the grantee is to be preferred. It was the duty of the grantor to have expressed himself in plain and intelligible terms. This is the doctrine not of Coke only, (whose dicta I admit have nothing to do with the question,) but of the code of universal law. The doctrine is entitled to augmented force when a clause only of the instrument is exhibited, in which clause the ambiguity lurks, and the residue of the instrument is kept back by the grantor. The entire convention of 1762, by which France transferred Louisiana to Spain, is concealed, and the whole of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, except a solitary clause. We are thus deprived of the aid which a full view of both of those instruments would afford. But we have no occasion to resort to any rules of construction, however reasonable in themselves, to establish our title. A competent knowledge of the facts, connected with the case, and a candid appeal to the treaties, are alone sufficient to manifest our right. The negotiators of the treaty of 1803 having signed with the same ceremony two copies, one in the English and the other in the French language, it has been contended, that in the English version the term "cede" has been erroneously used instead of "retrocede," which is the expression in the French copy. And it is argued that we are bound by the phraseology of the French copy, because it is declared that the treaty was agreed to in that language. It would not be very unfair to inquire if this is not like the common case, in private life, where individuals enter into a contract, of which each party retains a copy, duly executed. In such case neither has the preference. We might as well say to France we will cling by the English copy, as she could insist upon an adherence to the French copy; and if she urged ignorance on the part of Mr. Marbois, her negotiator, of our language, we might, with equal propriety, plead ignorance on the part of our negotiators of her language. As this, however, is a disputable point, I do not avail myself of it; gentlemen shall have the full benefit of the expressions in the French copy. According to this, then, in reciting the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, it is declared by Spain in 1800, that she retrocedes to France the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it then had in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States. This latter member of the description has been sufficiently explained by my colleague.
It is said that since France in 1762 ceded to Spain only Louisiana west of the Mississippi, and the island of New Orleans, the retrocession comprehended no more—that the retrocession ex vi termini was commensurate with and limited by the direct cession from France to Spain. If this were true, then the description, such as Spain held it, that is in 1800, comprising West Florida, and such as France possessed it, that is in 1762, prior to the several cessions, comprising also West Florida, would be totally inoperative. But the definition of the term retrocession, contended for by the other side, is denied. It does not exclude the instrumentality of a third party. It means restoration or reconveyance of the thing originally ceded, and so the gentleman from Delaware acknowledged. I admit that the thing restored must have come to the restoring party from the party to whom it is retroceded, whether directly or indirectly is wholly immaterial. In its passage it may have come through a dozen hands. The retroceding party must claim under and in virtue of the right originally possessed by the party to whom the retrocession takes place. Allow me to put a case: You own an estate called Louisiana. You convey one moiety of it to the gentleman from Delaware, and the other to me; he conveys his moiety to me, and I thus become entitled to the whole. By a suitable instrument I reconvey or retrocede the estate called Louisiana to you as I now hold it, and as you held it; what passes to you? The whole estate or my moiety only? Let me indulge another supposition: that the gentleman from Delaware, after he received from you his moiety, had bestowed a new denomination upon it, and called it West Florida, would that circumstance vary the operation of my act of retrocession to you? The case supposed is in truth the real one between the United States and Spain. France in 1762 transfers Louisiana west of the Mississippi to Spain, and at the same time conveys the eastern portion of it, exclusive of New Orleans, to Great Britain. Twenty one years after, that is in 1783, Great Britain cedes her part to Spain, who thus becomes possessed of the entire province; one portion by direct cession from France, and the residue by indirect cession. Spain then held the whole of Louisiana under France, and in virtue of the title of France. The whole moved or passed from France to her. When, therefore, in this state of things, she says, in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, that she retrocedes the province to France, can a doubt exist that she parts with, and gives back to France, the entire colony? To preclude the possibility of such a doubt, she adds, that she restores it, not in a mutilated condition, but in that precise condition in which France had, and she herself possessed it.
Having thus shown, as I conceive, a clear right in the United States to West Florida, I proceed to inquire if the proclamation of the President directing the occupation of property, which is thus fairly acquired by solemn treaty, be an unauthorized measure of war and of legislation, as has been contended.
The act of October, 1803, contains two sections, by one of which the President is authorized to occupy the territories ceded to us by France in the April preceding. The other empowers the President to establish a provisional government there. The first section is unlimited in its duration; the other is restricted to the expiration of the then session of Congress. The act, therefore, of March, 1804, declaring that the previous act of October should continue in force until the first of October, 1804, is applicable to the second and not the first section, and was intended to continue the provisional government of the President. By the act of the 24th of February, 1804, for laying duties on goods imported into the ceded territories, the President is empowered, whenever he deems it expedient, to erect the bay and river Mobile, &c., into a separate district, and to establish therein a port of entry and delivery. By this same act the Orleans Territory is laid off, and its boundaries are so defined as to comprehend West Florida. By other acts the President is authorized to remove by force, under certain circumstances, persons settling or taking possession of lands ceded to the United States.
These laws furnish a legislative construction of the treaty, correspondent with that given by the Executive, and they vest in this branch of the Government indisputably a power to take possession of the country, whenever it might be proper in his discretion. The President has not, therefore, violated the constitution, and usurped the war-making power, but he would have violated that provision which requires him to see that the laws are faithfully executed, if he had longer forborne to act. It is urged that he has assumed powers belonging to Congress in undertaking to annex the portion of West Florida between the Mississippi and the Perdido to the Orleans Territory. But Congress, as has been shown, has already made this annexation the limits of the Orleans Territory, as prescribed by Congress, comprehending the country in question. The President, by his proclamation, has not made law, but has merely declared to the people of West Florida what the law is. This is the office of a proclamation, and it was highly proper that the people of that Territory should be thus notified. By the act of occupying the country, the Government de facto, whether of Spain, or the revolutionists, ceased to exist; and the laws of the Orleans Territory, applicable to the country, by operation and force of law, attached to it. But this was a state of things which the people might not know, and every dictate of justice and humanity required, therefore, should be proclaimed. I consider the bill before us merely in the light of a declaratory law.
Never could a more propitious moment present itself for the exercise of the discretionary power placed in the President of the United States, and, had he failed to embrace it, he would have been criminally inattentive to the dearest interests of this country. It cannot be too often repeated, that if Cuba on the one hand, and Florida on the other, are in the possession of a foreign maritime power, the immense country belonging to the United States, watered by streams discharging themselves into the Gulf of Mexico—that is, one-third, nay more than two-thirds of the United States, comprehending Louisiana, is placed at the mercy of that power. The possession of Florida is a guarantee absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the navigation of those streams. The gentleman from Delaware anticipates the most direful consequences from the occupation of the country. He supposes a sally from a Spanish garrison upon the American forces, and asks what is to be done? We attempt a peaceful possession of the country, to which we are fairly entitled. If the wrongful occupants under the authority of Spain assail our troops, I trust they will retrieve the lost honor of the nation in the case of the Chesapeake. Suppose an attack upon any portion of the American army within the acknowledged limits of the United States by a Spanish force? In such event there would exist but a single honorable and manly course. The gentleman conceives it ungenerous that we should at this moment, when Spain is encompassed and pressed on all sides by the immense power of her enemy, occupy West Florida. Shall we sit by, passive spectators, and witness the interesting transactions in that country—transactions which tend to jeopardize, in the most imminent degree, our rights, without interference? Are you prepared to see a foreign power seize what belongs to us? I have heard in the most credible manner that, about the period when the President took his measures in relation to that country, the agents of a foreign power were intriguing with the people there to induce them to come under his dominion.
Whether this be the fact or not, it cannot be doubted, that if you neglect the present auspicious moment—if you reject the proffered boon, some other nation, profiting by your errors, will seize the occasion to get a fatal footing in your southern frontier. I have no hesitation in saying, that if a parent country will not or cannot maintain its authority in a colony adjacent to us, and there exists in it a state of misrule and disorder, menacing our peace, and if moreover such colony, by passing into the hands of any other power, would become dangerous to the integrity of the Union, and manifestly tend to the subversion of our laws; we have a right, upon eternal principles of self-preservation, to lay hold of it. This principle alone, independent of any title, would warrant our occupation of West Florida. But it is not necessary to resort to it, our title being in my judgment incontestably good.