Gentlemen contend that the construction which they give to the constitution has been acquiesced in by all parties, and under all administrations; and they rely particularly on an act which passed in 1804, for extending a branch to New Orleans, and another act, of 1807, for punishing those who should forge or utter forged paper of the bank. With regard to the first law, passed no doubt upon the recommendation of the Treasury Department, I would remark, that it was the extension of a branch to a Territory, over which Congress possesses power of legislation almost uncontrolled, and where, without any constitutional impediment, charters of incorporation may be granted. As to the other act, it was passed no less for the benefit of the community than the bank—to protect the ignorant and unwary from counterfeit paper, purporting to have been emitted by the bank. When gentlemen are claiming the advantage supposed to be deducible from acquiescence, let me inquire what they would have had those to have done who believed the establishment of the bank an encroachment upon State rights? Were they to have resisted, and how? By force? Upon the change of parties, in 1800, it must be well recollected that the greatest calamities were predicted as consequences of that event. Intentions were ascribed to the new occupants of power of violating the public faith and prostrating national credit. Under such circumstances, that they should act with great circumspection was quite natural. They saw in full operation a bank, chartered by a Congress who had as much right to judge of their constitutional powers as their successors. Had they revoked the law which gave it existence, the institution would, in all probability, have continued to transact business notwithstanding. The Judiciary would have been appealed to; and, from the known opinions and predilections of the judges then composing it, they would have pronounced the act of incorporation, as in the nature of a contract, beyond the repealing power of any succeeding Legislature. And, sir, what a scene of confusion would such a state of things have presented—an act of Congress, which was law in the statute book, and a nullity on the judicial records! Was it not wisest to wait the natural dissolution of the corporation, rather than accelerate that event by a repealing law involving so many delicate considerations?
When gentlemen attempt to carry this measure, upon the ground of acquiescence or precedent, do they forget that we are not in Westminster Hall? In courts of justice, the utility of uniformity of decision exacts of the judge a conformity to the adjudication of his predecessor. In the interpretation and administration of the law, this practice is wise and proper; and without it, every thing depending upon the caprice of the judge, we should have no security for our dearest rights. It is far otherwise when applied to the source of legislation. Here no rule exists but the constitution; and to legislate upon the ground merely that our predecessors thought themselves authorized, under similar circumstances, to legislate, is to sanctify error and perpetuate usurpation. But if we are to be subjected to the trammels of precedents, I claim, on the other hand, the benefit of the restrictions under which the intelligent judge cautiously receives them. It is an established rule, that to give to a previous adjudication any effect, the mind of the judge who pronounced must have been awakened to the subject, and it must have been a deliberate opinion formed after full argument. In technical language, it must not have been sub silentio. Now, the acts of 1804 and 1807, relied upon as pledges for the re-chartering this company, passed not only without any discussions whatever, of the constitutional power of Congress to establish a bank, but I venture to say, without a single member having had his attention drawn to this question. I had the honor of a seat in the Senate when the latter law passed; probably voted for it; and I declare, with the utmost sincerity, that I never once thought of that point; and I appeal confidently to every honorable member who was then present to say if that was not his situation.
This doctrine of precedents, applied to the Legislature, appears to me to be fraught with the most mischievous consequences. The great advantage of our system of government over all others is, that we have a written constitution defining its limits and prescribing its authorities; and that, however for a time faction may convulse the nation, and passion and party prejudice sway its functionaries, the season of reflection will recur, when calmly retracing their deeds, and all aberrations from fundamental principle will be corrected. But once substitute practice for principle, the expositions of the constitution for the text of the constitution, and in vain shall we look for the instrument in the instrument itself. It will be as diffused and intangible as the pretended constitution of England; and it must be sought for in the statute book, in the fugitive journals of Congress, and in reports of the Secretary of the Treasury. What would be our condition if we were to take the interpretations given to that sacred book, which is or ought to be the criterion of our faith, for the book itself? We should find the Holy Bible buried beneath the interpretations, glosses, and comments of councils, synods, and learned divines, which have produced swarms of intolerant and furious sects, partaking less of the mildness and meekness of their origin than of a vindictive spirit of hostility towards each other. They ought to afford us a solemn warning to make that constitution, which we have sworn to support, our invariable guide.
I conceive, then, sir, that we are not empowered by the constitution nor bound by any practice under it, to renew the charter of this bank and I might here rest the argument. But, as there are strong objections to the renewal upon the score of expediency, and as the distresses which will attend the dissolution of the bank have been greatly exaggerated, I will ask your indulgence for a few moments longer. That some temporary inconvenience will arise, I shall not deny; but most groundlessly have the recent failures in New York been attributed to the discontinuance of this bank. As well might you ascribe to that cause the failures of Amsterdam and Hamburg, of London and Liverpool. The embarrassments of commerce, the sequestration in France, the Danish captures—in fine, the belligerent edicts, are the obvious sources of these failures. Their immediate cause is the return of bills upon London, drawn upon the faith of unproductive or unprofitable shipments. Yes, sir, the protests of the notaries of London, not those of New York, have occasioned these bankruptcies.
The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse. Perhaps, at last, all power is resolvable into that of the purse, for with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie circulation of the United States is estimated by some calculators at ten millions of dollars; and if it be no more, one moiety is in the vaults of this bank. May not the time arrive when the concentration of such a vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the hands of any corporation will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom is this immense power wielded? By a body who, in derogation of the great principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people, is amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners. Suppose an attempt to subvert this Government, would not the traitor first aim, by force or corruption, to acquire the treasure of this company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven-tenths of its capital are in the hands of foreigners, and these foreigners chiefly English subjects. We are possibly upon the eve of a rupture with that nation. Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English Premier would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of this institution? Republics, above all other nations, ought most studiously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves that the internal dissensions excited by foreign intrigue have produced the downfall of almost every free Government that has hitherto existed; and yet gentlemen contend that we are benefited by the possession of this foreign capital. If we could have its use, without its attending abuse, I should be gratified also. But it is in vain to expect the one without the other. Wealth is power, and under whatsoever form it exists, its proprietor, whether he lives on this or the other side of the Atlantic, will have a proportionate influence. It is argued, that our possession of this English capital gives us a certain influence over the British Government. If this reasoning be sound, we had better revoke the interdiction as to aliens holding land, and invite foreigners to engross the whole property, real and personal, of the country. We had better at once exchange the condition of independent proprietors for that of stewards. We should then be able to govern foreign nations, according to the arguments of gentlemen on the other side. But let us put aside this theory, and appeal to the decisions of experience. Go to the other side of the Atlantic, and see what has been achieved for us there by Englishmen holding seven-tenths of the capital of this bank. Has it released from galling and ignominious bondage one solitary American seaman, bleeding under British oppression? Did it prevent the unmanly attack upon the Chesapeake? Did it arrest the promulgation, or has it abrogated the Orders in Council—those orders which have given birth to a new era in commerce? In spite of all its boasted effects, are not the two nations brought to the very brink of war? Are we quite sure that, on this side of the water, it has had no effect favorable to British interests. It has often been stated, and, although I do not know that it is susceptible of strict proof, I believe it to be a fact, that this bank exercised its influence in support of Jay's treaty; and may it not have contributed to blunt the public sentiment, or paralyze the efforts of this nation against British aggression?
The Duke of Northumberland is said to be the most considerable stockholder in the Bank of the United States. A late Lord Chancellor of England, besides other noblemen, was a large stockholder. Suppose the Prince of Essling, the Duke of Cadore, and other French dignitaries owned seven-eighths of the capital of this bank, should we witness the same exertions (I allude not to any made in the Senate) to recharter it? So far from it, would not the danger of French influence be resounded throughout the nation?
I shall give my most hearty assent to the motion for striking out the first section of the bill.
Mr. Pope.—Mr. President, in rising on this occasion, I never more entirely obeyed both my feelings and my judgment. The principle involved in the decision about to be given, is in my view of more magnitude than any which has been presented for our consideration since I had the honor of a seat here. It is no less than whether we shall surrender to the State Governments the power of collecting our revenue and rely upon the old system of requisitions. We are called upon to return to that state of imbecility and chaos from which this political fabric was reared by the wisdom and patriotism of the first statesmen of which any age or nation can boast. For twenty years we have collected our revenue, borrowed money, paid our debts, and managed our fiscal concerns through the agency of a national bank. That it has answered the most sanguine expectations of its authors; that it has been well managed, is admitted by the most decided opponents to the renewal of the charter. Although in public debate, in newspapers, court-yards, muster-fields, &c., we have heard much of dangerous powers, violations of the constitution, British influence, and poisonous vipers, &c., &c., which were to sting to death the liberties of the people, yet we find ourselves as free almost as the air we breathe, and hardly subservient to the mildest code of laws by which any nation was ever governed. In the city of Philadelphia, and the State of Pennsylvania generally, where these animals called banks have grown to the most enormous size, we find as sound morals, and as much real practical republicanism, as in those parts of the Union where the rattling of this viper's tail has never been heard, and in point of solid wealth and internal improvements, mark the contrast. We are required to disregard the lessons of that best teacher, experience, and to try some new scheme. However captivating new theories and abstract propositions were a few years since, I believe the thinking men of all parties in the nation are perfectly convinced that one ounce of experience and common matter-of-fact sense is worth more for the purposes of legislation than a ship-load of theory and speculation. We are told that we must force into the vaults of the bank a large portion of the circulating medium, and thereby depress the price of every thing in the market; we must give a shock to credit of every kind, check and embarrass every branch of agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing industry; give up the young mechanics, manufacturers, and merchants with small capitals a prey to the cupidity of moneyed men, who will be tempted to withdraw their funds from trade to speculate on the wrecks of the unfortunate. This is not mere matter of calculation. I only state facts proved to us by the most unquestionable evidence. We are not only, sir, to ruin many innocent and unoffending individuals, but to derange the national finances; and for what is all this to be done? To promote the public good or advance the national prosperity? No, sir, it is not pretended. We are gravely told, that we, the Representatives of the people, must sacrifice the people to save the constitution of the people, whose happiness and welfare it was intended to secure. If this be true, it is indeed a strange Government under which we live. I advance the opinion with confidence, that no principle which, in its practical effects, outrages the common sense and feelings of mankind, can be a sound one, and we ought to examine it well, and hesitate much before we give our assent. To bring distress on the country, not to prevent a violation of any positive provision of the constitution; but to correct what we suppose to have been an erroneous construction of it by our predecessors, of which neither the States nor the people have ever complained, appears to be more nice than wise.
Disguise this question as you will, sir, and still it will clearly appear to be a contest between a few importing States and the people of the United States. Resolutions have been already laid on our table by gentlemen from the two large States; from which instructions have been received in substance, requiring Congress to give up to the State banks the collection of the national revenue. I am, Mr. President, on the side of the people of the United States. This is indeed a question of party, but of a very different character from that which will be attempted to be palmed on the people. It is a contest between the friends and enemies of the Federal Constitution revived; for, if I am not mistaken, the power of laying and collecting imposts and duties was strongly objected to by some of the large States having advantageous seaports, before the constitution was adopted. I am for preserving both the States and the Union. I consider the safety and independence of the several States, and the liberties of the people, inseparably connected with and dependent on the efficiency of the National Government, and it is to me unaccountable that gentlemen in favor of strong measures against foreign nations should be so solicitous to strip the General Government of this very essential part of its power. We were told, a few days since, that our army was so insignificant and contemptible, that it would require a constable, with a search warrant, to find it. I have heard another gentleman of very high standing suggest the propriety of retroceding the ten miles square to the States of Virginia and Maryland. Our gunboats are almost rotten. We have not more frigates and other armed vessels than sufficient to carry our Ministers and diplomatic despatches to foreign courts, and if we yield to the States the collection of our revenue, what will remain of the Federal Government with which the people can identify their feelings or affections? In what will this Government consist? It will be a mere creature of the imagination—a political fiction. And, analogous to the fiction in the action of ejectment, we shall have to suppose its existence, and then bottom our proceedings upon that supposition. If I was hostile to our Federal Union, or wanted to prepare the public mind for a surrender of this happy system of Government, I would join in the hue and cry against this institution; I would support every measure calculated to destroy all confidence in and respect for this Government, both at home and abroad; I would endeavor to produce throughout the country, confusion and disorder, and a state of glorious uncertainty; then persuade the people to seek security and tranquillity under some other form of Government. The transition from a wild, factious democracy, to despotism, is often easy, and generally sudden. The extremes are very nearly allied. A Republican Government, guided by the virtue and intelligence of a nation, is the first of human blessings, but when directed by the angry, vindictive passions of party, the worst of which the imagination can conceive. A republic, to be durable, must inspire confidence and respect. Such instability, such variable, unsettled policy as now appears to be the order of the day, could not have been anticipated by any man blessed with a tolerable degree of faith in the success of this great republican experiment. Mr. President, I have ever been opposed to yielding to the commercial interest an undue influence in this Government, but I am unwilling to make an unnecessary and wanton attack upon them. Coming from an agricultural State, I am not disposed to increase the jealousies which unfortunately exist, and thereby weaken the ties by which these States are held together. I am sensible, too, how much the prosperity of the State I represent depends on a prosperous state of trade, and although the shock from the dissolution of this bank will be first felt in the commercial cities, it must immediately react to the extremes of the empire. I know many are under an impression that Federalists and British agents are to be the victims; but very different will be the result. I refer to the evidence detailed by the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd.) But is it possible that an intolerant spirit of party has prepared us for this? Are gentlemen ready to injure their country, weaken our Federal Union, the sheet-anchor of our political safety, to reach their political opponents? I will not believe it. When I see around me some of the soldiers of the Revolution, actuated I am sure by nobler views; when I see the professors of a religion which teaches us to love our neighbors as ourselves, I cannot persuade myself that Christian charity, and all the noble, generous feelings of the human heart, are extinguished by this demon, party spirit. If there be a man in the nation who can witness with unfeeling apathy the distresses of his fellow-citizens, he would have figured in Smithfield in the bloody reign of Queen Mary of England, in binding heretics to the stake; or in the sanguinary time of Robespierre, in adding victims to the guillotine; but he is unworthy the blessings of a free Government.
Sir, I address the Senate under circumstances discouraging indeed. I have been told, and on this floor, that debate is useless; that no man's opinion is to be changed; that I shall find verified in the decision of this question the sentiment contained in two lines of Hudibras—"He that is convinced against his will, is of the same opinion still." I cannot admit this. I know there are gentlemen fully sensible of the evils about to befall their country, without any obstinate pride to conquer, who would rejoice at being convinced it is in their power to avert them. Let me entreat them to pause and reflect, before they inflict a wound on their country's interest, under the influence of constitutional doubt; and if they err, I would ask them, would it not be more safe and patriotic to err in favor of the people? Permit me now, sir, to redeem this subject from the constitutional difficulties with which it has been encumbered.