Mr. Macon said he was decidedly of opinion that the ratio ought to be fixed, before the result of the census was known. He had no objection to a moderate increase of the number of members; if they amounted to so many that one side of the House could not hear the other side speak, debate was at end, and the purposes of deliberative legislation defeated. He should have liked the bill better, he said, if it had declared that the House of Representatives should hereafter consist of a certain number of members, and had left the apportionment then to be made according to the population. On the subject of electioneering, he said it became him at least to say, that that portion of the people who sent him here, had not been concerned in it. Whatever might have been the practice elsewhere, so far as concerned his constituents, there had been no going about or haranguing. And, on the subject of electioneering, said he, wherever the people are free, there will be electioneering. It belongs to free government. Possibly different parts of the country may differ as to the mode. In some, men go themselves about electioneering; in others, their friends do it for them. In some, newspaper publications help an election; in others, they destroy it. In some places, I have heard, the sacred pulpit is not free from it; in others, a divine would be destroyed that would attempt it. There was not more electioneering South, Mr. M. believed, than elsewhere; certain he was that candidates could not there spend the sums of money which he had heard of being spent elsewhere in an election. He concluded by saying he was in favor of a moderate increase of representatives. He was not afraid that, from a multitude of counsellors, nothing would be done; it was quite as much to be feared from too few that they would act rashly.

Friday, December 14.

Another member, to wit, from Massachusetts, Abijah Bigelow, elected to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of William Stedman, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.

Apportionment Bill.

Mr. Gold considered this bill as a very important one, as fixing the construction to be put on a provision of the constitution. While, on the one hand, it might be admitted that business would be in general better done by a small number of Representatives, yet, on the other hand, there were important considerations in favor of a large number, as gentlemen would find by referring to the discussions at the period of the adoption of the constitution. It was then feared by some that the representation of so great a people would be too small. If gentlemen would refer to a number of papers, drawn up by an association of gentlemen, at that time, and published under the title of "The Federalist," they would find various arguments used to induce the Legislature to make the representation full; so that, at that period, no apprehensions had existed of the Representatives becoming too numerous. On the contrary, it was supposed that the public confidence would be impaired by having a small delegation. In adverting to the relaxed state of the Union, and how much it was exposed to be shook by attempts to weaken it, it was supposed that public confidence would be inspired, and general satisfaction given, by the selection of a large number. It was true, Mr. G. said, that representation might swell so much as to operate to the exclusion of legislation; but the House of Representatives would not, even if the present ratio were retained, be so numerous as many other legislative bodies in the Union. He had no objection to increasing the numbers of the House of Representatives to such an amount as would permit public business to be done with facility. Gentlemen might differ as to the precise ratio; but, while they argued in favor of a small number, from the inconvenience of a large delegation, he hoped they would conceive with him that well-grounded apprehensions might be entertained of the evils which would result from its being too small.

Mr. Mitchill said he was in favor of the largest number proposed; and, not having been able to obtain that, he should vote for the largest on which a majority could agree. In the district represented by his colleague (Mr. Mumford) and himself, there was probably one hundred and twenty thousand souls, and yet he had not heard any murmuring that they were not adequately represented.

Congress, Mr. M. said, did not convene here to legislate on all the subjects of the rights of citizens. Our Government is, he contended, a peculiar piece of machinery, an imperium in imperio. The Representatives to Congress left behind them Legislatures, whose province it was to take care of the personal rights and the rights of property of our citizens. With these concerns, said Mr. M., we have nothing to do. We meet here under a constitution expressly framed and devised for legislating on select subjects, which, on account of the generality of their nature, could not be confided to the several States. When, then, we consider the narrow grounds we have to legislate on, that our great privileges are left at home, we shall be convinced that there is no occasion that this body should be as numerous as if we were concerned in the great questions of property and right, which are secured by the constitution, under the guardianship of the State Legislatures, and of the courts for the furthering of justice. If I were to quote a precedent of a Legislature for commanding influence, and for wisdom and sagacity in carrying us through an arduous contest whilst struggling for our liberties, I should quote the Old Congress—limited in number, but remarkable for the honesty and fidelity with which they performed what a more numerous body could not have accomplished. And, if I wished to cite an instance of the evils to be dreaded from a numerous assembly, I should quote the National Convention of France, where representatives, assembling in great number, exhibited such a spectacle of disorder as I hope we shall never, by a multitude of counsellors, run the risk of imitating.

Mr. Pitkin said that he had not expected that a bill of so much importance would have progressed so far, and gone through the Committee of the Whole in so rapid a manner as this had. What, he asked of the House, was settled by the passage of this bill? Nothing was, or could be settled by the present Congress, unless the returns were made from the different States of the number of inhabitants in each State, before the bill became a law; for Congress alone could designate and specify the number of Representatives which each State should send. The laws heretofore passed, designating the number of Representatives, had, at the same time, declared the ratio, and specified the number of Representatives of each State. Congress alone were competent to decide on the legality of the returns, and on their act alone could the State Legislatures proceed. Mr. P. presumed no member would say that it should be left to the Executive, or any Department of the Government, to say how many Representatives each State should send to Congress. The present Congress might fix the ratio as they pleased, but it would not be obligatory on the next Congress, who could, and undoubtedly would, modify or reverse it as they should think proper. This bill was, therefore, premature, and, in fact, would not settle the principle which it proposed to decide. He was, therefore, on this ground, opposed to the passage of this bill; and he believed the inconvenience of deciding it now would be greater than if the business were to rest until after the returns were made.

Mr. Quincy said that the agitation of this question at the present moment had taken him as much by surprise as it had the gentleman from Connecticut. He had no idea that a question so pregnant with interest would be hurried through the House in this way. His object in rising was to obtain a postponement of the question till some time in the next week, for the consideration of a point, which to his mind was important. He objected to the bill on the principle that it would be a violation of the constitution to pass it. It went to establish a ratio which, in its effect, must be abortive. The constitution says:

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and, excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative."