The bill being on its final passage—
Mr. Pitkin said he had heretofore stated that he had some objections to the bill, which he had intended to have stated to the House when the bill was capable of amendment, but that he had not an opportunity so to do. I have stated, said Mr. P., that it was probable there would be some difficulty between Orleans, when it becomes a State, and the United States, respecting the extent of the State westward. I stated that the United States, in consequence of the purchase of Louisiana with the same extent that it had when Spain and France possessed it, had claimed the territory as far as the river called Rio Bravo; that the negotiations on this subject between the Governments of the United States and Spain were probably unknown to many members of the House, and that it required a pretty accurate knowledge of them, of the extent of the claim, and of the geography of the country, to understand precisely what I meant. I stated that there was an extent of country between a meridional line passing through Nacogdoches and Rio Bravo, of four or five hundred miles in width, which the United States had claimed as being their property. In the negotiations between the two countries, the United States offered to cede all the country between the Rio Bravo and the Colorado running east of it to Spain, on the condition that Spain would cede to the United States all the territory west of the Perdido. This proposition was rejected. Our Commissioners were instructed to assert our title as far as the Rio Bravo, or at least to the Bay of St. Bernard. It is so stated by the President of the United States in the introduction to the compilation of the land laws, in which he states that we unquestionably have a right to the country as far west as the sources of the rivers which fall into the Mississippi, to the sources of the Red River, Arkansas, and Missouri; that with respect to the territory immediately bounding on the Gulf of Mexico, we have claims to the "province of Texas," which it is well known is a very large province. By the bill before us, according to this construction, jurisdiction is extended over this very province; and it may be, and in fact will be, in the power of the State of Orleans to say that our limits extend so far, and therefore to extend their jurisdiction in like manner. In my apprehension, therefore, it is important, while we are making this Territory a State, where the boundaries are disputed, to retain in our own hands the power of settling them. It is known that, by the law which passed providing for the government of the Territory of Orleans, we had liberty to alter the boundary before we made them a State, but not after. Will it not be in the power of the new State to insist on their right to jurisdiction over the territory, at least as far west as the Colorado, and to prevent the United States from ceding any part of it? For instance, sir, the United States may wish, as we have taken Florida as far as the Perdido, subject to future negotiation, to make this arrangement: to cede to Spain a certain proportion west for East Florida. Now, sir, I ask when we have made this country a State if we can do this? I believe it will be said by every person that we cannot, after she becomes a State, alter the boundaries without her consent. I do apprehend, therefore, there will be difficulties on the subject hereafter, if the United States should attempt to settle the boundary in a manner disagreeable to the State; because, if they cannot extend their jurisdiction west of a meridional line passing through Nacogdoches, the territory will be in extent east and west but about one hundred miles, and north and south about one hundred and twenty, and this will make them comparatively a small State.
As the United States have settled a provisional line, to wit: a meridional line through Nacogdoches, it should not be in the power of the new State to extend its jurisdiction beyond that line. Provision might be made in this way: The western boundary might be made to conform to the provisional line; and a provision might then be made that there should be reserved to the United States the privilege of adding to it whatever land it should acquire westwardly. Such a provision would leave us at liberty to settle the limits without the interference of that State, and without, I apprehend, much difficulty. This was done in relation to the State of Ohio. Unless the right had been reserved, the consent of the State would have been necessary to a cession, or other alteration of its boundary. Such a course in this case will be perfectly safe for the United States, as well as for the new State. I wish we may so regulate the Territory as there may not in future be any collision between the State and the United States. The province of Texas is in the viceroyalty of New Spain. We know that the Viceroy sent his troops to oppose the passage of our troops, and a provisional line was established. New Spain is very powerful, and I should be very sorry that the new State should have power to embroil the United States with it. I would ask the chairman of the committee who reported this bill, what were his views respecting the western boundary, and how far it was his idea that the new State should extend, and whether it would not comport with his ideas that the change which I have suggested should be made? I could have wished that the bill was in such a state of its progress that I could have moved an amendment; but, as it is, unless I am satisfied that we shall not be involved in difficulty by the consequences I have stated, I shall be unwilling to pass the bill, and must vote against it.
Mr. Quincy.—Mr. Speaker, I address you, sir, with an anxiety and distress of mind with me wholly unprecedented. The friends of this bill seem to consider it as the exercise of a common power; as an ordinary affair; a mere municipal regulation which they expect to see pass without other questions than those concerning details. But, sir, the principle of this bill materially affects the liberties and rights of the whole people of the United States. To me, it appears that it would justify a revolution in this country; and that, in no great length of time, may produce it. When I see the zeal and perseverance with which this bill has been urged along its Parliamentary path, when I know the local interests and associated projects, which combine to promote its success, all opposition to it seems manifestly unavailing. I am almost tempted to leave, without a struggle, my country to its fate. But, sir, while there is life, there is hope. So long as the fatal shaft has not yet sped, if Heaven so will it, the bow may be broken, and the vigor of the mischief-meditating arm withered. If there be a man in this house, or nation, who cherishes the constitution under which we are assembled, as the chief stay of his hope, as the light which is destined to gladden his own day, and to soften even the gloom of the grave, by the prospect it sheds over his children, I fall not behind him in such sentiments. I will yield to no man in attachment to this constitution, in veneration for the sages who laid its foundations, in devotion to those principles which form its cement and constitute its proportions. What, then, must be my feelings; what ought to be the feelings of a man cherishing such sentiments, when he sees an act contemplated which lays ruin at the root of all these hopes? When he sees a principle of action about to be usurped, before the operation of which the bands of this constitution are no more than flax before the fire, or stubble before the whirlwind? When this bill passes, such an act is done, and such a principle usurped.
Mr. Speaker, there is a great rule of human conduct, which he who honestly observes cannot err widely from the path of his sought duty. It is, to be very scrupulous concerning the principles you select as the test of your rights and obligations; to be very faithful in noticing the result of their application; and to be very fearless in tracing and exposing their immediate effects and distant consequences. Under the sanction of this rule of conduct, I am compelled to declare it as my deliberate opinion, that, if this bill passes, the bonds of this Union are virtually dissolved; that the States which compose it are free from their moral obligations, and that, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, to prepare definitely for a separation—amicably if they can, violently if they must.
Mr. Quincy was here called to order by Mr. Poindexter.
Mr. Quincy repeated, and justified the remark he had made, which, to save all misapprehension, he committed to writing, in the following words: "If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is virtually a dissolution of this Union; that it will free the States from their moral obligation, and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must."
After some little confusion,
Mr. Poindexter required the decision of the Speaker whether it was consistent with the propriety of debate, to use such an expression. He said it was radically wrong for any member to use arguments going to dissolve the Government, and tumble this body itself to dust and ashes. It would be found, from the gentleman's statement of his language, that he had declared the right of any portion of the people to separate——
Mr. Quincy wished the Speaker to decide, for if the gentleman was permitted to debate the question, he should lose one-half of his speech.