Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 4 (of 16)

by United States. Congress

The non-intercourse law of March, 1809, contains a provision, that, "in case either France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," the President shall declare the same by proclamation, and the non-intercourse was then to cease as to the nation revoking. It was under this law, and in consequence of the power so given to the President, that the celebrated, though ill-fated arrangement, was made between the Executive and the British Minister, Mr. Erskine. Now, sir, by referring to this arrangement, you will find, that on April 18, Mr. Erskine proposed to Secretary Smith the revocation of the orders in council of January and November, 1807, as a compliance on the part of Great Britain with the terms of the act of March; and our Secretary, on the same day, declaring that the withdrawing of such orders would be deemed satisfactory by the President, the arrangement was completed on the 19th, and a proclamation accordingly issued on the ground, and assuming the fact, that the British edicts had ceased to violate our neutral commerce, and again opening the intercourse between the two countries after the 10th of June.

This arrangement, and the short and hasty correspondence connected with it, you will recollect, sir, were presented to Congress with the Message, at the opening of the summer session of 1809, and we then passed a law, the object of which was to ratify and to carry into effect the arrangement. Here, then, we have an explicit opinion from both the Executive and the Legislature, that the only British orders which came within the spirit and intent of the law of March, were those of January and November 1807, and that, when those orders were revoked, the edicts of Great Britain ceased to violate the commerce of the United States.

I pray you now, Mr. Chairman, to turn with me to the law of May last; you will there find the precise phraseology of the act of March: "In case either Great Britain or France shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," the President is to make known the fact by proclamation. The authority given to the President is in both cases the same, and it was to have been presumed that it would have been exercised on the same terms. But, sir, it will be found, on referring to the papers, that, under the act of May, the Executive made a further requisition. The revocation of the orders in council of January and November was not to satisfy us, but the blockade of the year preceding was to be also annulled.

In the letter from Secretary Smith to our Minister at London, of the 5th of July, 1810, and which enclosed a copy of the law of May, it is said, "that in explaining the extent of the repeal which is required on the British side, Mr. Pinkney will let it be distinctly understood, that it must necessarily include an annulment of the blockade of 1806;" and our minister accordingly, in his letter to Lord Wellesley, of the 21st of September, tells him it is his duty to state "that an annulment of the blockade of May, 1806, is considered by the President to be as indispensable, in the view of the act, as the revocation of the British orders in council." Nay, so far has the President gone in this particular as to give the French Government a pledge that this will be required on the part of Great Britain. In the letter from Secretary Smith to General Armstrong, of the 5th of July, 1810, the latter is authorized, if it should be found necessary, to "let it be understood that a repeal of the illegal blockades of a date prior to the Berlin decree, namely, that of May, 1806, will be included in the condition required of Great Britain."

It is not my intention at this time, to enter into a discussion on the subject of blockades, nor am I to be understood as giving countenance to the system of paper blockades, whether that system proceeds from or is attempted to be enforced by England or by France; but, sir, I have gone into this examination to show that the President has acted differently under two laws which ought to have the same practical construction, because the terms used in them were alike; that under the law of May, 1810, he added a condition to a settlement with Great Britain, which he did not require under the law of March, 1809; and why this difference?

Will it be said, that when the arrangement was made with Mr. Erskine the President had no knowledge of the blockading orders of May, 1806? Not so, sir. By recurring to a report made by Mr. Madison, as Secretary of State, in December, 1808, of belligerent decrees and orders affecting neutral commerce, you will find this very blockade; and certainly what he knew as Secretary in December, he must have known as President in the April following. Shall I be told the President had discovered that the blockade had been "avowed to be comprehended in, and identified with, the orders in council?" I fear this will not be a satisfactory answer. For, in this case, if the orders in council are rescinded, the connection between them and the blockade will then stand as it was supposed by the Executive to stand when the arrangement was entered into.

Persons, Mr. Chairman, more prone to jealousy than myself, and who are disposed to find fault with the late Executive projects, may perhaps point to that passage in the letter from Secretary Smith to Mr. Pinkney, of the 22d of May, 1810, in which it is said, that the President has read, with surprise and regret, the reply of Lord Wellesley to the note requiring explanations with respect to the blockade of France, which "evinces an inflexible determination to persevere in the system of blockade," as affording a reason for this added condition: they may say that it was thrust in when our Administration were satisfied that it would not be acceded to by the British, and for the purpose of preventing an accommodation with, and keeping up the irritation against, that nation. But while, for myself, I disclaim this inference, I must confess that I am at a loss to assign a sufficient motive for the difference in the two cases.

As to France, sir, what were the edicts to be revoked, and how revoked? I shall have occasion, before I sit down, to notice the Berlin and Milan decrees. But were there not other decrees?

We have before us the Rambouillet decree, with a date of the 23d of March, 1810, which declares that "all vessels navigating under the flag of the United States, or possessed in whole or in part by a citizen or subject of that power, which, counting from the 20th of May, 1809, have entered, or shall enter into the ports of our Empire, of our colonies, or of the countries occupied by our arms, shall be seized, and the product of the sales shall be deposited in the surplus fund." Thus embracing almost the whole of continental Europe; for, with the exception of the Russian ports on the Baltic, and two or three places in the European peninsula, every port frequented by the Americans belonged either to the Empire of France, to the colonies of that Empire, or to countries occupied by the forces of the Empire. The seizures under this decree were consequently great and distressing to our merchants.

This decree purports to be an act of reprisal on this country, and for what cause? Not for any act of hostility by us; not for any seizures or confiscations of French vessels or French property under the authority, or within the limits of this Government. No, sir, a pretence of this kind appeared too absurd to be inserted even in a French decree. It is true that General Armstrong, in his letter to Secretary Smith, of the 10th of September, 1810, communicates a verbal explanation which accompanied the last letter of the French Minister: "If you confiscate French property under the law of non-intercourse, they will confiscate your property under their decree of Rambouillet." Ay, sir, and they have given a practical explanation that they would confiscate our property under the decree, although we did not confiscate their property under the non-intercourse law. Look at the decree itself, and you will find the motive, or rather the pretext for this act of reprisal. It is grounded on the passing of the act of the 1st of March, 1809, and it is grounded on that alone.