But, in order to cause any obligation to result under the law of May 1, 1810, it is necessary, not only that the fact required be done, and the effect required produced; but also the terms of that act must be accepted. The proffer we made, if such be the character of that act, was only to revive the non-intercourse law against the contumacious belligerent, after three months had expired from the date of the proclamation. Now it is remarkable, that, so far from accepting the terms of the proposition contained in our act, as the extent of our obligations, Bonaparte expressly tells us that they mean something else; and something, too, that no man in this House will dare to aver they really intend. It is also remarkable that the terms of this celebrated letter from the Duke of Cadore, of the fifth of August, which have been represented as a relaxation in the rigor of the French Emperor's policy, are, in fact, something worse than the original terms of the Milan decree, and that, instead of having obtained a boon from a friend in this boasted letter, our Administration have only caught a gripe from a Tartar. By the terms of the Milan decree, it was to "cease with respect to all nations who compelled the English to respect their flag." By the terms of the letter of Cadore, it was to cease on condition that the United States "cause their rights to be respected." Now, as much as an obligation, of an indefinite extent, is worse than a definite obligation, just so much worse are the terms of the letter of Cadore, than the original terms of the Milan decree. Mr. Speaker, let us not be deceived concerning the policy of the French Emperor. It is stern, unrelenting, and unrelaxing. So far from any deviation from his original system being indicated in this letter of the Duke of Cadore, a strict adherence to it is formally and carefully expressed. Ever since the commencement of "his continental system," as it is called, the policy of Napoleon has uniformly been to oblige the United States to effectual co-operation in that system. As early as the 7th of October, 1807, his minister, Champagny, wrote to General Armstrong, that the interests of all maritime powers were common, to unite in support of their rights against England. After this followed the embargo, which co-operated effectually at the very critical moment, in his great plan of continental commercial restriction. On the 24th of the ensuing November, he resorts to the same language—"in violating the rights of all nations England has united them all by a common interest, and it is for them to have recourse to force against her." He then proceeds to invite the United States to take "with the whole continent the part of guaranteeing itself from her injustice, and in forcing her to a peace."
On the 15th of January, 1808, he is somewhat more pointed and positive, as to our efficient concurrence in his plan of policy. For his Minister, Champagny, then tells us, that "His Majesty has no doubt of a declaration of war against England by the United States," and he then proceeds to take the trouble of declaring war out of our hands, and volunteers his services, gratuitously, to declare it, in our name and behalf. "War exists then, in fact, between England and the United States; and His Majesty considers it as declared from the day on which England published her decrees." And in order to make assurance doubly sure, he sequesters our vessels in his ports, "until a decision may be had on the dispositions to be expressed by the United States," on his proposition of considering themselves "associated in the cause of all the powers," against England. Now in all this there is no deception, and can be no mistake, as to the purpose of his policy. He tells us, as plain as language can speak, that "by causing our rights to be respected," he means war, on his side, against Great Britain. That "our interests are common"—that he considers us already "associates in the war," and that he sequesters our property by way of security for our dispositions. This is his old policy. I pray some gentlemen on the other side of the House to point out in what it differs from the new. The letter of Cadore on the fifth of August tells us, it is expected that we "cause our rights to be respected, in conformity to our act," and the same letter also tells us what he understands to be the meaning of our act. "In short, Congress engages to oppose itself to that one of the belligerent powers which shall refuse to acknowledge the rights of neutrals." In other words, "by causing our rights to be respected," he means war on his side against Great Britain. In perfect conformity with this uniform, undeviating policy, his Minister, Turreau, tells our Government, in his letter of the 28th of November last, that "the modifications to be given to the present absolute exclusion of our products will not depend upon the chance of events, but will be the result of measures, firm and pursued with perseverance, which the two Governments will continue to adopt to withdraw from the monopoly and from the vexations of the common enemy a commerce loyal and necessary to France as well as the United States." And to the end, that no one feature of his policy should be changed, or even appear to be relaxed, his Excellency the Duke of Massa, and his Excellency the Duke of Gaete, in their respective letters of the 25th of December, declare, that the property taken, shall be "only sequestered until the United States have fulfilled their engagements to cause their rights to be respected." Now, Mr. Speaker, is there a man in this House bold enough to maintain, or with capacity enough to point out, any material variation between the policy of France to this country, subsequent to the Cadore letter, of the 5th of August, and its policy anterior to that period? The character of the policy is one and indivisible. Bonaparte had not yielded one inch to our Administration. Now, as he neither performed the act required by the law of May, 1810; nor produced the effect; nor accepted the terms it proposed; whence arise our obligations? How is our faith plighted? In what way are we bound again to launch our country into this dark sea of restriction; surrounded on all sides with perils and penalties?
The true nature of this Cadore policy is alone to be discovered in the character of his master. Napoleon is a universal genius. "He can exchange shapes with Proteus to advantage." He hesitates at no means and commands every skill. He toys with the weak—he tampers with the mean—he browbeats the haughty—with the cunning he is a serpent. For the courageous he has teeth and talons. For the cowering he has hoofs. He found our Administration a pen and ink gentry—parchment politicians; and he has laid, for these ephemeral essences, a paper fly-trap, dipped in French honey. Hercules, finding that he could not reach our Administration with his club, and that they were out of their wits at the sight of his lion's skin, has condescended to meet them in petticoats, and conquer them, spinning at their own distaff.
As to those who, after the evidence now in our hands, deny that the decrees exist, I can no more reason with them than with those who should deny the sun to be in the firmament, at noon-day. The decrees revoked! The formal statute act of a despot revoked by the breath of his servile Minister; uttered on conditions not performed by Great Britain, and claiming terms not intended to be performed by us! The fatness of our commerce secure, when every wind of heaven is burdened with the sighs of our suffering seamen, and the coast of the whole continent heaped with the plunder of our merchants! The den of the tiger safe! Yet the tracks of those who enter it are innumerable, and not a trace is to be seen of a returning footstep! The den of the tiger safe! While the cry of the mangled victims are heard through the adamantine walls of his cave; cries, which despair and anguish utter, and which despotism itself cannot stifle!
No, Mr. Speaker. Let us speak the truth. The act now proposed is required by no obligation. It is wholly gratuitous. Call it then by its proper name. The first fruit of French alliance. A token, a transatlantic submission. Any thing except an act of an American Congress, the Representatives of freemen.
The present is the most favorable moment for the abandonment of these restrictions, unless a settled co-operation with the French continental system be determined. We have tendered the provisions of this act to both belligerents. Both have accepted—both, as principals, or by their agents, have deceived us.
We talk of the edicts of George the Third and Napoleon. Yet those of the President of the United States, under your law, are far more detestable to your merchants. Their edicts plundered the rich. His make those who are poor still poorer. Their decrees attack the extremities. His proclamation fixes upon the vitals, and checks the action of the seat of commercial life.
I know that great hopes are entertained of relief from the proposed law, by the prospect of a British regency. Between a mad monarch and a simpering successor, it is expected the whole system of that nation will be abandoned. Let gentlemen beware, and not calculate too certainly on the fulfilment, by men in power, of professions made out of it. The majority need not go out of our own country, nor beyond their own practice, to be convinced how easily, in such cases, proud promises may eventuate in meagre performance.
The whole bearing of my argument is to this point. It is time to take our own rights into our own keeping. It is time, if we will not protect, to refrain from hampering, by our own acts, the commerce of our country. Put your merchants no longer under the guardianship and caprice of foreign powers. Punish not, at the instigation of foreigners, your own citizens for following their righteous calling. We owe nothing to France. We owe nothing to Great Britain. We owe every thing to the American people. Let us show ourselves really independent; and look to a grateful, a powerful, and then united people, for support against every aggressor.
Mr. Mumford.—The gentleman (Mr. Quincy) from Massachusetts has given us a long talk, that amused the House very much with tropes and figures, and I hope has convinced himself that he is right. I am no advocate of either belligerent, I have not much confidence in the declarations of foreign Governments. I did, however, put some confidence in the Erskine arrangement, but I was deceived; it met my approbation, because I was among those who were determined to settle our disputes with Great Britain in our own way, as an independent nation. And I will now ask the gentleman from Massachusetts whether, if the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or any other higher authority in Great Britain, should write a letter to Sir William Scott, and a circular letter to the Collector of Liverpool, informing them that the Orders in Council did not apply to American vessels from and after the 1st November, he would not deem those letters to be evidence of the fact? If so, why not give the same credence to the letters of the Duke of Massa and the Duc de Gaete? I wish to preserve the faith of the nation. We have been plundered by both belligerents, and have as little confidence in the one as in the other; but without some reliance on the word of constituted authorities there is an end to all negotiations. The gentleman says that we are about to shut up "the only avenue to our commercial hope." These are his own words. Let us now examine this avenue to our commercial hope. I will in the first place ask the indulgence of the House while I read and state some facts from a letter I have just received from Liverpool, dated January 8, of the present year, from one of the most respectable houses there, which states that the importation of cotton from the United States was 320,000 bales in 1810; that there were then 145,000 bales on hand; tobacco imported in the same period, 14,700 hogsheads; and notwithstanding the consumption, the quantity imported kept the market supplied constantly with about the same number of hogsheads throughout the year 1810. Potashes imported 28,946 barrels, on hand 13,000 barrels: rice 39,000 imported, and there remain on hand very large supplies. Those are the principal articles of the produce of our soil unsold on 8th January, 1811, in the port of Liverpool alone, besides the quantities in the other ports of Great Britain; and the same letter observes: "This supply checks any attempt at speculation, and without an export vent is procured, the stock on hand must remain unsalable; if the belligerents return to a sense of justice, the continental markets being in that case reopened, will require large supplies, and cause our market to rise." The prices of upland cotton are stated at 12d. sterling per lb.; tobacco, very prime, 4d. to 7d., middling quality, great quantity on hand, fit only for continental market, at 1½ a 4d.; pot-ashes £43 to £44 per ton—rice 19 to 23 per cwt. Sir, there is no American merchant who can pursue that commerce, attended with the enormous charges and duties imposed on those articles without inevitable ruin; and I call to the recollection of gentlemen the numerous failures in consequence of bills of exchange returned under protest, which had been predicated on shipments to British ports; and yet the gentleman from Massachusetts tells us this is "the only avenue to our commercial hope." Send your vessels to the Brazils, you meet them there intriguing against your commerce; to Buenos Ayres, you find them there; to Cayenne, there also; to Terra Firma, you there find them in conjunction with Miranda intriguing and counteracting your commerce; to Barbadoes, Surinam, Demerara, Trinidad, Martinique, Guadaloupe, Jamaica, &c., and you are met with enormous port charges, and duties amounting to prohibition on the staple articles of the New England States; codfish, beef, pork, butter, lard, cheese, hams, &c. It is true we are admitted every now and then, at the mere will and caprice of a governor, to import into those colonies flour at a duty of one dollar per barrel; rice and lumber in proportion; on condition that you shall not take away any article but rum and molasses, and this is the only avenue to our commercial hope. They are like the locusts of Egypt in relation to our commerce. What has become of your 1,350,000 tons of shipping, valued at fifty dollars per ton, amounting to $67,500,000, one-third of which belongs to Massachusetts? Is the gentleman willing to surrender the carrying trade to Great Britain? Let him turn his attention to the ports of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, and New Orleans, and he will find that British ships are now taking the bread out of the mouths of his own constituents. They are enabled to take freight on so much lower terms than American vessels can afford to do it in consequence of the very great difference of duties in Great Britain, between importations in America or in a British ship, that we cannot compete with them unless you will countervail them, and take a decisive stand in defence of your commerce to continental Europe, and carry your produce direct to the consumers, and be no longer subjected to be fleeced by the monopolizers and retailers of the old world. They are not content to have the whole products of your soil deposited on their Island, on which they receive an enormous import, and raise an extra war tax, besides; but they will claim very soon the exclusive right to carry it when and where they please in their own ships. We are thus reduced to a worse situation than in a state of colonization; we have now all the disadvantages of being plundered by their navy, and none of the advantages of receiving its protection, although they have the impudence to charge us four per cent. convoy duty on their gewgaws and manufactures, which convoy they do not give us. Can this be a desirable state of things? And if persevered in, I am convinced the commerce of the United States will descend into the same tomb with the gentleman's story of the coffin.