Desperate as the course was which now alone remained to be pursued, they supposed they were obliged to advance or become the object of reproach and scorn both to friends and foes. This necessity they had brought upon themselves, but it was too late to consider whether the condition might have been avoided; they were pledged in this state of events to attempt to extort from Great Britain by force the concession of those points which their arguments had failed in persuading her to yield. He had no doubt but that, some months past, the Cabinet had seriously determined upon resorting to hostilities. But the concurrence of Congress was to be obtained, and whether a majority of both Houses could be brought to take the daring and hazardous step, no man in or out of the Government, without the gift of prophecy, could have predicted.
The public mind had been so repeatedly distracted and deceived by boisterous speeches, and bold but ephemeral resolutions, that it had sunk into a state of apathy, and was no longer excited even by the sound of war echoed in the ministerial paper from the proceedings of Government. When the bill before us was first brought up from the other House, it was the opinion of very few that it would obtain the support of a majority of this body; and, even now, it was likely to pass, not because it was approved by a majority, but of the differences of opinion which existed among gentlemen as to other courses which had been proposed.
If, with the light and information possessed in this body as to the views and designs of the Cabinet and of Congress, it has been doubtful among ourselves whether the Government would resort to war, how was it to be known by our merchants, or any other class of society unacquainted with the intentions and secret proceedings of those exercising the powers of the Government, that the nation would be wantonly plunged into a sudden war?
He had heard it said, that the embargo was a sufficient notice of the design of the Government to resort to hostilities upon its expiration, and that the people must be infatuated, who, after such warning, were not apprised of the approaching crisis. But it is too recently and deeply in our recollection to be forgotten, that this is not the first embargo we have experienced, and which, though of longer duration, we saw pass away without being followed by war.
The language held there, as to people out of doors who have doubted of the war, is retorted by the public voice with equal confidence and on better grounds. They rely upon your integrity and wisdom, and say that Congress cannot be so infatuated, destitute as they are of the means of aggression or defence, to draw upon themselves a war with one of the most powerful and formidable nations on the globe. If a war with Great Britain be thought unavoidable, yet, as she leaves to us the time of commencing it, surely we ought to select that time when the first shock shall be least disastrous, and can best be resisted. Why should we hurry into a war from which nothing but calamity can be expected? There is no danger that the redress of our wrongs, or the assertion of our rights, will be barred by the limitation of time. No time has existed for years past when we had less cause to complain of the conduct of Great Britain. Her vessels of war had all been withdrawn from our coast, as he presumed, in order to avoid collisions and hostility. If the war be suspended till November, the Government and the people will both be better prepared to sustain it. He was not a friend to the restrictive system, but with a choice out of evils, he should prefer the embargo to war. Postpone the war, and we will submit to the embargo till November. This will furnish time for the return of your ships and seamen; and if, at the same time, you will abandon the non-importation act, you will replenish your Treasury with at least twelve millions of dollars, and restore to your citizens sixty millions now abroad, and in danger of being lost. It appeared to him that the course which had been pursued was the most preposterous imaginable. For eighteen months past, we had been sending our property out of the country, and not suffering it to return; and, while contemplating a war with Great Britain, we saw our effects to an immense amount accumulating in that kingdom, liable at any moment, to fall a prey to the Government, and to be employed in support of the war against us. He asked, why rush with this precipitancy into the war? Are you provided with means to annoy the enemy, or to defend yourselves? Have you an army or navy which can make any impression? Are your exposed towns fortified and garrisoned? Was any nation ever less prepared for war? It would require the whole military force that you now possess to constitute an adequate defence for New Orleans, New York, and Newport. It is very well known that the General who will command at New Orleans has declared to the Government, that he will not be answerable for the security of the place with less force than ten thousand men, which is equal to all the effective troops yet raised. It would be natural to suppose that no Government would declare war till it was prepared to attack its enemy. In peace we require no defence, and shall we declare war in order to defend ourselves? But what blow are you prepared to strike? Were you able in the summer to recruit your army of twenty-five thousand men, could it be employed in any service in the course of this year? A soldier is not made in a day. The authority of a foreign officer, now in this country, of the highest military reputation, he had heard frequently cited, that it required at least fourteen months to form a soldier of a recruit. This remark applied to France, where the officers have generally received a military education, and where there are so many models to imitate, and so many instructors to teach. But here the officer is to form as well as the soldier. The officer has to learn his lesson first, before he can prescribe the task of the soldier. You may possibly have a herd of men, but you can have no army to lead into service this season; and if this herd be led against disciplined troops, you can expect nothing but defeat and disgrace.
But you have not got, nor can you get the men during the present year. These are not the days of Cadmus. It will require great patience and industry, and a considerable length of time, to collect twenty-five thousand men. Have you the least prospect, if you declare war, of attacking Canada this season? It is impossible that you can do it with effect. You will be sufficiently occupied in defending your frontiers against the savages.
It is not on land then that you expect immediately to assail your enemy. Is it on the ocean that the impression is to be made? You have twenty vessels of war—Britain upwards of a thousand. What will avail the activity or gallantry of your officers and seamen against such disparity of force? Your little Navy must fall immediately, or be driven from the ocean. Some gentlemen indulge great expectations from privateers; but has Great Britain any unarmed or unprotected trade which they can attack? Privateers have no other object than plunder and booty. They avoid armed vessels—and, defended as is the British commerce in every part of the world by her great naval force, it is little to be expected that privateering will be attended with much success or encouragement. But while we are searching for the means of annoying the commerce of Britain, does it become us to overlook at this moment the condition of our own? A valuable part of the trade from beyond the Cape of Good Hope has not yet arrived. Of the numberless vessels which sailed upon the eve of the embargo, few have returned. Your merchant vessels are without convoy and utterly defenceless. Your condition, therefore, is, that with more commerce exposed, your adversary will possess greater means of annoyance, and the consequence must be, that we shall lose infinitely more than we can expect to gain.
Under such circumstances, what should hurry us into the war? Are gentlemen afraid if they wait till November the world will not last long enough to afford them time to gratify in war their mighty resentment against Britain? He believed, as he hoped, that there was no honorable gentleman on the floor who would not live long enough to have a complete surfeit of the war, though it should be postponed for a few months.
The question on postponement was determined in the negative—yeas 11, nays 21.
On motion, by Mr. Bayard, to postpone the further consideration of the bill to the third day of July next, it was determined in the negative—yeas 9, nays 23.