But the advocates of immediate war said that if they could not obtain their objects by direct hostility on the ocean, they could do it by a succedaneum—by the exercise of the lex talionis in an indirect way. After issuing letters of marque, they would resort to the invasion of the enemies' territorial provinces. He contended that this would be inefficacious, and maintained that to convert our merchants into privateers would be to turn them loose upon the seas as highway robbers. They would not be competent to carry on a war in this way. They would have abandoned their peaceful pursuits; they would accept a fraternal embrace of French subjects; fight side by side with them, and submit themselves to the will of the French Emperor. However scrupulous gentlemen might now be, when the hour of danger came they would accept the alliance of France. The national interests would be identified with those of the European continent. We should adopt the continental system, in which our liberties and independence would be jeopardized.
He deprecated the invasion of Canada as an act of foreign conquest. We could not suppose that Great Britain would slumber over our occupation of it, and where should we find a stationary force able to keep possession of it as a conquered province? Admit it as a sister into the Union, we dare not abandon it at the peace, and therefore we could not give it back for the restoration of our maritime rights. But suppose that Great Britain should be brought to her knees, (and this was all the most valiant of us would ask,) what have we to expect, if the power and the commerce of England should be thrown into the arms of France, from the high, the mighty, the imperial Napoleon? Would he respect us more than England would? They both follow their own interest, as we ought to follow ours. What would be the effect of this war upon ourselves?
He feared a war, not from a puerile fear of its expenses or of death, but from a manly dread of the consequences of this war, which must last as long as England had a ship at sea, or a man to man it. It must link us to the destinies of continental Europe; it would place us under complete foreign influence and foreign dominion; it would change our political institutions. The sages who framed the constitution, and illumined it by their commentaries, had predicted that it would not suit to stand the shock of war. The Republic would be ruined by war. We do not want courage. The Revolution had shown proofs of the greatest valor ever exhibited by human nature. But few circumstances besides invasion would justify war. It would strengthen the Executive arm at the expense of the Legislature. The Chief Magistrate would have to carry on the war. He would, upon the plea of necessity, change our appropriations from one object to another. The constitution would be sapped. The legislative power would be destroyed. He cared not for the prices of cotton and tobacco as compared with the constitution. War would introduce a slavish subordination among the people. They would lose their republican simplicity and their republican independence. They would neglect their homespun for the military plume and the gilded epaulette. Their morals would become depraved. Love of idleness, extravagance, and neglect of the dull pursuits of common life, would take place. The desire would again prevail of acquiring large fortunes by aid of invasion, at the expense of the war-worn soldier whose fruits would be taken away for a mere song, as they had been at the close of the Revolution. Cupidity would be introduced, and pervade the public mind.
I have made these remarks, Mr. Speaker, to repel the declarations of gentlemen, that to vote for this resolution would pledge me to embark in war. If war is necessary, I would not shrink from it, big as it is with calamity and ruin. It will be the duty of Government to obviate some of its evils.
I am in hopes, too, sir, that I have been so fortunate as to check the intemperance of the youth of my country. They will excuse me. I trust we may not be led away by the ardor of youth or of old age. I shall vote for the increase of the regular force, to go hand in hand with my friends, even in a war, if necessary and just. I have not made this speech to prove that I am against war.
Mr. Findlay said he had frequently observed members, after a question had undergone a very tedious discussion, say that if the yeas and nays had not been called they would not have spoken on the question, but these having been called, they must assign the reasons for their votes. He did not approve of that principle, because if it was to be reduced to practice every member would speak to every such question, and there would be no end of the debate. However, on this question, though he thought it had been sufficiently discussed, yet he deemed it proper to express a few thoughts, not so much to give the reasons for the vote he designed to give, as to explain the principles on which he designed to give his vote. He designed to vote for the resolution before the House, but not surely for the same reasons or with the same determined views that some honorable members have expressed. He would not dwell on the tyrannies and robberies of either the more ancient or modern despots or Governments, of the old world, but confine himself to such as had a direct relation to the question depending before the House.
That the aggressions and bad faith of the British Government, and the recommendations of the Executive, were the foundation of the resolutions before the House, was admitted by all that have spoken on the question. In order to be understood he would take a concise retrospect of our relations with Britain since nearly the commencement of the present Government of the United States.
During the First Congress an Indian war was commenced on our western frontier, and conducted as usual with savage ferocity; but, believing that it only resulted from the combination of a few tribes, our defensive measures at first were weak, and our first attempts unfortunate. But it soon became such a tedious and expensive war as to require for several years the exertion of all our resources. It had at last a fortunate conclusion; but during its progress our Government and the citizens were fully convinced that the Indians were encouraged and supported by the British Government.
We all knew that for several years past Indian councils have been convened by British agents, who influenced them by presents, and employed them as emissaries to excite the peaceable Indians in our own territories to go to war against our new and dispersed settlements. It would be infidelity to doubt the truth of the Indians having received their arms, &c., from British agents, and though these British allies have got a check in the late engagement, yet it also has cost us dear. We have no ground to conclude that the danger is over; revenge is the predominant passion of savages, and though we have not such unequivocal proofs of the British in the present instance exciting the Indians to war, and supplying them for that purpose, as we had in 1793, when President Washington received a copy of Lord Dorchester's speech to the Indian tribes, encouraging them to war against our settlements, and promising them a co-operation of the British force—the copy of which gracious speech several members yet in Congress saw at that time, and every member has heard of it—through a kind Providence that co-operation was prevented by the defeat of the British armies in Europe. Though we have not at present such explicit proofs that the Indians at present are acting as British allies, yet we have as much proof as the nature of the case can afford, and it would be very unwise if we did not act accordingly.
From the above view of the subject, if we had no other cause, I deduce the expediency of increasing our regular force agreeable to the recommendation of the President and of our committee. I think more has been said about taking Canada than was necessary. It is true, that during the same Indian war, it was the opinion of our most sage politicians that we never could be secure against Indian war till we had possession of Canada, and by that means have it in our power to cut off the communication between foreign nations and the Indians on our frontiers and in our own territory. They said that neither our revenue, our credit or population would at that time justify the attempt; but that we were rapidly increasing in population and all other resources, while the nations of Europe are wasting their own strength, but the time was fast approaching when we must repel national insults or surrender our independence. This was said particularly with respect to the impressment of our seamen. At the commencement of this outrage, never committed by any other nation but Britain, the public mind was very sensibly affected by it, but time and the frequent repetition of the injury seems to have rendered the public feelings callous. This put him in mind of what he had sometimes observed, that when the savages scalped a few families on the frontier, the whole country was terribly alarmed, but that after the savage butchery had continued and extended itself for some time, the sensibility seemed to abate. This had been evidently the effect of the continued impressment of our seamen.