Saturday, January 18.
Naval Establishment.
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the Navy bill; when Mr. Cheves finished his speech in favor of the bill, as given in full in preceding pages.
Mr. Seybert.—I rise under a pressure of more than ordinary embarrassment—prudence on one hand bids me shrink from the task which I am about to undertake; whilst on the other hand, a conscious duty impels me to engage in the consideration of the question now before the honorable committee. My friend from South Carolina (Mr. Cheves) says this question is all important to this nation; in this I perfectly coincide with him, and therefore cannot rest satisfied with a mere vote on this occasion. Sir, it is not my intention to follow the gentleman from South Carolina through all the windings of the labyrinth into which he has ventured to penetrate. I will not pretend to chase reason on the wing.
I will not particularly follow the gentleman in his comparison of the Army and Naval Establishments of the United States. He has stated to us that the Army has cost this nation much more than the Navy; he concludes we ought to be equally liberal in our appropriations for both these purposes. Sir, I perceive no reason in this assertion. Some gentlemen on the other side of the House may say, that we have been lavish in our appropriations for an army; even admitting that in this respect we have been liberal to extravagance, it surely cannot be inferred that we should make ourselves doubly guilty of this charge. I will agree to make appropriations for the establishing a navy for the United States. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that when the war which we are about to wage, shall be over, our Army will leave us. Sir, I am happy to hear that on such an event the military will be readily disbanded—a dread of the contrary gave much uneasiness to many a few days since—this is just what we wish should take place. On the other hand, said he, "your proud Navy," will remain. It is for this, with many other reasons, why I am opposed to a navy. I wish he could have proved to us, that with the end of the war the Navy would also leave us; perhaps I should then agree with him in favor of its establishment: though the "proud Navy" will remain with us, he has neglected to tell us at what rate of expense.
Sir, the gentleman from South Carolina says many oppose a navy, because they deem it an anti-republican institution. On this head, I shall remark but little: I will only ask if it is to remain with us in times of peace with its numerous train of officers, may it not become a powerful engine in the hands of an ambitious Executive?
Sir, it was thought proper to make the foregoing remarks as preliminary to the subject. The question of a Naval Establishment for the United States more especially concerns those who inhabit commercial districts. As one of these I am much interested. Many persons maintain, that a naval system of defence is indispensably necessary to a nation, whose seaboard extends more than 1,500 miles, with a shipping interest amounting to 1,300,000 tons—in this respect, ranking the second of modern nations. The argument is as specious as it is plausible; it is liable to many, and in my opinion, to insuperable objections. The proposition before us will be considered as leading to a permanent Naval Establishment. This course is warranted by the report of the Secretary of the Navy as well as by the mode which was pursued by my friend from South Carolina. I shall not hesitate to declare my decided opposition to such an establishment, and will proceed to state the objections whereon my opinion is grounded. Sir, I deem it inexpedient to commence a permanent Naval Establishment at this time. We are quite unprepared for it—we are in want of all the necessary materials; though we have been told that our forests abound in all the necessary timber, it was said little of this material was to be found in our dockyards. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that a sufficiency of seasoned timber, to build four seventy-fours, was now on hand, and that the proper authority deemed it advisable to be used for frigates. Sir, this timber is a portion of that which was purchased some years since, for the purpose of building six seventy-fours. It now appears, that of this timber as much as was sufficient for two of these vessels, has been employed to build smaller vessels or gunboats, I presume. This is all a piece with our pretended economy. This mode of proceeding will not answer, sir. We are in the wrong from the commencement of our Navy. I do not wish it to be understood that I have decided a navy will never be a proper mode of defence for this nation—but whenever it shall be determined on, we should begin right; this can only be done by following those nations who have had most experience on the subject. Our first step should be to store away the proper timber. This should be done in times when we can best afford it—in times when our market is glutted—in times when labor can be commanded at fair prices—at a period when we enjoy peace, and surely not when we are about to engage in a war. We have heretofore paid the highest price for every article; we have given double wages for labor; and instances might be mentioned, when the workmen were transported in stage coaches, at an enormous expense, from our large seaport towns to the navy yard of this city. Contracts for timber were made in haste and at a very advanced price. As soon as it was obtained, it was put together, and in a few months we saw it floating in the form of a ship of war—rotten ships, I may say, sir, for I believe without exception in the frigates which were built by the United States, the more important parts decayed and were rotten in two, three, or four years. In many instances the expense for repairs was equal to the original cost. A single frigate, the Constitution, has cost for repairs, from October, 1802, to March, 1809, the enormous sum of $302,582 21, or upwards of $43,000 per annum for seven years in succession.
Let us view this subject in a more extended sense—I mean as regards our commerce generally—we shall still have cause to entertain the opinion which we first adopted. We cannot protect our commerce on the ocean. Our ships have vexed every sea—we trade to all parts of the world; of course, to protect our commerce, our ships of war must abandon our coasts and encounter all the force of the enemy or those of Europe. The ports we have in view are European. If your frigates, for convenience and safety, are to cruise only on your coasts, what will be the fate of the millions which are embarked beyond the Cape of Good Hope? By this management surely you cannot afford it protection. France, Spain, and Holland, when combined and backed by an armed neutrality in the north of Europe, could not secure their commerce. The fleets of Great Britain now sail triumphant over every wave of the deep. The Russians have a navy far superior to that which it is proposed we shall establish, and they cannot protect their trade in the confined limits of the Baltic. They count fifty or sixty sail-of-the-line, besides many frigates and smaller vessels.
Sir, the expenses which are incurred by a Naval Establishment, far exceed the profits which arise from the commerce which it is intended to protect. This proposition is warranted by the experience of Great Britain, the most commercial nation of modern times. In the year 1798, the total imports and exports of Great Britain amounted to £94,952,000. For the same year the expenditure for her navy amounted to £13,654,013, or about one-seventh of the total imports and exports, or fourteen per cent. on the total capital employed in commerce. What regular trade can yield such profits on the outward and inward cargoes? To me this is a secret. In the year 1799 Mr. Pitt computed the profits on the commerce of Great Britain at £12,000,000, or one and a half millions less than the expenses for her navy the preceding year!