Naval Establishment.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Naval Establishment.
Mr. Johnson said: I do not know, sir, why I should regret the discussion of any subject in this place, when I recollect that each member is under the same obligations of duty and responsibility. It has been said that no member would be thanked for his vote in favor of this bill—and, fearless of censure, I shall oppose this attempt to lay the foundation, and to pledge the property of the people for naval systems, as ruinous to the finances of the country, as it will be destructive to the peace of the nation. After every effort in my power, I could not suppress the sensation of sorrow, that Congress should be distracted with a subject that would justly excite alarm throughout the nation, even in the hours of profound tranquillity. I have looked to the Treasury reports, and I see a national debt of about fifty millions of dollars. I look to the aggressions of England, and I find we have been driven to the necessity of creating a great and expensive military force to avenge our wrongs and to expel the enemy from her North American colonies. I look to the arguments of the advocates of this pernicious system, and they acknowledge that we are driven to the brink of a war that will require loans and taxes, and end in a new debt of at least fifty millions of dollars—and under these circumstances, when we are upon the heels of a second revolution, when the people are likely to be most pressed for the ways and means to carry on the war with vigor and certain success, the ruinous system of a great navy is pressed upon us. Upon the return of a second peace, when the British possessions shall be incorporated into the Union, and our army disbanded—when commerce shall be restored, and a surplus of revenue in the Treasury—after meeting the demands of the Government, with more propriety might the question be presented for consideration. I believe, sir, since the political reformation in 1801, the question of building a navy had never been before presented directly to the consideration of Congress. When Mr. Jefferson, that illustrious character, presided over the destinies of the United States, why was not this navy-building proposed? Then we had a revenue of fifteen millions of dollars annually, and a surplus in the Treasury. No, sir, such a system had been put down too recently—the struggles against a navy in '98-9 were not forgotten. I deny the capacity of the United States to maintain a navy without oppression to the great mass of the community in the persons of tax-gatherers; and if a great navy could be maintained, it would be more than useless—it would be dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of this nation. I was in favor of repairing and putting into service the whole of our naval force, consisting of one hundred and sixty-two gunboats and upwards of fifteen frigates and smaller war vessels; because this naval force, united with our fortifications, would give security to our coasts and harbors, protect our coasting trade, and would be important in the present crisis to co-operate with privateers and individual enterprise against the commerce and plunder of Great Britain. But this is not the object of the bill. It contemplates and embraces a navy to protect our commerce in distant seas as well as at home, and which cannot cost less than twenty or thirty millions to accomplish; and, when built, would entail upon the Government of the United States the annual expense of fifteen millions of dollars,[25] equal to the amount of our whole revenue in the most prosperous years of commerce under the administration of Mr. Jefferson, and double the amount of our present financial income. It is the system, as well as the expense, that I object to; and while I am ready as any man to keep a small naval force, to be confined to the protection of our maritime frontiers, as well as I am to keep up a small land force, to protect our territorial frontiers, I will not vote one cent for a system of naval force which is destined to keep foreign nations in check in distant seas, and destined to entail upon this happy Government perpetual taxes and a perpetually-increasing national debt. The people will not support such a Naval Establishment—they have the corrective in their hands; and build this fleet of twenty seventy-fours and forty frigates, and the people will in their turn put them down. But, sir, we are told that we are a commercial people, and that you cannot restrain a spirit of enterprise in our citizens which is limited only by the polar snows to the North and the icy mountains to the South. No person has attempted to damp that gallant spirit, that mercantile enterprise—such adventurous voyages have been fostered and cherished by every means in the power of the Government. But, sir, has this unparalleled enterprise, this gallant spirit, been carried on by a navy? Such a thing has never been thought of, which proves that this question of a navy has no connection with this commercial enterprise; and the existence of one without the other, is positive proof of the fact. But it is also said, that agriculture and commerce are twin sisters, and the learned gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchill) will not allow a more distant connection. I have no objection to such a union, and I did expect that it would have been demonstrated what was the real relationship between these twin sisters and a permanent navy; whether it is that of cousin-german, brother or husband. As these subjects have not been identified, I must be permitted to say that there is no connection—unless under the disguise of protection, the navy would be the destroyer both of commerce and agriculture—by taxes upon the one and constant war upon the theatre of the other. The advocates of a navy need not expect to cover the deformity and danger of the system by telling the people they are friends to the protection of commerce—and that those who oppose it are ready to relinquish our rights upon the ocean. No, sir, this will not do. They will ask if our commerce, as great as it has been, was ever protected by a navy. They will look at the expenditure of the public money—they will see twenty-nine millions of dollars expended upon our present Naval Establishment; and though they may not complain of that prodigal waste of public money upon so small a naval force, they will look to the effects produced by this power, and they will refuse to augment it, until, indeed, the Peace Establishment shall require augmentation. The people will look to the votes of this House, and they will see the opposers of a navy willing at this moment to avenge the depredation upon our commerce and neutral rights by actual hostility. I am not prepared to give up our rights, whether upon the ocean or upon land, whether commercial or personal; but I may differ in the means of avenging these wrongs, and vindicating those rights, and I shall ever differ from those who wish a navy to ride triumphant in distant seas, and, under a pretext of protection to commerce, doom the nation to galling burdens too intolerable to be borne. But we are told, sir, that this question partakes of the character of a self-evident proposition. Indeed, sir, and in what respect is it entitled to this definition of self-evident? Unless, indeed, from every consideration of history, experience and reason, it is evident that a navy is an engine of power and ambition, calculated to embroil a nation in quarrels and wars, and to fix permanent wretchedness upon the industrious class of the people. When we look to the delegation from each State, we find a difference in sentiment upon this subject, whether lying on the seaboard or distant from it.
The chairman of the Naval Committee has attempted to make us believe that a navy is the anchor of our hopes, and I dare venture to say, his eloquent colleague (Mr. Williams) will in due time denounce it as the most abominable system—always employed in the fell purposes of outrage, plunder, war, and death. The same division of sentiment exists in Massachusetts as to this destructive and expensive establishment. And, sir, let me not omit to mention, the sentiments of the Republicans of '98-9 were not only entitled to the love and confidence of the people, but worthy of our imitation. Nor will I omit the resolutions of the Virginia Legislature in opposition to a navy, when they remonstrated against measures which they considered ruinous to the freedom of the United States—nor is my respect for those opinions lessened, although many Republicans in Congress at this time, and men of talents, have become great advocates for a navy, and I will put it to the people whose opinions are entitled to their approbation, whether a navy beyond the peace establishment is ruinous, or the rock of our safety.
Leaving the division of sentiment in our country, let us advert to ancient and modern history, and search for examples upon this important subject. And here, sir, I will take this position, and defy history for an example, that no great naval power ever confined their naval strength to the legitimate object of protecting commerce in distant seas. I will refer to Tyre and Sidon, Crete and Rhodes, to Athens and to Carthage. No sooner had these nations ceased to confine their naval strength to their maritime defence at home, to the protection of their seacoast, than they were engaged in plunder, piracy, depredations upon other nations, or involved in wars, which certainly accelerated, if it did not produce, the downfall and destruction of those governments. Peace and tranquillity is not the natural state of a great naval power. A disregard of public law, sacred treaties, and bloodshed, would suit it better; and it has been and ever will be, the consequences of such force. These nations furnish another example and instructive lesson to the present generation—that while their commerce and navy furnished a small part of the people with the luxuries of every country at that time known, the great mass of citizens at home were miserable and oppressed. Their rights neglected, their burdens increased, and their happiness destroyed, while their fleets and external grandeur carried astonishment and terror to distant nations. When a nation puts forth her strength upon the ocean, the interior of the country will be neglected and oppressed with contributions. Ancient history does not furnish a solitary instance of any permanent good, or long continuance of peace arising from a great naval supremacy; such overgrown power, such unnatural strength, must feed upon plunder, at home and abroad. When we come to modern nations we have proof before us of the positions I have taken. We have been told of Holland, as a people existing in a most flourishing state of prosperous commerce without a navy to protect it, and we have been told of Spain as a naval power without commerce to protect. But leaving these examples, let us look at France and Great Britain; we here have examples before our eyes; we need no history; the facts are before us.
Admit that Great Britain, with her thousand vessels, could protect her lawful commerce, let me ask, if her navy has ever been confined to that object; whether it is confined to that object at this time; whether her navy has not fattened upon the spoils of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, and the commerce of neutral nations, making war equally upon friends and enemies. Her navy, triumphant in every sea, is employed in a system of plunder against the world, and, notwithstanding this supremacy, we see her citizens groaning under a national debt of eight hundred millions of pounds sterling, more than all the nations of the universe could pay. We see her upon the precipice of bankruptcy—we see her people, her numerous subjects, loaded with taxes, that would astonish any man who did not know the fact—notwithstanding this, the public debt is daily increasing, and it is now acknowledged by all the world that she is fighting for her existence—victorious at sea and safe at home from invasion, and still her very existence is at stake. Sir, I never wish to see the liberties of my country afloat upon the ocean and staked upon the strength of a navy. Look at France, separated from her enemy by a narrow channel, without vessels to meet the fleets of England on the water, and still she is unable to burn the seaport towns of France or invade the French territories, or in any way to make an impression upon her. Populous and powerful upon land, nothing but the imperial despotism that exists throughout that vast empire, prevents the country from being the most enviable residence upon the globe, except our own favored land. Let not the Congress of the United States therefore stake their existence upon navies, let us not withdraw the protecting hand of Government from the soil; let us not increase the burdens of the people, and weigh them down with a public debt to support external grandeur. Do not by this system destroy the affections and attachments of the solid and honest part of the community, who support the government of the country.
Sir, the report of the Naval Committee has assumed principles as erroneous as they are novel—that the protection of maritime commerce was, above all other objects, the first and the greatest consideration which laid the foundation for the present constitution. There is nothing to warrant such a position; and no reason does exist why our commercial rights should have been better secured than the other various rights and interests embraced by that charter of our independence. In the specific grants of powers, Congress has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, with the several States, and with the Indian tribes; not giving preference in language to foreign over State and domestic commerce. I will admit, sir, that our commercial rights formed one of the primary considerations—not more primary than the rights of agriculture and manufactures, nor the rights of property, the rights of persons, protection from foreign invasion and aggression, or from internal foes. These rights were equally important, and not less the considerations which strengthened the bonds of the Union. And if any consideration had a preference, it arose from considerations of peace and war.
When I look into the preamble of the constitution, which to be sure is no specific grant of power, but is an interpretation of the objects of that great charter of our Union, I find it was to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence and general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty, that the constitution was adopted; and although maritime commerce has only a co-equal right with all others, still, the greatest means and resources of the Government have been directed to its protection. And still it would seem, if we do not ruin the nation by the establishment of a navy, we wish to make encroachments upon commerce, to damp the commercial spirit. And this we are told in the face of facts which appear upon record, and in the face of every expensive war measure now taken and adopted. Sir, in a colonial state, it was a duty upon tea that was the immediate cause of a war, which was bloody indeed, and continued upwards of seven years; a conflict which has no parallel in history as to its beginning and termination. And at this moment, violations of our neutral rights upon the ocean is a primary cause why we are about to wage a second war with Great Britain; and still we are gravely told that we are unwilling to protect commerce, and that we are ready to abandon it, because we will not vote away the substance of the people upon a system of policy which must ruin the nation if not crushed in its infancy. The constitution says, Congress shall have the power to provide and maintain a navy. And this has been read. So has it authorized Congress to raise and support armies, to lay and collect taxes, and declare war; but the constitution does not fix the limit of these powers, and all are liable to abuse. And the convention did not suppose that any Congress would so far abuse these powers as to keep either a standing army in time of peace, which must endanger the liberties of the people, or a permanent navy, that would involve us in continual wars with other nations, and permanent taxes upon the people. A reasonable peace establishment to protect our maritime and territorial frontier, consistent with strict economy, must have been contemplated; and this force, naval and military, we have maintained; and we are as secure as a nation can expect to be from savages or a maritime foe. There would be as much reason why we should keep in pay five hundred thousand regular troops in time of peace, as your twenty vessels of seventy-four guns and your forty frigates, in addition to our present naval force. In every point of view, therefore, a permanent navy is as injurious to the country as a standing army. One will endanger your liberties by conquest, and the other by wars with foreign nations.
But I am asked, how will you contend with a maritime nation, without a navy? Sir, that question is as easily answered as the first. I will ask, how we succeeded in the Revolutionary war? We were without any security upon our seacoast, and still we succeeded. But to be more specific—I would grant letters of marque and reprisal, and authorize privateering. Give scope to individual enterprise, to destroy the commerce of the enemy—which can be done effectually. I would fortify our seaport towns; station our gunboats and frigates along our coast, to protect us at home. And in this way I would in war avenge the infractions of our neutral rights.
Mr. Lowndes.—Mr. Speaker, in one opinion expressed by the honorable gentleman last up, (Mr. Johnson,) I can concur. The constitution was not formed for the exclusive protection of commerce, but for the defence of all the interests of the United States. These are to be protected by the whole force of the nation. If he had adhered throughout his speech to this opinion, the question would have been narrowed to the inquiry, by what means shall commerce be protected? He has asserted the adequacy to this purpose of the naval force which we now possess. This is, indeed, a different view of the subject from that which was taken by his honorable colleague. We were told but yesterday, that the undivided exertions of the United States could not give them a navy large enough to be useful. To-day the five frigates which we have in commission are thought sufficient if properly employed, to redress all our injuries. The death of Pierce might have been revenged, and the disgrace of the Chesapeake obliterated, if these five frigates had been sent a cruising. We did not want force, but spirit to employ it. Can it be necessary gravely to answer these assertions? May I not trust their confutation to that general knowledge of the subject which every member of the House possesses? Must we inquire what number of British vessels have been lately stationed near our coast, or what greater number it is in the power of England to station there?