What maritime strength is it expedient to provide for the United States? In considering this subject, three different degrees of naval power present themselves. In the first place, such a force as would be capable of contending with that which any other nation is able to bring on the ocean—a force that, boldly scouring every sea, would challenge to combat the fleets of other powers, however great. He admitted it was impossible at this time, perhaps it never would be desirable for this country to establish so extensive a Navy. Indeed, he should consider it as madness in the extreme in this Government to attempt to provide a Navy capable to cope with the fleets of Great Britain, wherever they might be met.
The next species of naval power to which he would advert, is that which, without adventuring into distant seas, and keeping generally in our own harbors, and on our coasts, would be competent to beat off any squadron which might be attempted to be permanently stationed in our waters. His friends from South Carolina (Messrs. Cheves and Lowndes) had satisfactorily shown that, to effect this object, a force equivalent only to one-third of that which the maintenance of such squadron must require would be sufficient. That if, for example, England should determine to station permanently upon our coast a squadron of twelve ships-of-the-line, it would require for this service thirty-six ships-of-the line, one-third in port repairing, one-third on the passage, and one-third on the station. But that is a force which it has been shown that even England, with her boasted Navy, could not spare for the American service whilst she is engaged in the present contest. Mr. C. said he was desirous of seeing such a force as he had described, that is, about twelve ships-of-the-line and fifteen or twenty frigates, provided for the United States; but, he admitted that it was unattainable in the present situation of the finances of the country. He contended, however, that it was such as Congress ought to set about providing, and he hoped, in less than ten years, to see it actually established. He was far from surveying the vast maritime power of Great Britain with the desponding eye with which other gentlemen beheld it. He could not allow himself to be discouraged at the prospect even of her thousand ships. This country only required resolution, and a proper exertion of its immense resources, to command respect, and to vindicate every essential right. When we consider our remoteness from Europe, the expense, difficulty, and perils, to which any squadron would be exposed, stationed off our coasts, he entertained no doubt that the force to which he referred would insure the command of our own seas. Such a force would avail itself of our extensive seaboard and numerous harbors, everywhere affording asylums to which it could retire for safety from a superior fleet, or from which it could issue for the purpose of annoyance. To the opinion of his colleague, (Mr. McKee,) who appeared to think that it was in vain for us to make any struggle on the ocean, he would oppose the sentiments of his distinguished connexion, the heroic Daviess, who fell in the battle of Tippecanoe.
[Here Mr. C. read certain parts of a work written by Colonel Daviess, in which the author attempts to show that, as the aggressions upon our commerce were not committed by fleets, but by single vessels, they could in the same manner be best retaliated; that a force of about twenty or thirty frigates would be capable of inflicting great injury on English commerce by picking up stragglers, cutting off convoys, and seizing upon every moment of supineness; and that such a force, with our seaports and harbors well fortified, and aided by privateers, would be really formidable, and would annoy the British navy and commerce, as the French army was assailed in Egypt, the Persian army in Scythia, and the Roman army in Parthia.][26]
The third description of force worthy of consideration is, that which would be able to prevent any single vessel, of whatever metal, from endangering our whole coasting trade, blocking up our harbors, or laying under contribution our cities; a force competent to punish the insolence of the commander of any single ship, and to preserve in our own jurisdiction the inviolability of our peace and our laws. A force of this kind is entirely within the compass of our means at this time. Is there a reflecting man in the nation who would not charge Congress with a culpable neglect of its duty, if, for the want of such a force, a single ship were to bombard one of our cities? Would not every honorable member of this committee inflict on himself the bitterest reproaches, if, by failing to make an inconsiderable addition to our gallant little Navy, a single British vessel should place New York under contribution? Yes, sir, when the city is in flames, its wretched inhabitants begin to repent of their neglect in not providing engines and water buckets. If, said Mr. C, we are not able to meet the wolves of the forest, shall we put up with the barking of every petty fox that trips across our way? Because we cannot guard against every possible danger, shall we provide against none? He hoped not. He had hardly expected that the instructing but humiliating lesson was so soon to be forgotten which was taught us in the murder of Pierce; the attack on the Chesapeake; and the insult offered in the harbor of Charleston, which the brave old fellow that commanded the fort in vain endeavored to chastise.
It was a rule with Mr. C., when acting either in a public or private character, to attempt nothing more than what there existed a prospect of accomplishing. He was, therefore, not in favor of entering into any mad projects on this subject; but for deliberately and resolutely pursuing what he believed to be within the power of Government. Gentlemen refer to the period of 1798, and we are reminded of the principles maintained by the opposition at that time. He had no doubt of the correctness of that opposition. The naval schemes of that day were premature, not warranted by the resources of the country, and were contemplated for an unnecessary war into which the nation was about to be plunged. He always admired and approved the zeal and ability with which that opposition was conducted by the distinguished gentleman now at the head of the Treasury. But the state of things is totally altered. What was folly in 1798 may be wisdom now. At that time, we had a revenue only of about six millions. Our revenue now, upon a supposition that commerce is restored, is about sixteen millions. The population of the country, too, is greatly increased—nearly doubled—and the wealth of the nation is, perhaps, tripled. While our ability to construct a navy is thus enhanced, the necessity for maritime protection is proportionately augmented. Independent of the extension of our commerce, since the year 1798, we have had an addition of more than five hundred miles to our coast, from the bay of Perdido to the mouth of the Sabine—a weak and defenceless accession, requiring, more than any other part of our maritime frontier, the protecting arm of Government.
Friday, January 24.
Naval Establishment.
The blank in the section for providing a dock yard, was filled with one hundred thousand dollars.
Mr. Rhea moved so to amend the bill as to fix the dock yard in the navy-yard at Washington City; but this motion was negatived by a large majority.
On motion of Mr. Cheves, the words "central and," were struck out, so as to leave the site of the dock yard to be determined by the Executive.