Sir: I am favored with another opportunity of writing to you by a private conveyance; and think it probable, at this season, that the frequency of these will render it unnecessary to write to you in cipher.
It does not yet appear necessary that I should discover to any person the purpose of my visit to Boston; nor is it probable that I shall be compelled, for the sake of gaining more knowledge of the arrangements of the Federal party in these States, to avow myself as a regular authorized agent of the British Government, even to those individuals who would feel equally bound with myself to preserve, with the utmost inscrutability, so important a secret from the public eye. I have sufficient means of information to enable me to judge of the proper period for offering the co-operation of Great Britain, and opening a correspondence between the Governor General of British America, and those individuals who, from the part they take in the opposition to the National Government, or the influence they may possess in any new order of things that may grow out of the present differences, should be qualified to act on behalf of the Northern States. An apprehension of any such state of things as is pre-supposed by these remarks, begins to subside, since it has appeared, by the conduct of the General Government, that it is seriously alarmed at the menacing attitude of the Northern States. But, although it is believed that there is no probability of an immediate war, yet no doubts are entertained that Mr. Madison will fall upon some new expedients to bring about hostilities. What these may be, can only be deduced from what appears to be practicable. A non-intercourse with England and France will probably supersede the embargo; which, by opening with the rest of Europe a partial, legitimate commerce, and offering strong temptations to that which is illegal, will expose the vessels to capture, detention, and embarrassment; will justify the present policy, and produce such a degree of irritation and resentment as will enable the Government of this country to throw the whole blame and responsibility of war from its own shoulders upon those of the British Ministry. If, in this, the party attached to France should calculate with correctness, and the commerce of New England should greatly suffer, the merchants, being injured and discouraged, would not only acquiesce in the restrictive system, but even submit to war. On the other hand, should the small traffic, permitted by a non-intercourse law, be lucrative and uninterrupted, the people would be clamorous for more, and soon compel the Government to restore the friendly relations between the two countries.
While I offer my opinion upon this subject, I cannot but express a strong hope that, if any terms should be proposed by either Government, to which the other might think proper to accede, that a principal motive to the adjustment of differences should be understood to arise from the amicable disposition of the Eastern States, particularly of the State of Massachusetts. This, as it would increase the popularity of the friends of Great Britain, could not fail to promote her interests. If it could not be done formally and officially, nor in a correspondence between Ministers, still, perhaps, the administration in the Parliament of Great Britain might take that ground, and the suggestion would find its way into the papers both in England and America.
It cannot be too frequently repeated, that this country can only be governed and directed by the influence of opinion, as there is nothing permanent in its political institutions; nor are the populace, under any circumstances, to be relied on, when measures become inconvenient and burdensome. I will soon write again, and am yours, &c.
A. B.
(In cipher.) No. 7.
Boston, March 7, 1809.
Sir: I have now ascertained, with as much accuracy as possible, the course intended to be pursued by the party in Massachusetts that is opposed to the measures and politics of the Administration of the General Government.
I have already given a decided opinion that a declaration of war is not to be expected; but, contrary to all reasonable calculation, should the Congress possess spirit and independence enough to place their popularity in jeopardy by so strong a measure, the Legislature of Massachusetts will give the tone to the neighboring States, will declare itself permanent until a new election of members, invite a Congress, to be composed of delegates from the Federal States, and erect a separate government for their common defence and common interest. This Congress would probably begin by abrogating the offensive laws, and adopting a plan for the maintenance of the power and authority thus assumed. They would, by such an act, be in a condition to make or receive proposals from Great Britain; and I should seize the first moment to open a correspondence with your Excellency. Scarcely any other aid would be necessary, and perhaps none required, than a few vessels of war from the Halifax station, to protect the maritime towns from the little navy which is at the disposal of the National Government. What permanent connection between Great Britain and this section of the Republic would grow out of a civil commotion, such as might be expected, no person is prepared to describe; but it seems that a strict alliance must result of necessity. At present the opposition party confine their calculations merely to resistance; and I can assure you that, at this moment, they do not freely entertain the project of withdrawing the Eastern States from the Union, finding it a very unpopular topic; although a course of events, such as I have already mentioned, would inevitably produce an incurable alienation of the New England from the Southern States.
The truth is, the common people have so long regarded the Constitution of the United States with complacency, that they are now only disposed in this quarter to treat it like a truant mistress, whom they would, for a time, put away on a separate maintenance, but, without further and greater provocation, would not absolutely repudiate.