"The following articles shall be considered as articles of compact between the original States and the people of the States in the said Territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent, to wit."

[Here follow six articles.] The ordinance declares that which follows the declaration to be unalterable, but by common consent; it follows of consequence that that which precedes the declaration is alterable. Independent of this reasoning, which cannot be refuted, at every session since we have been a Territory, there have been laws passed altering the ordinance in some shape or other. For example, the ordinance requires two judges to hold a court; and, in a variety of instances, Congress has legislated with respect to the form of government of the Territory. I had supposed that the articles of agreement between the United States and Georgia had become obsolete, with respect to the imagined necessity of the consent of Georgia to legislation on the subject of the Territory. It was urged at the last session with all the eloquence which the gentlemen from Georgia are in so great a degree possessed, and disregarded; for it was decided by both Houses that the United States had a right to rule the Territory without the consent of Georgia.

The Constitution of the United States says that Congress shall "have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." Can an agreement arising from the exercise of this power, supersede the right of exercising the power expressly delegated by the constitution itself? Certainly not.

On the ground of policy I presume that there is no gentleman who will contend that the power of which I wish to deprive the Governors, ought to be retained. The gentleman from Georgia himself says, that if he were about to frame an original ordinance, he would not think of such a power. As the opinion of Judge Tucker has been referred to on one subject, I will refer to it on the subject of prerogative. Let it be recollected, that the power to prorogue and dissolve is one of the highest prerogatives of the King of England: that it crept into the governments of his colonies, and thence into this ordinance, previous to the adoption of the constitution. It now remains for the United States to say, whether they will copy after Great Britain, and because it is a high prerogative, give the Governors of the Territories of the United States the same powers as she gives to her Territorial Governors. I trust it will be expunged.

"The title 'prerogative,' it is presumed, was annihilated in America with the Kingly Government." "This definition (of prerogative) is enough to make a citizen of the United States shudder at the recollection that he was born under a government in which such doctrines were received as catholic," &c.

This is the opinion of Judge Tucker. Is not this sufficient to induce us to take away from Governors this prerogative? Is not this feature modelled after the feature in the Government of England? Certainly; and that it is transferred from her Colonial Government, I can show by the present ordinance for the government of Canada, [to which Mr. P. referred.] It is the same principle, and we have copied it.

I will not object to retain this power, if any gentleman can show any advantage to be gained by it. I will suppose an extreme case; that any of the Territories designed to commit treason, and the Legislature were to pass an act giving it their sanction; (and they have shown less treasonable disposition than some of the elder States, if we may judge from occurrences of a few years past)—could not the Governor put his negative on this law? There could be no such law without his consent. It is therefore entirely unnecessary, in any possible case, to give the Governor the arbitrary power of dissolving the Legislature.

There is a special reason which has operated upon my mind as forcibly as the general reason in favor of the bill on the table. In the Territory which I have the honor to represent, we have been nearly twelve months without any Legislature. The Governor thought proper to dissolve the Assembly without any reason given, for the ordinance does not bind him to assign reasons for his acts. Within a few days, a new Council has been chosen, which may again be dissolved as soon as it meets, and the Territory again left without a Legislature, and no reason assigned for the procedure. Is it possible that this Government will sanction such arbitrary practices? If it does, it will be the first case since the Revolution in which such a procedure has been sanctioned. I beg leave to refer gentlemen to the glorious year 1776. I beg them to revert to that instrument, in which all the sins of our political father, George III., were delineated, and they will find that one of the charges against him was that he permitted his Governors to dissolve the Legislatures from time to time. Are we prepared to ingraft these arbitrary principles into our constitution, and cherish them when practised in so arbitrary a manner? Instead of this ordinance being passed with deliberation, it must have passed originally sub silentio, and been adopted for all the new Territories without any discussion at all; for, if the principle had been investigated, it would never have been enacted into a law. In the Declaration of Independence it is stated that "he (George III.) has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing, with manly firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people." Here we see that, at that day, we complained of the arbitrary exercise of power, and I hope that, at this day, we shall give it a death-blow. If any gentleman wishes to retain it, let him show a single possible case in which it can properly be exercised—never, but to gratify the ambition or caprice of an individual. The people elect Representatives and send them to legislate; if they do not please the Governor, he can say, "gentlemen, go to your homes—I dissolve you." Can there be any necessity for this? But I will not detain the House longer, except to express a hope that the committee will not rise, unless it be to report the bill.

Mr. Troup said he would state, in as few words as he could, his objections to the passage of the bill. It was only the day before yesterday that this bill had been introduced into the House, proposing to alter one part of the ordinance. To-day, a petition came from another territory to alter another part of it. Before they adjourned, it was ten thousand to one that not a remnant of the ordinance would be left, with their good will.

I have before stated it as my opinion, said he, that the articles of the ordinance are a compact between the people of the States and of the territories, unalterable but with the consent of both parties. With the permission of the House, I will read the opinion of Judge Tucker on this subject: