The House proceeded to consider the amendments of the Senate to the bill, entitled "An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States;" and the said amendments being read at the Clerk's table, a motion was made by Mr. Lewis, that the said bills and amendments be postponed indefinitely.

Mr. Quincy expressed in strong terms his abhorrence of the measure. He said that if he believed it to be a preparation for war, he should have a less indignant sense of the injury than he felt now, as he deemed it pure, unsophisticated, reinstated embargo. The limitation of sixty or ninety days gave little consolation or hope to him, because he knew how easily the same power which originated could continue this oppressive measure.

He said that his objection was, that it was not what it pretended to be; and was what it pretended not to be. That it was not embargo preparatory to war; but, that it was embargo as a substitute for the question of declaring war. It was true that it was advocated as a step incipient to a state of war, and by way of preparation for it, by gentlemen whose sincerity he was bound to respect. He could not, however, yield the conviction of his senses and reflections to their asseverations; nor declare, in complaisance to any, let them be as respectable as they might, that he saw in this measure more or less than its features indicated.

Is this embargo what it pretends to be—preparation for war? In the first place, no sudden attack is expected from Great Britain. It is not suggested that we have a tittle of evidence relative to any hostility of her temper which is not possessed by the whole community. The President has not communicated to us one document or reason for the measure. His Message merely notifies to us his will and pleasure.

An embargo, as preparatory to war, presupposes some new and hidden danger, not known to the mercantile community. In such case, when the Government sees a danger of which the merchant is unapprised, it may be wise to stay the departure of property until the nature and extent of it can be explained, but not a moment longer. For, let the state of things be that of war or peace, the principle is precisely the same. The interest which the community has in the property of individuals is best preserved by leaving its management to the interest of the immediate proprietor, after he is made acquainted with all the circumstances of the times which have a tendency to increase its exposure.

The reason of an embargo, considered as an incipient step to war, is either to save our property from depredation abroad, or keep property which we want at home. Now it happens that the nature of the great mass of our exports is such that there is little danger of depredation from the enemy we pretend to fear abroad, and little want of the articles most likely to be exposed at home. The total export of last year amounted, as appears by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, to $45,000,000. It also appears by that report, our exports to Great Britain and her dependencies, and also to those of Spain and Portugal, were $38,500,000. Nearly seven-eighths in value of our whole exports have been, and continue to be, to the dominions of that very power from which so much is pretended to be apprehended. Now, it is well known that these articles are of very great necessity and importance to her, and whether, even in the case of actual war between our countries, Great Britain would capture them, might be questionable. But that she would capture them on the mere preparation, before one really hostile act was committed on our part, is not only unreasonable, but absolutely absurd to expect. This very commerce which, by the passing of this bill, you indicate it is her intention to prohibit or destroy, it is her obvious and undeniable policy to unite and cherish; besides, the articles are in a very great proportion perishable, which, by this embargo, are to be prohibited from going to market. Which is best—to keep them at home, to a certain loss and probable ruin, or adventure them abroad to a possible loss and highly probable gain? Ask your merchant. Ask common sense.

But it is said "we must protect our merchants." Heaven help our merchants from embargo-protection! It is also said that "the present condition of things has been brought upon the country by the merchants; that it was their clamor, in 1805 and 1806, which first put Congress upon this system of coercive restriction, of which they now so much complain." It is true that, in those years, the merchants did petition; not for embargo, not for commercial embarrassment and annihilation, but for protection. They, at that time, really thought that this national Government was formed for protection, and that it had at heart the prosperity of all the great interests of the country. If "it was a grievous fault, grievously have the merchants answered it." They asked you for relief, and you sent them embarrassment. They asked you for defence, and you imposed embargo. They "asked bread, and you gave them a stone." They "asked a fish, and you gave them a serpent." Grant that the fault was great, suppose that they did mistake the nature and character of the Government, is the penalty they incurred by this error never to be remitted? Permit them once to escape, and my word for it, they will never give you an apology for this destructive protection. If they do, they will richly deserve all the misery which, under the name of protection, you can find means to visit upon them. Your tender mercies are cruelties. The merchants hate and spurn this ruinous defence.

Mr. Q. then took notice of an intimation which had been thrown out in relation to an express, sent off on the day preceding the Message of the President, giving notice that the embargo would be proposed the ensuing day. He said that there was no necessity of speaking of that matter by distant allusions, as if there was any thing that sought concealment. That is not an affair, said Mr. Q., that shuns the light. I had the honor and the happiness, in conjunction with another member of this House, from the State of New York, (Mr. Emott,) and a Senator from Massachusetts, (Mr. Lloyd,) to transmit that intelligence to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, by an express which started on Tuesday afternoon. In doing this, we violated no obligation, even of the most remote and delicate kind. The fact that the Committee of Foreign Relations had decided that an embargo should be proposed on Wednesday, was openly avowed here on Tuesday, by various members of that committee, to various members of this House. Among others, I was informed of it. I shall always be grateful to the gentleman who gave me that information. Indeed, the whole commercial community are under great obligations to the Committee of Foreign Relations for their feeling and patriotism in resolving on that disclosure. It enabled us, by anticipating the mail, to give an opportunity for great masses of property to escape from the ruin our Cabinet was meditating for them. Yes, sir; to escape into the jaws of the British lion, and of the French tiger, which are places of refuge, of joy and delight, when compared with the grasp and fangs of this hyena embargo. What was the effect of this information? When it reached Philadelphia, the whole mercantile class was in motion, and all that had it in their power were flying in all directions from the coming mischief, as if it were a plague and a pestilence. Look, at this moment, on the river below Alexandria, and the poor seamen, towing down their vessels against wind and tide, anxious only to escape from a country which destroys under the mask of preserving.

Mr. Gold.—The first object with a wise Legislature is, Is the law expedient? The second object, which should never for a moment escape attention, Can the law be executed? Under the first head, the advocates of embargo disclaim the measure as appertaining to the odious restriction system: they present it as the old-fashioned, legitimate precursor of war, as the provident measure of Government to protect your merchants against reprisals resulting from meditated hostilities.

In this view can you be prepared for war at the expiration of the embargo? Will you open your campaign at mid-summer? Whatever appearance this measure may now assume, the country have grounds to fear a relapse into the old system—you will go again back into Egypt.