But I am afraid I have fallen somewhat into error, by wandering from the course I proposed. On the occasion to which I have alluded, I maintained that the provision of a bill then pending, similar to that I now object to, was arbitrary, unconstitutional and unjust, because it was in the nature of an ex post facto law. It is of the nature of an ex post facto law—it is more—it tends to exalt the military authority over the civil—it is this or it is nothing. If the section pronounce an ambiguous voice, to be construed according to expediency, then is there so much greater reason to recommit the bill, to reduce it to some shape which shall render it intelligible to the meanest capacity. It goes to alter the nature of a remedy—to impair the obligation of a contract. A man has contracted a debt, and his creditors arrest him. He enlists. He enlists through the grates of a prison, or within the limits of prison bounds. The contract between this man and the creditor is varied by the law, because the remedy of the creditor is changed. Let us not have a descant on the cruelty of imprisonment for debt, and the expediency of introducing other provisions on that subject. That is not the question. It is on a law for exempting a particular class of men from those penalties and provisions which attach to all other classes of society. The military of all classes in society, that class which we are about to exempt from the general provisions attaching to other classes, is that of which the people of this country have been led by all our writers, by all our authorities, to entertain the most watchful and justly founded jealousy. It is on principles somewhat analogous to these, or rather the same, much better enforced, that an opposition was maintained to a law, not dissimilar in its provisions from this, in the winter of 1799-1800.
In the fury and tempest of his passion, my friend from South Carolina seemed to overlook, what I thought he would be one of the last to forget, that we live in a limited Government, possessing restricted powers, which we cannot exceed. Has the constitution, with the most jealous scrutiny, defined the privileges of a member of this House, not permitting us to define our own, and made our principal privilege an exemption from arrest; and do we clothe ourselves with a power of exempting from arrest, ad libitum, a whole class of society—of creating a privileged order? We are, indeed, a privileged order, but we are privileged by the constitution. I ask the gentleman from South Carolina whence he derives the power of creating a privileged order, and, shall this assumption of power be attempted in favor of the military, of all other classes? In my opinion, sir, the section to which I have had reference is freighted with most fatal consequences. I will suppose a case. Suppose a man had a writ served upon him, and he afterwards enlists; that an escape warrant is taken out against him, and a contest ensues between the recruiting sergeant and the civil officer for this man, and that the civil authority supports its officer by calling out the force at its disposal. What would be the upshot? What is it to lead to? I need not state the consequences. These principles, sir, were urged thirteen years ago; they are urged now, in the same place, and on the same occasion. I cannot consent, in deference to any gentlemen, however great their zeal, to admit that I merely urged them at that time, from party views, to put down one description of persons in order to get into their warm berths. I cannot consent to such an admission, and, therefore, cannot give my support to any bill which contains such provisions. I have said this will be an ex post facto law. It is so; it operates not only after the right has accrued to the creditor to sue out his writ, but after it is in a course of execution. Let me put another case. Suppose that Congress were to pass a law that every malefactor under the sentence of death, who enlisted in the Army, should not have the sentence of the law executed on his body. Have you not as good a right to do that as to pass this law? Would you consent to see a scuffle at the gallows between the civil authority and the military for the body of that wretch?
I will put another case, sir. A son, who is the only support of a widowed and aged mother, in some moment of hilarity, perhaps of intoxication, led astray by the phantom Glory, enlists in the army of the United States. I speak of one who is a minor. Although I know that freemen of this country cannot be property in the sense in which a slave is property, yet, I do allow that the mother has a property in the time of that child; that he is under an obligation from which no human law can absolve him—an obligation imposed upon him by the maternal throes that issued him into life—by the nourishment drawn from the parent's breast—by the cherishing hand which fostered him through imbecility and infancy. You have not a right to take him—I hope, then, sir, that no question will be made of your power.
I put another case, said Mr. R. Although an apprentice and a minor are not property in the sense in which a slave is property, there is a class of men, unluckily, in certain parts of our country (in Philadelphia, for instance—I mean that class called "redemptioners,") who were sold but yesterday in the markets of that city. Is the gentleman who represents that district (Mr. Seybert) willing that they shall absolve themselves from their contract by enlisting in the Army? If he is, I am. A redemptioner sold in Philadelphia for a term of years, bought in the market as fairly as any other commodity—(I say fairly, because bought with his own consent, and as he believes, for his own advantage)—such a person, if tempted to enlist, will, unquestionably, prefer the pay and emolument of the soldier in your Army to his present situation. With regard to apprentices, I very much fear, sir, that those who enlist will, for the greater part, be of that description for whom their masters have advertised six cents reward, and forewarned all persons from harboring them. I remember, when a small boy, to have seen a series of prints by Hogarth, called "The Progress of Industry and Idleness." The gradations were not more regular than natural. The one ends with wealth, honor, and an eligible matrimonial connection with the daughter of his master, with whom he had been admitted into partnership; the other is brought up by the gibbet. Their names were Thomas Idle and William Goodchild. I believe, sir, that more of the Thomas Idles than of any other will enlist under this law, and I sincerely hope they will; for I very much fear that even William Goodchild, after he has gone through the discipline of a camp for five years, will be utterly unfit for any other species of employment. This is not all. There are other considerations, which I forbear to touch—which, I should have supposed, would have brought themselves home to the bosom of every gentleman in this House. Personal indisposition has prevented my attendance in this House, and I did not hear of this bill until last night. It was then mentioned to me by one who is fast in the old faith, and has often brought the House to a recollection of good old principles; and I did hope that they would this day have received more strenuous aid from that quarter than they have. I hope the House will refuse to pass the bill, if it were only to show that there is some one act of the Administration of 1799-1800, which the present possessors of power have not copied from their statute book. There remains only this, and the eight per cent. stock loan—and we are saved from the latter only by the infractions of that law, which we imperiously refused at the last session to repeal. It is the infractions of this law which has poured money into our coffers, and saved us from the disgrace of an eight per cent. loan. There is another part of this bill which strikes me as being inexpedient; but, as I do not wish to blend considerations of expediency with those of great and vital principles, I shall waive any thing on that head.
The question was then taken on the motion to recommit the bill, and lost. For recommitment 42, against it 62.
The question was then taken that the said bill do pass; and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 64, nays 37.
Monday, November 23.
Proposed new State.
On motion of Mr. Poindexter, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill to authorize the people of Mississippi Territory to form a constitution and State Government, and for the admission of the same into the Union.
Mr. Richardson moved to strike out the first section of the bill.