As to the causes of the war, without admitting or denying their justice on national principles to justify the act at the time it was declared, he might say that some of the pretended causes have never been seriously relied on by our own Government. The principal one has been wholly removed; and but one of the ingenious catalogue now remains, and that might easily be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of both nations. And, sir, it ought not to be forgotten, that the act declaring war was carried with great labor and much reluctance; and such was the majority in each branch of Congress that it might well have justified a doubt as to the expediency when it did pass. Besides, a large proportion of the United States were then, and even since have been opposed to the act. And this opposition was not confined to those who have been slanderously reported to be in the interest of Great Britain. The disgust and abhorrence was felt by some of the best patriots and purest bosoms in the country. Experience has also proved that the public sentiment was against the war; witness the feeble ranks of your volunteers, the slow and reluctant march of the militia, and the tardy progress in the recruiting service. Sir, the disgrace and disasters which have hitherto attended the army, have resulted more from a want of confidence in the justice and propriety of the war, than from the lack of talents in those who have conducted the battles, incompetent as they have been represented to command. A nation like this cannot be driven to war. They must feel the justice and necessity of it, and the justice must be so strong as to pierce every heart. This would be felt in a necessary and defensive war; then, indeed, the nation would smite with one arm. Before such a people, roused in such a cause, the veteran legions of Napoleon would be compelled to bite the dust. Such, alas! is not our case. We have a war, without the spirit or unanimity which springs from these causes, and without the pecuniary means of supporting it. Such a war must be disastrous! On what, sir, is the honor of this nation now suspended? On the Navy! that little navy which was despised, neglected, and forgotten, until it fought itself into notice, and rescued the sinking honor of the country.
What, sir, was the avowed object of this war? It has ever been said that conquest, with a view of extending our territory, and enlarging our dominion, was not the wish of this Government. The idea of this Republic following the footsteps of foreign ambitious nations, was so repugnant to the genius of the American people, and the constitution under which we live, that few, if any, of the warmest advocates of the war dare avow it.
The pretence was to take, or rather to receive Canada; for it was vainly supposed the inhabitants of that province would readily join our standard, on the first invitation. But we must go through the form of conquest to protect them from the charge of treason to their own Government. We were to hold Canada until peace should return, and then it was to be delivered up in exchange for maritime rights. And this it was supposed would be a powerful weapon in our hands in the negotiation. With this view the bills augmenting the Army, raising the volunteers, and transferring the militia, passed. By the present bill, and the project connected with it, the original plan is abandoned with the volunteers and militia, and we are now presented with a compound system of conquest, extermination, and defence. It would seem with the force of fifty-five thousand regular troops, we are to conquer all the residue of North America; exterminate every tawny infidel this side of the Isthmus of Darien, and defend a seacoast many hundred miles in extent from the incursions of the enemy! This is truly a gigantic project. He said he could not give it his aid; and he thought some honorable gentlemen who voted for the war would, when they reflected on the magnitude of the scheme now presented, seize this occasion to retire, unwilling to entail on themselves and posterity the expense and ruin which would flow from the project, if carried into execution.
Mr. Quincy.—Mr. Speaker, I fear that the state of my health may prevent my doing justice to my sentiments concerning this bill. I will, however, make the attempt though I should fail in it.
The bill proposes that 20,000 men should be added to the existing Military Establishment. This, at present, consists of 35,000 men. So that the effect of this bill is to place, at the disposal of the Executive, an army of 55,000. It is not pretended that this addition is wanted either for defence or for the relief of the Indian frontier. On the contrary, it is expressly acknowledged that the present establishment is sufficient for both of those objects. But the purpose for which these 20,000 men are demanded is, the invasion of Canada. This is unequivocally avowed by the chairman of the Committee of Military Affairs, (Mr. D. R. Williams,) the organ, as is admitted, of the will and the wishes of the American Cabinet.
The bill, therefore, brings, necessarily, into deliberation, the conquest of Canada, either as an object, in itself desirable, or consequentially advantageous, by its effect, in producing an early and honorable peace.[31]
Before I enter upon the discussion of those topics, which naturally arise from this state of the subject, I will ask your indulgence, for one moment, while I make a few remarks upon this intention of the American Cabinet thus unequivocally avowed. I am induced to this from the knowledge, which I have, that this design is not deemed to be serious by some men of both political parties; as well within this House as out of it. I know that some of the friends of the present Administration do consider the proposition as a mere feint, made for the purpose of putting a good face upon things, and of strengthening the hope of a successful negotiation, by exciting the apprehensions of the British Cabinet for the fate of their colonies. I know, also, that some of those who are opposed in political sentiment to the men who are now at the head of affairs, laugh at these schemes of invasion; and deem them hardly worth controversy, on account of their opinion of the imbecility of the American Cabinet, and the embarrassment of its resources.
I am anxious that no doubt should exist upon this subject either in the House or in the nation. Whosoever considers the object of this bill to be any other than that which has been avowed, is mistaken. Whosoever believes this bill to be a means of peace, or any thing else than an instrument of vigorous and long-protracted war, is grievously deceived. And whoever acts under such mistake, or such deception, will have to lament one of the grossest, and perhaps one of the most critical errors of his political life. I warn, therefore, my political opponents; those honest men, of whom I know there are some, who, paying only a general attention to the course of public affairs, submit the guidance of their opinions to the men who stand at the helm, not to vote for this bill under any belief that its object is to aid negotiation for peace. Let such gentlemen recur to their past experience on similar occasions. They will find that it has been always the case, whenever any obnoxious measure is about to be passed, that its passage is assisted by the aid of some such collateral suggestions. No sooner do the Cabinet perceive that any potion, which they intend to administer, is loathed by a considerable part of the majority, and that their apprehensions are alive lest it should have a scouring effect upon their popularity, than certain under-operators are set to work, whose business it is to amuse the minds, and beguile the attention of the patients while the dose is swallowing. The language always is: "Trust the Cabinet doctors. The medicine will not operate as you imagine, but quite another way." After this manner the fears of the men are allayed, and the purposes of the Administration are attained under suggestions very different from the true motives. Thus, the embargo, which has since been unequivocally acknowledged to have been intended to coerce Great Britain, was adopted, as the Executive asserted, "to save our essential resources." So, also, when the present war was declared against Great Britain, members of the House were known to state that they voted for it under the suggestion that it would not be a war of ten days: that it was known that Mr. Foster had instructions to make definitive arrangements, in his pocket; and that the United States had only to advance to the point of war, and the whole business would be settled. And now an army, which, in point of numbers, Cromwell might envy, greater than that with which Cæsar passed the Rubicon, is to be helped through a reluctant Congress, under the suggestion of its being only a parade force, to make negotiation successful; that it is the incipient state of a project for a grand pacification!
I warn also my political friends. These gentlemen are apt to place great reliance on their own intelligence and sagacity. Some of these will tell you that the invasion of Canada is impossible. They ask where are the men—where is the money to be obtained? And they talk very wisely concerning common sense and common prudence, and will show, with much learning, how this attempt is an offence against both the one and the other. But, sir, it has been my lot to be an observer of the character and conduct of the men now in power for these eight years past. And I state, without hesitation, that no scheme ever was, or ever will be, rejected by them, merely on account of its running counter to the ordinary dictates of common sense and common prudence. On the contrary, on that very account, I believe it more likely to be both suggested and adopted by them. And, what may appear a paradox, for that very reason, the chance is rather increased that it will be successful.
I could illustrate this position twenty ways. I shall content myself with remarking only upon two instances, and those recent; the present war, and the late invasion of Canada. When war against Great Britain was proposed at the last session, there were thousands in these United States, and I confess to you I was myself among the number, who believed not one word of the matter. I put my trust in the old fashioned notions of common sense, and common prudence. That a people, which had been more than twenty years at peace, should enter upon hostilities against a people which had been twenty years at war; that a nation, whose army and navy were little more than nominal, should engage in a war with a nation possessing one of the best appointed armies and the most powerful marine on the globe; that a country, to which neutrality had been a perpetual harvest, should throw that great blessing away for a controversy in which nothing was to be gained, and every thing valuable put in jeopardy; from these, and innumerable like considerations, the idea seemed so absurd that I never once entertained it as possible. And now, after war has been declared, the whole affair seems so extraordinary and so utterly irreconcilable to any previous suggestions of wisdom and duty, that I know not what to make of it or how to believe it. Even at this moment my mind is very much in the state of certain Pennsylvania Germans, of whom I have heard it asserted that they are taught to believe, by their political leaders, and do at this moment consider the allegation, that war is at present existing between the United States and Great Britain, to be a "federal falsehood."