If ever a body of men were pledged to any thing, the American Cabinet, its friends and supporters, were pledged for the truth of this fact; that the French decrees of Berlin and Milan were definitively repealed as it respects the United States, on the first of November, 1810. If ever any body of men staked their whole stock of reputation upon any point, our Cabinet did it on this. They and their partisans asserted and raved. They denounced every man as a British partisan who denied it. They declared the restrictive system was revived by the mere effect of the proclamation. But lest the courts of law should not be as subservient to their policy as might be wished, they passed the law of the 2d of March, 1811, upon the basis of this repeal, and of its being definitive. The British Government refused, however, to recognize the validity of this repeal, and denied that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the first of November, 1810, as our Cabinet asserted. Thus, then, stood the argument between the British Ministry and our Cabinet. The British Ministry admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, they were bound to revoke their Orders in Council. But they denied that repeal to exist. Our Cabinet, on the other hand, admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, the restrictive system ought not to have been revived against Great Britain. But they asserted that repeal to exist. This was, virtually, the state of the question between the two countries on this point. And it is agreed, on all hands, that this refusal of the British Government to repeal their Orders in Council, after the existence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as asserted by the American Cabinet, was the cause of the declaration of war between the two countries. So that in truth, the question of the right of war depended upon the existence of that fact; for if that fact did not exist, even the American Cabinet did not pretend that, in the position in which things then stood, they had a right to declare war, on account of the continuance of the British Orders in Council.
Now, what is the truth in relation to this all-important fact, the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees on the 1st of November, 1810; the pivot upon which turned the revival of the restrictive system and our declaration of war? Why, sir, the event has proved that in relation to that fact the American Cabinet was, to say the least, in an error. Bonaparte himself, in a decree, dated the 28th of April, 1811, but not promulgated till a year afterwards, distinctly declares that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not definitively repealed, as relates to the United States, on the 1st of November, 1810. He also declares that they are then, on that twenty-eighth of April, for the first time, repealed. And he founds the issuing of this decree on the act of the American Congress of the 2d of March, 1811. That very act, which was passed upon the ground of the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, on the 1st of November, 1810; and which, it is agreed on all sides, the American Government were bound in honor not to pass, except in case of such antecedent repeal.
Were ever a body of men so abandoned in the hour of need, as the American Cabinet, in this instance by Bonaparte? Was ever any body of men so cruelly wounded in the house of their friend? This, this was "the unkindest cut of all." But how was it received by the American Cabinet? Surely they were indignant at this treatment. Surely the air rings with reproaches upon a man who has thus made them stake their reputation upon a falsehood; and then gives little less than the lie direct, to their assertions. No, sir, nothing of all this is heard from our Cabinet. There is a philosophic tameness that would be remarkable, if it were not, in all cases affecting Bonaparte, characteristic. All the Executive of the United States has found it in his heart to say, in relation to this last decree of Bonaparte, which contradicts his previous allegations and asseverations, is, that "This proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections!"
I have referred to this subject as being connected, with future conduct, strikingly illustrative of the disposition of the American Cabinet to carry on the war, and of their intention, if possible, not to make peace. Surely, if any nation had a claim for liberal treatment from another, it was the British nation from the American, after the discovery of the error of the American Government, in relation to the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, in November, 1810. In consequence of that error, the American Cabinet had ruined numbers of our own citizens, who had been caught by the revival of the non-intercourse law; they had revived that law against Great Britain, under circumstances which now appeared to have been fallacious; and they had declared war against her, on the supposition, that she had refused to repeal her Orders in Council, after the French decrees were in fact revoked: whereas, it now appears that they were in fact not revoked. Surely the knowledge of this error was followed by an instant and anxious desire to redress the resulting injury. As the British Orders in Council were in fact revoked, on the knowledge of the existence of the French decree of repeal, surely the American Cabinet at once extended the hand of friendship; met the British Government half way; stopped all farther irritation; and strove to place every thing on a basis best suited to promote an amicable adjustment. No, sir, nothing of all this occurred. On the contrary, the question of impressments is made the basis of continuing the war. On this subject, a studied fairness of proposition is preserved, accompanied with systematic perseverance in measures of hostility. An armistice was proposed by them. It was refused by us. It was acceded to by the American General on the frontiers. It was rejected by the Cabinet. No consideration of the false allegation on which the war in fact was founded; no consideration of the critical and extremely consequential nature to both nations of the subject of impressment; no considerations of humanity, interposed their influence. They renewed hostilities. They rushed upon Canada. Nothing would satisfy them but blood. The language of their conduct is that of the giant, in the legends of infancy:
"Fee, faw, fow, fum,
I smell the blood of an Englishman;
Dead or alive, I will have some!"
Can such men pretend that peace is their object? Whatever may result, the perfect conviction of my mind is, that they have no such intention, and that if it comes it is contrary both to their hope and expectation.
I would not judge these men severely. But it is my duty to endeavor to judge them truly; and to express fearlessly the result of that judgment, whatever it may be. My opinion results from the application of the well-known principle of judging concerning men's purposes and motives: to consider rather what men do, than what they say; and to examine their deeds in connection with predominating passions and interests; and on this basis decide. In making an estimate of the intentions of these or any other politicians, I make little or no account of pacific pretensions. There is a general reluctance at war, and desire of peace, which pervades the great mass of every people; and artful rulers could never keep any nation at war any length of time, beyond their true interests, without some sacrifice to that general love of peace which exists in civilized men. Bonaparte himself will tell you that he is the most pacific creature in the world. He has already declared, by his proclamation to Frenchmen, that he has gone to Moscow for no other end than to cultivate peace, and counteract the Emperor of Russia's desire of war. In this country, where the popular sentiment has so strong an impulse on its affairs, the same obtrusive pretension must inevitably be preserved. No man or set of men ever can or will get this country at war, or continue it long in war, without keeping on hand a stout, round stock of gulling matter. Fair propositions will always be made to go hand in hand with offensive acts. And when something is offered so reasonable that no man can doubt but it will be accepted, at the same moment something will be done of a nature to embarrass the project, and if not to defeat at least to render its acceptance dubious. How this has been in past time, I have shown. I will now illustrate what is doing and intended at present.
As from the uniform tenor of the conduct of the American Cabinet, in relation to the British Government, I have no belief that their intention has been to make a solid arrangement with that nation; so, from the evidence of their disposition and intention, existing abroad and on the table, I have no belief that such is at present their purpose. I cannot possibly think otherwise, than that such is not their intention. Let us take the case into common life. I have demands, Mr. Speaker, against you, very just in their nature, but different. Some of recent, others of very old date. The former depending upon principles very clearly in my favor. The latter critical, difficult, and dubious, both in principle and settlement. In this state of things, and during your absence, I watch my opportunity, declare enmity; throw myself upon your children and servants and property, which happen to be in my neighborhood, and do them all the injury I can. While I am doing this, I receive a messenger from you, stating that the grounds of the recent injury are settled; that you comply fully with my terms. Your servants and children, whom I am plundering and killing, invite me to stay my hand until you return, or until some accommodation can take place between us. But, deaf to any such suggestions, I prosecute my intention of injury to the utmost. When there is reason to expect your return, I multiply my means of injury and offence. And no sooner do I hear of your arrival, than I thrust my fist into your face, and say to you—"Well, sir, here are fair propositions of settlement; come to my terms, which are very just; settle the old demand in my way, and we will be as good friends as ever." Mr. Speaker, what would be your conduct on such an occasion? Would you be apt to look as much at the nature of the propositions, as at the temper of the assailant? If you did not at once return blow for blow, and injury for injury, would you not at least take a little time to consider? Would you not tell such an assailant, that you were not to be bullied nor beaten into any concession? If you settled at all, might you not consider it your duty in some way to make him feel the consequences of his strange intemperance of passion? For myself, I have no question how a man of spirit ought to act under such circumstances. I have as little, how a great nation, like Great Britain, will act. Now, I have no doubt, sir, that the American Cabinet view this subject in the same light. They understand well, that by the declaration of war, the invasion of Canada, the refusal of an armistice, and perseverance in hostilities, after the principal ground of war had been removed, they have wrought the minds of the British Cabinet and people to a very high state of irritation. Now is the very moment to get up some grand scheme of pacification; such as may persuade the American people of the inveterate love of our Cabinet for peace, and make them acquiescent in their perseverance in hostilities. Accordingly, before the end of the session, a great tub will be thrown out to the whale. Probably, a little while before the Spring elections, terms of very fair import will be proffered to Great Britain. Such as, perhaps, six months ago our Cabinet would not have granted, had she solicited them on her knees. Such as probably, in the opinion of the people of this country, Great Britain ought to accept; such perhaps as in any other state of things, she would have accepted. But such as, I fear, under the irritation produced by the strange course pursued by the American Cabinet, that nation will not accept. Sir, I do not believe that our Cabinet expect that they will be accepted. They think the present state of induced passion is sufficient to prevent arrangement. But to make assurance doubly sure, to take a bond of fate, that arrangement shall not happen, they prepare this bill. A bill, which proposes an augmentation of the army for the express purpose of conquering the Canadas. A bill which, connected with the recent disposition evinced by our Cabinet, in relation to those provinces, and with the avowed intent of making their subjugation the means of peace, through the fear to be inspired into Great Britain, is as offensive to the pride of that nation as can well be imagined; and is, in my apprehension, as sure a guarantee of continued war as could be given. On these grounds, my mind cannot force itself to any other conclusion than this, that the avowed object of this bill is the true one; that the Canadas are to be invaded the next season; that the war is to be protracted: and that this is the real policy of the American Cabinet.
I will now reply to those invitations to "union," which have been so obtrusively urged upon us. If by this call to union is meant a union in a project for the invasion of Canada, or for the invasion of East Florida, or for the conquest of any foreign country whatever, either as a means of carrying on this war or for any other purpose, I answer, distinctly, I will unite with no man nor any body of men for any such purposes. I think such projects criminal in the highest degree, and ruinous to the prosperity of these States. But, if by this invitation is meant union in preparation for defence, strictly so called; union in fortifying our seaboard; union in putting our cities into a state of safety; union in raising such a military force as shall be sufficient with the local militia in the hands of the constitutional leaders, the Executives of the States, to give a rational degree of security against any invasion; sufficient to defend our frontiers, sufficient to awe into silence the Indian tribes within our Territories; union in creating such a maritime force as shall command the seas on the American coasts, and keep open the intercourse, at least between the States: if this is meant, I have no hesitation; union on such principles you shall have from me cordially and faithfully. And this, too, sir, without any reference to the state of my opinion, in relation to the justice or necessity of this war. Because I will understand such to be the condition of man, in a social compact, that he must partake of the fate of the society to which he belongs, and must submit to the privations and sacrifices its defence requires, notwithstanding these may be the result of the vices or crimes of its immediate rulers. But there is a great difference between supporting such rulers in plans of necessary self-defence, on which the safety of our altars and firesides especially depend, and supporting them in projects of foreign invasion, and encouraging them in schemes of conquest and ambition, which are not only unjust in themselves, but dreadful in their consequences; inasmuch as, let the particular project result as it may, the general effect must be, according to human view, destructive to our own domestic liberties and constitution. I speak as an individual. Sir, for my single self, did I support such projects as are avowed to be the objects of this bill, I should deem myself a traitor to my country. Were I even to aid them by loan, or in any other way, I should consider myself a partaker in the guilt of the purpose. But when these projects of an invasion shall be abandoned; when men yield up schemes which not only openly contemplate the raising of a great military force, but also the concentrating them at one point, and placing them in one hand; schemes obviously ruinous to the fates of a free Republic—as they comprehend the means by which such have ever heretofore been destroyed; when, I say, such schemes shall be abandoned, and the wishes of the Cabinet limited to mere defence and frontier and maritime protection, there will be no need of calls to union. For such objects there is not, there cannot be, but one heart and soul in this people.
Mr. Archer said, so great was the respect which he felt for the House, so deep was the consciousness which he entertained of his inability to do justice to a cause, especially one of so much magnitude and importance, of which he might be the advocate, that he would be doing injustice to his feelings were he not to express the weight of the embarrassments which oppressed him. But the wide range which the present discussion had taken, involving considerations of great national interest, and calling forth the cruel asperities of political intolerance, seemed to leave him no alternative in the discharge of his duty, but to repel the unfounded insinuations which had flown in so copious a stream from the other side of the House. Were gentlemen to confine themselves to a temperate investigation of the propriety of adopting measures either recommended by the Executive, or proposed by the majority, who is there that would not listen with pleasure and satisfaction? But when the liberty of debate was prostituted in disseminating the most unfounded charges, in the indiscriminate abuse of the constituted authorities of the nation, he confessed he could not "always be a hearer, and never reply." The few observations he had to make would be without either system or arrangement, having bestowed no previous consideration on the subject, and should be confined not so much to the bill for raising an additional army, as the remarks and arguments of those gentlemen who had preceded him on the other side of the House.