I exclude all consideration of the abstract justice of our complaints against Great Britain. Upon that subject I never had but one opinion. I always did believe that her conduct towards this country was not only unjust as it affected us, but impolitic as it affected herself.
Before the war commenced last Summer, the Orders in Council formed the principal ground of complaint against Great Britain. I venture to assert, without the dread of contradiction, that if the repeal which has since taken place had happened and been known here before we resorted to the sword, we should have remained at peace. I make this declaration on (what I deem) the most unquestionable authority. The proof is on record. In 1808, Mr. Jefferson, then President of the United States, through our Minister in London, proposed to the British Government to relinquish the embargo as to her, on condition the Orders in Council were revoked. In 1809, Mr. Madison entered into the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which made the same condition the sole foundation for restoring amicable intercourse between the two nations. In 1810 and 1811, the discussions between our Government and that of Great Britain were confined almost exclusively to that subject. And in 1812, preceding the declaration of war, the Secretary of State informed the British Envoy, that if the Orders in Council were revoked, the non-importation act would cease immediately. During the whole of this period, our complaints were directed to the Orders in Council, and our measures, (I speak of our restrictive system,) so far as they affected Great Britain, were adopted with a single eye to their repeal. Until the war was declared, I did not suppose that it would be waged for any other object.
The Orders in Council, though a violation of our maritime rights in point of principle, were practically of very little injury to our commerce at the commencement of the war in which we are now engaged. The reasons are obvious. Our commerce to France, Holland, Italy, &c., never was of great importance. And the effect of the French "municipal regulations" had caused it to dwindle into insignificance. The exclusions, restrictions, impositions, and confiscations, so permanent in the commercial code (and practice) of Napoleon, had inspired our merchants with a due portion of caution, how they ventured their property into the power of a Government actuated by no liberal principle, and bound by no faith. From this state of things, it was not difficult to conjecture that the period was not distant when Great Britain must become convinced of the inefficiency of the Orders in Council, so far as respected their retaliatory object on her enemy. How could France be distressed by the British interdiction of her foreign commerce, when France herself was hostile to that commerce—when she adopted every measure to narrow, to shackle, and ultimately to exclude it? We had even strong evidence that British statesmen began to waver on the subject. The vote in the House of Commons, during the last Winter, showed a minority unusually strong, and indicated most clearly that before long the Orders in Council were doomed to perish. But, with this information before our eyes, we hurried on to war without waiting for the event, or even without waiting for preparation.
The Orders in Council have since been repealed. The manner has indeed been objected to by the honorable Speaker, (Mr. Clay,) because the right to secure them in certain events is reserved. But surely this cannot be and has not been considered by our Government a serious objection; for without such reservation the power to revive them existed to every possible extent. The only question is, do they cease to violate our neutral commerce? This is not doubted. The remaining obstacle, therefore, to a good understanding between the two nations, and the sole ostensible cause for persevering in the war, is the subject of impressments.
This is, indeed, a difficult and unquestionably an interesting subject. Not that I place entire confidence in the sympathetic descriptions of the magnitude of the evil, which we have so often heard and daily heard in this House. I am inclined to believe fancy has colored the picture too highly. There is one reason, above all others, which leads me to that conclusion. It is this: In that section of the United States of which two-thirds of our seamen are natives, there is a strong, overwhelming current of opinion against this war. Can it be possible that the country where dwells the kindred of those who are said to be incarcerated in great numbers in the "floating dungeons" of Great Britain is not only indifferent about the fate of its children, but opposes, as ruinous, the war waged for their protection? It is certainly a curious spectacle to see the defenders of seamen's rights come from those portions of the Union that have little commerce, and few, if any, seamen. I do not mean to insinuate that those gentlemen do wrong in espousing the cause of the oppressed, to whatever quarter they may belong; but I state the fact to show that their sympathies may possibly have magnified the evil—and to infer from it, that the opposition of those most immediately interested is to be ascribed, not to their insensibility, but to their apprehensions that this war, instead of securing seamen's rights, will banish their seamen into foreign service.
The controversy between this country and Great Britain seems to have been brought to a single point. She claims the service of her seafaring subjects in time of danger. Our Government admits this right. To give effect to the right thus claimed and admitted, she insists that her officers may go on board our merchant ships on the high seas, or in her ports—search for and take her subjects. This our Government deny, and claim the immunity of the flag so far as persons are concerned; because, under the pretext of taking British subjects, American citizens are frequently taken. It does, indeed, not distinctly appear in the late communication from our Executive to the British Government, that they mean by the terms American citizens, whether it includes naturalized persons as well as natives. With respect to those of the first description, I confess I feel no great interest for their immunity abroad or on the high seas; I am one of those who think that we act sufficiently liberal when we offer them any asylum from the oppression or poverty of their own country, receive them into our bosom, and extend to them all the advantages belonging to us; and so long as they remain within our territorial limits, they shall, with my consent, have the full benefit of the protection which our laws afford to all. But I cannot consent that the native blood of this country shall be profusely wasted to protect aliens born, wherever they may ramble. We all profess a deep solicitude for the interest of seamen. To describe their distresses and to eulogize their valor and patriotism, is one of the topics of the day. And yet we are contending for principles which, if successful, will bring a host of foreigners in competition with them to elbow them out of employment. But it is said that Great Britain does the same—that by the act passed during the reign of George II., foreign seamen are naturalized who have been in the King's service for two years, and that she has no right to object if we imitate her conduct. It is true she has adopted such a regulation. But I have never heard of any instance where she has contended that such a person is absolved from his natural allegiance, if he comes within the power of his original sovereign. I have understood that act to mean that such persons should become entitled to certain rights—not absolved from any duties towards others, should they leave the country. That they should have the right to hold lands—be admitted under the regulations of the navigation act as British seamen on board merchant ships, and participate in the pension and hospital provisions. Should I be mistaken, however, I am not inclined to relinquish my opinion, merely because the practice of Great Britain is opposed to it.
Sir, I do not find fault with the Administration for insisting on the immunity of our flag, as it respects the seamen. I approve of the principle. It is of that character which at a proper time and with proper means is (in effect and to all general purposes) attainable, if we do not by ill-timed and imprudent efforts frustrate it. It is supposed that the present is the auspicious moment to insist on our rights. That pressed as Great Britain is by the most powerful enemy the world ever saw, who threatens her very existence; the impression which we can make upon her by our arms, will be greater than at any other time. This very circumstance renders the attainment of our object more difficult, and makes our case hopeless. Her danger forbids a compliance with our demands. In her present struggle, her naval power constitutes her security. Without that she would long since have become a French province. This every man in England knows and feels. It is well known that four-fifths of her seamen on board her navy render not voluntary but compulsory service. Should this principle be established, which in all cases would afford a secure asylum in our merchant ships, it is dreaded by British statesmen and the British people, that their seamen, allured by higher wages and easier employment, would abandon their service, and thus render their country accessible to their enemy. Hence you see every Ministry, of whatever political party or distinction, tremblingly alive to this subject. They dare not touch it in the present state of that country. No man could maintain his power a moment after having hazarded the public safety by making an experiment, the effect of which could not be foreseen, and may be productive of such disastrous consequences. This spirit is manifest in all the communications from the British Cabinet to our Government. We have seen the sentiments of Lord Grenville, Lord Auckland, Lord Holland, and Mr. Fox, men whose prepossessions were in our favor, and who on almost every other subject supported our pretensions. On this subject they resisted our demands, because they dared not grant them. While I conceive the claims of our Government as not going too far, I doubt their prudence as to the time and manner of giving them effect. I fear that instead of realizing our wishes the measures pursued are calculated to deprive us of every hope hereafter. In the present unexampled state of the world, according to my limited conception of our true interest, we ought to have seriously avoided all hostile collision with foreign powers. We ought to have cherished the resources within our grasp. Nothing is more obvious than the remark made by the honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. Bleecker,) that, with all the injuries which we received from the belligerents, our commerce was more extensive and more profitable in the aggregate than if Europe had been at peace. We might have obtained (and we ought not to have rejected) such temporary arrangements with England, (with whom our commerce was chiefly carried on,) which, though they did not embrace all our interests, would have secured those of first importance and kept us at peace. The benefits of such a policy are to my mind self-evident. Should Europe be restored to tranquillity and assume something like its former appearance, (and I do not believe the present state of things durable,) we should have been able to have effected every valuable object, because such a change will probably bring with it a respect for the rights of nations, which have now no existence but in name. And should an imposing attitude have been wanting to give effect to our claims, we should have exhibited an unbroken spirit and unexhausted resources.
An honorable member from Tennessee, (Mr. Grundy,) the other day, read some extracts from the instructions transmitted to our Minister in London, in 1792. His object was to show the deep interest which the great man who then presided over this nation felt on the subject of impressments. I sincerely wish that while gentlemen resort to his opinions to support theirs, they would consent to imitate his conduct. Nothing can be more strikingly different than his policy and that which is now pursued.
In 1793 the subject of impressments did not form the only complaint against Great Britain. The Treaty of Peace remained unexecuted on her part. To that was added the great injury which our commerce sustained by the extensive captures made by her cruisers during that year. The interest which was felt for the success of the French Revolution, against which Great Britain had arrayed herself, tended to excite the nation, even beyond the measure of its wrongs, and ripen it for war. But the wisdom of Washington saved us from being drawn into the vortex, which has since devoured all who approached it. His genius considered the true interests of his country to consist in the preservation of its peace; and he had firmness enough to preserve it, though opposed by the strong feelings of the people. Notwithstanding the accumulated wrongs which we had received, he sent a messenger of peace, and ultimately gave his assent to a treaty in which there was not one stipulation even to restrain the abuses of impressments, which the year before he had declared could not be longer tolerated. Why was this done by him, who, to say the least, had as much affection for his country's rights, as the politicians of the present day—whom fear never influenced—and who could safely calculate on the support of the people, should he resort to arms? The answer is obvious. Peace upon almost any terms was better than a hopeless, endless contest. What a contrast does his example present to the conduct of those who now direct the destinies of this nation, and who, while they reject his policy, resort to his opinions to support their own?
Upon the subject of foreign war, and the objects connected with it, the opinions of gentlemen of the majority have certainly undergone a strange revolution since they came into power. Little more than twelve years ago, they deprecated foreign war as inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, and the genius of our Government. Nothing short of self-defence, when attacked in our own country, was considered as a justification for abandoning our peaceful pursuits, and mingling in hostility with European powers. Every other object was deemed subordinate to the preservation of peace, because with it was connected every benefit which it had pleased Providence to bestow upon us, and which our detached situation rendered secure. We now hear those very gentlemen talk of Rome and Greece in their proudest days, when they inspired terror into the inhabitants of distant climes and carried their arms to every quarter of the globe; and their example is held up for our imitation. The almost boundless extent of our territory is become too limited, and we hear of conquests in the North and South, as essential to our security and happiness. In taking a retrospect, and contrasting former opinions with present conduct, a person would almost be inclined to distrust his observation, was there not left on record monuments with sentiments of former times entertained by gentlemen in the days of humility, when they were struggling against power. Permit me to call your attention to a resolution of the Virginia Assembly, adopted in 1798, said to be draughted by Mr. Madison, now President of the United States, upon this subject. It was then considered the standard of Republican opinion, by all who professed to be of that party. It in substance declares, that though the General Assembly view with indignation the violations of our commerce, the impressment of our seamen, and other wrongs committed by foreign nations, yet detached as the United States are from European concerns, they should deprecate a war waged for any other object except self-defence, in cases of actual invasion. This resolution had an eye to our relations with France, from whom we had then received every injury and indignity she could inflict, and with whom we were in a state of partial hostility; but it explicitly declares, that we ought to engage in offensive war, for no object whatever. Let the sentiment be compared with the conduct of the same men now they are in power.