Mr Randolph proposed in order to give a favorable aspect to ye measure, that a sermon be preached at the request of the convention on 4th of July, the anniversary of Independence; & thenceforward prayers be used in ye Convention every morning. Dr Frankn 2ded this motion. After several unsuccessful attempts for silently postponing this matter by adjourng the adjournment was at length carried, without any vote on the motion.
Friday June 29th in Convention.
Docr Johnson. The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the States as districts of people composing one political Society; those on the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is that the States do exist as political Societies, and a Govt is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the States as such are to exist they must be armed with some power of self-defence. This is the idea of (Col. Mason) who appears to have looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the aristocratic and other interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves, the States have their interests as such, and are equally entitled to like means. On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to be represented, in the other the States.
Mr Ghoram. The States as now confederated have no doubt a right to refuse to be consolidated, or to be formed into any new system. But he wished the small States which seemed most ready to object, to consider which are to give up most, they or the larger ones. He conceived that a rupture of the Union wd be an event unhappy for all, but surely the large States would be least unable to take care of themselves, and to make connections with one another. The weak therefore were most interested in establishing some general system for maintaining order. If among individuals, composed partly of weak, and partly of strong, the former most need the protection of law & Government, the case is exactly the same with weak & powerful States. What would be the situation of Delaware (for these things he found must be spoken out, & it might as well be done at first as last) what wd be the situation of Delaware in case of a separation of the States? Would she not be at the mercy of Pennsylvania? would not her true interest lie in being consolidated with her, and ought she not now to wish for such a union with Pa under one Govt as will put it out of the power of Pena to oppress her? Nothing can be more ideal than the danger apprehended by the States from their being formed into one nation. Massts was originally three colonies, viz old Massts Plymouth—& the province of Mayne. These apprehensions existed then. An incorporation took place; all parties were safe & satisfied; and every distinction is now forgotten. The case was similar with Connecticut & New haven. The dread of Union was reciprocal; the consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory. In like manner N. Jersey has been made one society out of two parts. Should a separation of the States take place, the fate of N. Jersey wd be worst of all. She has no foreign commerce & can have but little. Pa & N. York will continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If she consults her interest she wd beg of all things to be annihilated. The apprehensions of the small States ought to be appeased by another reflection Massts will be divided. The province of Maine is already considered as approaching the term of its annexation to it; and Pa will probably not increase, considering the present state of her population, & other events that may happen. On the whole he considered a Union of the States as necessary to their happiness, & a firm Genl Govt as necessary to their Union. He shd consider it as his duty if his colleagues viewed the matter in the same light he did to stay here as long as any other State would remain with them, in order to agree on some plan that could with propriety be recommended to the people.
Mr Elseworth, did not despair. He still trusted that some good plan of Govt wd be devised & adopted.
Mr Read. He shd have no objection to the system if it were truly national, but it has too much of a federal mixture in it. The little States he thought had not much to fear. He suspected that the large States felt their want of energy, & wished for a Genl Govt to supply the defect. Massts was evidently labouring under her weakness and he believed Delaware wd not be in much danger if in her neighbourhood. Delaware had enjoyed tranquillity & he flattered himself wd continue to do so. He was not however so selfish as not to wish for a good Genl Govt. In order to obtain one the whole States must be incorporated. If the States remain, the representatives of the large ones will stick together, and carry everything before them. The Executive also will be chosen under the influence of this partiality, and will betray it in his administration. These jealousies are inseparable from the scheme of leaving the States in existence. They must be done away. The ungranted lands also which have been assumed by particular States must also be given up. He repeated his approbation of the plan of Mr Hamilton, & wished it to be substituted in the place of that on the table.
Mr Madison agreed with Docr Johnson, that the mixed nature of the Govt ought to be kept in view; but thought too much stress was laid on the rank of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he observed from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their laws in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy were analagous to that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State. Under the proposed Govt the powers of the States will be much farther reduced. According to the views of every member, the Genl Govt will have powers far beyond those exercised by the British Parliament, when the States were part of the British Empire. It will in particular have the power, without the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly on the people themselves; and therefore not to divest such unequal portions of the people as composed the several States, of an equal voice, would subject the system to the reproaches & evils which have resulted from the vicious representation in G. B.
He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a principle wch was confessedly unjust, which cd never be admitted, & if admitted must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we wished to last forever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences of suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been sd that the want of energy in the large states wd be a security to the small. It was forgotten that this want of energy proceeded from the supposed security of the States agst all external danger. Let each state depend on itself for its security, & let apprehensions arise of danger, from distant powers or from neighbouring States, & the languishing condition of all the States, large as well as small, wd soon be transformed into vigorous & high toned Govts. His great fear was that their Govts wd then have too much energy, that these might not only be formidable in the large to the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of all. The same causes which have rendered the old world the Theatre of incessant wars, & have banished liberty from the face of it, wd soon produce the same effects here. The weakness & jealousy of the small States wd quickly introduce some regular military force agst sudden danger from their powerful neighbours. The example wd be followed by others, and wd soon become universal. In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defence agst foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable, whether the best concerted system of absolute power in Europe cd maintain itself, in a situation, where no alarms of external danger cd tame the people to the domestic yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain was the principal cause of her being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence wch cd not be used for the purpose of oppression.—These consequences he conceived ought to be apprehended whether the States should run into a total separation from each other, or shd enter into partial confederacies. Either event wd be truly deplorable; & those who might be accessary to either, could never be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.
[119]Mr Hamilton observed that individuals forming political Societies modify their rights differently with regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are deprived of the right altogether, not having the requisite qualification of property. In some of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases and refused in others. To vote for a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property, to vote for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a higher quantum of property is required. In like manner States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States are a collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been sd that if the smaller States renounce their equality, they renounce at the same time their liberty. The truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty. Will the men composing the small States be less free than those composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 40,000 souls will lose power, if she has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to Pa having 400,000: but will the people of Del: be less free, if each citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pa He admitted that common residence within the same State would produce a certain degree of attachment; and that this principle might have a certain influence in public affairs. He thought however that this might by some precautions be in a great measure excluded: and that no material inconvenience could result from it, as there could not be any ground for combination among the States whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable distinction of interests, lay between the carrying & non-carrying States, which divides instead of uniting the largest States. No considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State of N. York into different districts of different sizes.