The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1

by United States. Constitutional Convention; James Madison

Saturday June 30. 1787. in Convention

M^r Brearly moved that the Presid^t write to the Executive of N. Hampshire, informing it that the business depending before the Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the deputies of that State. In support of his motion he observed that the difficulties of the subject and the diversity of opinions called for all the assistance we could possibly obtain, (it was well understood that the object was to add N. Hampshire to the n^o of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed from her relative size she must be adverse to).

M^r Patterson seconded the motion.

M^r Rutlidge could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a measure. They are not unapprized of the meeting, and can attend if they choose. Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint & send deputies. Are we to suspend the business until the deputies arrive? if we proceed he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could produce its effect.

M^r King, said he had written more than once as a private correspondent, & the answers gave him every reason to expect that State would be represented very shortly, if it sh^d be so at all. Circumstances of a personal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter c^d have no effect.

M^r Wilson wished to know whether it would be consistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to communicate to N. Hampshire that the business was of such a nature as the motion described. It w^d spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject; the meeting being merely voluntary—on motion of M^r Brearly Mas^ts no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a not on y^e floor. Del. not on floor. M^d div^d V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.

The motion of M^r Elseworth resumed for allowing each State an equal vote in y^e 2^d branch.

M^r Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of y^e contrary principle in the 1^st branch; and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the 1^st branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut (M^r Elseworth) had pronounced that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States North of Pen^a one only would agree to any Gen^l Government. He entertained more favorable hopes of Conn^t and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a Country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday ag^st the just principle of representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the question will be shall less than 1/4 of the U. States withdraw themselves from the Union; or shall more than 3/4 renounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial systems of States. If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would chuse to join it. The Gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that the preponderancy secured to the majority in the 1^st branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in the 2^d branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to controul in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will controul six: Seven States, according to the estimates that had been used, composed 24/90 of the whole people. It would be in the power then of less than 1/3 to overrule 2/3 whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called States? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with being told, that the one-third compose the greater number of States? The rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2^d as in the 1^st branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local, confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion, and grow with the growth of the U. States.—Much has been said of an imaginary combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes of aristocracy has been charged on it. No explanation however of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from reason & history that rivalships would be more probable than coalitions; and that there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No answer has yet been given to the observations of (M^r Madison) on this subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the other States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones? Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is all a mere illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed of aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of Gov^t or rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. It is true that a majority of States in the 2^d branch cannot carry a law ag^st a majority of the people in the 1^st. But this removes half only of the objection. Bad Govern^ts are of two sorts. 1. that which does too little. 2. that which does too much: that which fails thro' weakness; and that which destroys thro' oppression. Under which of these evils do the U. States at present groan? Under the weakness and inefficiency of its Govern^t. To remedy this weakness we have been sent to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave the U. S. fettered precisely as heretofore; with the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of y^e fair representation of the people in the 1^st branch, defeated in the 2^d. Twenty four will still controul sixty six. He lamented that such a disagreement should prevail on the point of representation, as he did not foresee that it would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the Gen^l & the local authorities. He thought the States necessary & valuable parts of a good system.

M^r Elseworth. The capital objection of M^r Wilson, "that the minority will rule the majority" is not true. The power is given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights ag^st the encroachm^ts of the Commons. No instance of a Confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States, to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for the 1^st branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary. Altho' no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations. Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports & no more were to be established would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston—Philad^a & some port of the Chesapeak? A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the Great officers. He appealed again to the obligations of the federal pact which was still in force, and which had been entered into with so much solemnity; persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the plighted faith under which each State small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general Councils. His remarks were not the result of partial or local views. The State he represented (Connecticut) held a middle rank.